Chip Supply Chain
Specimen 00 · the whole chip

Chapter 16The contest

Chapter 16: Who Controls the Chain

Since 2018 the United States has used export controls to limit China’s access to advanced chips and chipmaking tools, and China has been learning to make both.

3,459 words / 15 minSpecimen: globeUpdated 29 October 202670 sources

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Specimen 16 · Who Controls the Chain

The world, with nineteen chokepoint towns pinned in garnet. Five towns building alternatives to those chokepoints are pinned in ink: Beijing, Wuhan, Shenzhen, Hefei and Dresden. The taller the garnet pin, the tighter the chokepoint at that town’s stage of the chain. The pins are not to scale. If the globe were the size of the Earth, the tallest pin would stand about 1,000 km high.

In plain terms

work only when a country’s own firms sell something the buyer cannot get elsewhere, so few governments can use them to much effect. An export control is a rule that requires the government’s permission for a sale. The government names an item and a country or a buyer. From then on its own companies must hold a license before they ship that item to that country or buyer. The American government extends some of these rules to goods made abroad with American technology. The machines, software and chemicals used to make an advanced come from a short list of firms in the United States, the Netherlands and Japan, so those three governments can control who gets them.

In short

Japan and the Netherlands have aligned their own with the American rules on 1. China has answered by building its own tools and by restricting sales of US in China. Chinese toolmakers supplied 35 percent of China’s own chipmaking equipment market in 2025, up from 10 to 15 percent before 20222. Nvidia says the Chinese government restricted the sales of its H200 chip that the United States licensed in February 20263.

The most advanced chips come mainly from Taiwan. It held 69 percent of the world’s capacity for below 10 in 2022, by the count of the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group4.

How chip export controls work

China cannot yet make the most advanced machines, which print a ’s finest circuits5. China’s leading lithography maker, SMEE, produces only older, less precise machines, among them some types5. China has also yet to show it can make , the stacked memory beside an AI chip, .

In September 2022 US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said the United States had previously aimed to stay “only a couple of generations ahead” in some key technologies6. He said it must now keep “as large of a lead as possible” in foundational technologies such as advanced logic and memory chips6. The export rules of October 2022 were the first to apply his doctrine of a , meaning strict controls on a narrow set of technologies1. The (CSIS), a research institute in Washington, judged that those rules went beyond the old aim of staying two technology ahead of China and tried to push China’s capability back below the level it had already reached7.

US license rules can target a single buyer or a whole country, and in 2022 the rules on advanced AI chips and the tools for advanced began to cover all of China. In October 2018, for example, the (BIS), the US Commerce Department’s office, put the Chinese chip company Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit on its 8. From then on any item under US export rules needed a license to reach the company8. The 2022 rules went further and required a license for any advanced AI chip, and any tool for an advanced fab, bound for China9. BIS reviewed most applications under a , meaning it would normally refuse them9. It reviewed applications for equipment bound for the China fabs of firms headquartered in the United States or allied and partner countries 9.

Which countries lead each segment

SegmentLeaderShareBasis
lithographyNetherlands100.0%revenue, 2025
lithographyNetherlands99.3%revenue, 2025
United States71.7%revenue, 2025
United States60.3%revenue, 2025
and cleanUnited States52.6%revenue, 2025
Japan78%revenue, 2023
Japan53%revenue, 2023
logic, below 10 Taiwan69%capacity, 2022
, all nodesTaiwan81.9%market share, 2025
HBMSouth Korea82.5%revenue, 2025: SK hynix 63.2, Samsung 19.3, Micron 17.4
designUnited States65%sales, 2022
, 28 nm and aboveChina33%capacity, 2022

No country leads every segment. The United States leads four of the table’s segments. The Netherlands, Japan and Taiwan lead two each, and South Korea and China one each.

  • Equipment. TechInsights 2025 revenue by parent-company headquarters, from CSET’s ETO Supply Chain Explorer10.
  • Materials. Fuji Keizai’s survey by parent-company headquarters, as , Trade and Industry published it in December 202511.
  • Memory. Figures from the market research firm IDC, as SK hynix’s US listing prospectus relays them12.
  • Logic capacity. The Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group’s 2022 measurement of logic capacity, below 10 nm for Taiwan and at 28 nm and above for China4.

is missing from the table because no public source splits its capacity by country. The Taiwanese chipmaker TSMC does not publish one either.

How US chip export controls have changed

US chip controls grew tighter from 2020 to 2024. In August 2020 BIS widened its to require a license for any foreign-made item produced with US technology and bound for Huawei13. In 2022 BIS blocked China’s access to the most advanced AI chips and to the tools to make them1. It tightened those rules in 2023 and 20241. But in August 2025 the US government began licensing some sales of Nvidia’s H20 chip to China14. In February 2026 it began licensing small amounts of the H20014.

The United States has also approved large AI chip sales in the Gulf. In November 2025 Commerce authorized G42 of the United Arab Emirates and HUMAIN of Saudi Arabia to buy the equivalent of up to 35,000 Nvidia GB300 chips each under security and reporting conditions15. On 10 July 2026 BIS moved the United Arab Emirates into A:5, the export-control group that holds close US allies16. It named the Emirati government, G42 and eight US-headquartered AI companies as recipients that need no license for controlled AI chips and systems16.

The Export Controls page has the full timeline, with the legal citation for each rule.

Figure 16.1

US chip export controls tightened through January 2025, then partly eased

Eight US actions that shaped chip export controls

  1. Huawei and 68 affiliates added to the Entity List
  2. China-wide controls on AI chips and advanced-fab tools
  3. Performance-density test added, covering Nvidia’s A800 and H800
  4. 24 tool types, HBM controls, 140 entity listings
  5. AI Diffusion rule announced, three country tiers
  6. BIS stops enforcing the AI Diffusion rule
  7. US officials expect 15 percent or more of licensed H20 revenue
  8. H200 and MI325X move to case-by-case review
Source: Federal Register rules, BIS press releases and Nvidia filings, cited for each entry on the Export Controls timelineCSV

Renting compute abroad and chip smuggling

Firms can use controlled chips without any chip crossing a border, because renting out time on a chip does not count as exporting it17. A Singapore data center selling time on an H200 already installed there, for example, moves nothing across a border17. The of January 2025 required a license for advanced AI chips bound anywhere in the world18. For the data centers it approved, it said that API access to a model, and rented capacity for , “are not prohibited”18. On 13 May 2025 the Commerce Department said it would rescind the rule and told BIS officials not to enforce it19.

The American rules reach that trade through the firms holding the chips. A license under the 15 January 2026 rule for H200-class chips bound for requires the applicant to obtain a description of the recipient’s know-your-customer procedures20. These are the recipient’s checks on who its customers are. The applicant must also obtain the recipient’s list of customers renting computing power in China and seven other places, among them Russia and Iran20. The recipient must also promise that no algorithm trained on the chips is served to blacklisted or military 20.

Smugglers route chips past the controls through Southeast Asia. Since 14 July 2025 Malaysia has required a permit to export, transship or transit any high-performance US-origin AI chip21. On 25 March 2026 the Justice Department announced charges against three people accused of using Thai companies’ names to order servers with export-controlled chips for China22. The orders included one for $170 million that was never completed22.

In July 2025 the US House of Representatives’ select committee on China cited estimates that a median of 140,000 chips were smuggled to China in 202423. A bill in Congress, the Chip Security Act, would require location verification on controlled chips within 180 days of enactment24. The House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the House version 42–0 on 26 March 202625.

The Netherlands, Japan, Korea and Europe

US tool controls alone would only shift the sales to Dutch and Japanese suppliers, so US controls depend on those two governments. Both have aligned their own controls on with the American rules1.

  • The Netherlands. The Dutch government began requiring export licenses for advanced deep-ultraviolet tools on 1 September 2023 and widened the controls in September 202426. On 1 April 2025 it extended them to measurement and inspection tools27.
  • Japan. Japan’s controls on advanced manufacturing equipment took effect on 23 July 2023, apply to all destinations and name no country28.
  • US rules for South Korean fabs in China. BIS revoked the that let Samsung’s and SK hynix’s China subsidiaries and Intel Semiconductor (Dalian) receive US equipment without individual licenses, effective 31 December 202529. BIS said it would license those fabs to keep running, but not to expand capacity or upgrade technology30. SK hynix, which bought the Dalian fab from Intel, received an annual BIS license in December 2025 to ship approved US equipment to its China fabs during 202631.

A BIS rule effective 29 September 2025 extended Entity List restrictions to any company at least 50 percent owned by one or more listed firms32. The rule reached Nexperia, a Nijmegen chipmaker that supplies Europe’s car industry, and the Dutch government said it worked to secure an exemption for the company33. On 30 September the Dutch economy minister invoked the Goods Availability Act against Nexperia34. He cited governance failures that risked moving technology out of Europe34. The order aimed to keep Nexperia’s production capabilities available to Europe in an emergency33.

On 4 October the Chinese authorities imposed an export control on Nexperia’s operations in China, so deliveries from those operations to customers needed an export license35. The Dutch government said uncertainty over licensing and long processing times caused chip shortages among Nexperia’s customers and stopped production at some companies35.

Both the US rule and the Dutch order were suspended in November. On 10 November BIS suspended its rule until 9 November 202636. The minister suspended his order on 19 November33. He cited constructive meetings with the Chinese authorities and the measures they had taken to ensure the supply of chips to Europe and the rest of the world33. Europe holds a in leading-edge lithography, but none in the mature-node chips its car industry uses.

A bill in the US Congress would push allies to match US limits on chipmaking tools sold to China. The MATCH Act, a bill introduced on 8 April 2026, would ban sales of immersion deep-ultraviolet to China37. It would also restrict exports to, and servicing of, every chipmaking plant run by five Chinese companies, CXMT, Hua Hong, Huawei, SMIC and YMTC37. It would give allies 150 days to match those limits before the United States extends its own controls to foreign-made items that use US software, technology or components37.

China’s response to the chip controls

China has answered by replacing foreign chips at home, restricting some American suppliers, limiting its exports of minerals and building its own chipmaking tools. In 2024 China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology reportedly told Chinese telecom operators to strip foreign chips out of their networks by 20272.

China has also taken measures against American suppliers. On 21 May 2023 the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) said that products sold in China by Micron, the American memory maker, had failed a cybersecurity review38. It said operators of critical information infrastructure in China should stop buying them38. In September 2025 the CAC reportedly told firms including ByteDance and Alibaba to cancel Nvidia orders39. Nvidia says the Chinese government restricted the H200 sales that the United States licensed in February 20263. It says China had earlier restricted licensed H20 sales too3.

(MOFCOM) has also restricted exports of minerals.

  • 3 December 2024. MOFCOM banned exports of , germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the United States, one day after the American chip rules40.
  • 4 April 2025. It required export licenses for seven 41.
  • 9 October 2025. It announced that from 1 December 2025 foreign firms would need its license to export listed goods made abroad with Chinese rare earths worth 0.1 percent or more of their value42. MOFCOM suspended that rule on 7 November 2025 until 10 November 202643.
  • 9 November 2025. MOFCOM suspended its ban on exports of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the United States until 27 November 202644. It acted after Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met at the Asia-Pacific summit in October 202545.

China’s suspension of its October 2025 controls did not cover the April 2025 licensing rules for seven rare earths43.

Chinese toolmakers are winning a growing share of their home market. They held 10 to 15 percent of it before 2022, 25 percent in 2024 and 35 percent in 20252. In March 2026 CSIS put their share of the Chinese market for etch and deposition tools at 40 percent2. But in September 2025 CSIS judged that making its own extreme-ultraviolet machines remained firmly out of China’s reach despite massive state investment5.

Chinese chipmakers remain behind at the leading edge, where TSMC makes 2 nm chips46. SMIC’s most advanced process, N+3, reaches the of TSMC’s 6 process without extreme-ultraviolet scanners47. It prints its tightest layers in on deep-ultraviolet tools (see figure 04.2)47.

In September 2025 the research firm SemiAnalysis conservatively put SMIC’s capacity at 7 nm and below at 45,000 by the end of 202548. It expected 60,000 in 2026 and 80,000 in 202748. Those figures count wafers, and how many working chips they give depends on , the share of chips on a wafer that work.

SemiAnalysis judged that memory would limit China’s output of AI chips before logic wafers did48. It expected Huawei to ship about 805,000 of its Ascend AI chips in 2025, with made by both TSMC and SMIC48. SemiAnalysis says Huawei got Ascend dies made at TSMC, in violation of export controls, while SMIC ramped up its own production48. By its count, China had procured roughly 13 million memory stacks, enough for about 1.6 million Ascend 910C packages48. It expected CXMT, China’s own memory maker, to make only about 2 million stacks in 2026, enough for 250,000 to 300,000 more packages48.

Figure 16.2

China’s own memory could fill only 250,000 to 300,000 more Ascend packages in 2026

Huawei’s Ascend AI chip packages, shipped in 2025 and possible from China’s memory, as SemiAnalysis estimated in September 2025Ascend packages

SemiAnalysis expected CXMT, China’s own memory maker, to make only about 2 million stacks in 2026, enough for 250,000 to 300,000 more packages.

Huawei’s Ascend AI chip packages, shipped in 2025 and possible from China’s memory, as SemiAnalysis estimated in September 2025
Huawei’s expected shipments, 2025805,000 Ascend packages
From the 13 million memory stacks China procured1.6 million Ascend packages
From CXMT’s memory made in 2026, about 2 million stacks250,000 to 300,000 Ascend packages
Source: Huawei Ascend Production Ramp: Die Banks, TSMC Continued Production, HBM is The Bottleneck 48CSV

Huawei said in September 2025 that its Ascend 950 chips, due in 2026, would carry high-bandwidth memory of its own design49. It gave no figure for how much of that memory it would make49.

Figure 16.3

China’s revenue share fell at all four largest toolmakers after fiscal 2024

China’s share of revenue at the four largest chip-tool makers, peak fiscal year and latest

China’s share of revenue at the four largest chip-tool makers, peak fiscal year and latest
ASML, FY202436.1%
ASML, FY202529.1%
Applied Materials, FY202437.2%
Applied Materials, FY202530.1%
Lam Research, FY202442.2%
Lam Research, FY202633.8%
Tokyo Electron, FY202444.4%
Tokyo Electron, FY202634.1%
Source: ASML 2025 Form 20-F (total net sales), Applied Materials and Lam Research 10-K filings and Tokyo Electron FY2024 and FY2026 consolidated financial statements, each China share computed from the filing’s sales by region 50CSV

CHIPS Act, Big Fund, Rapidus and other subsidies

The US government helps pay for new chip plants with grants and a tax credit. The authorized about $52.7 billion for manufacturing incentives, research and workforce support2. By July 2025 Commerce had awarded $30.9 billion of direct funding to 19 companies for 40 projects51. The grants covered a median 14.2 percent of each project’s capital cost51. Commerce took a federal tax credit, the Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit, into account when it set the size of those grants51. Since the One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025, the credit covers 35 percent of investment in an advanced chip plant placed in service after 2025, up from 25 percent51.

On 22 August 2025 the US government agreed to take a 9.9 percent stake in Intel by buying $8.9 billion of its stock52. Of that sum, $5.7 billion was to come from CHIPS Act grants that Intel had been awarded but not yet paid52. The other $3.2 billion was to come from Intel’s award under Secure Enclave, a program to supply trusted and secure chips to the US Department of Defense52.

The United States has also used tariffs to draw chip investment. In January 2026 the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States signed a memorandum on investment53. Under it, Taiwanese chip and technology firms are to invest $250 billion in US semiconductor, energy and AI production53. In the same memorandum the United States agreed to cap some of its national-security tariffs on Taiwanese goods at 15 percent53. On 16 July 2026 TSMC announced another $100 billion for four more Arizona fabs, bringing its total Arizona investment to $265 billion54.

The European Commission says the EU still depends on other countries for advanced chip manufacturing55. On 3 June 2026 the Commission proposed a Chips Act 2.0 to support advanced chip production in the EU55.

Japan backs a homegrown chipmaker, Rapidus. Rapidus began prototyping 2 nm at its IIM-1 plant in July 202556. In February 2026 it raised another 267.6 billion yen, about $1.7 billion, from Japan’s Information-Technology Promotion Agency (IPA) and 32 companies, aiming for 2 nm mass production by 202757. By June 2026 it had raised 424.95 billion yen in equity in all, after a further 150 billion yen from the IPA58.

CSIS puts China’s cumulative state funding for chips since 2014 at an estimated $150 billion and calls the CHIPS Act substantially smaller in scale2. The latest round of China’s , the Big Fund, reached $47 billion59. That round, the fund’s third, was set up in May 202460.

Figure 16.4

Intel led CHIPS Act direct funding with $7.865 billion by July 2025

CHIPS Act direct funding awarded, by firm, as of July 2025

CHIPS Act direct funding awarded, by firm, as of July 2025
Intel$7.9B
TSMC$6.6B
Micron$6.4B
Samsung$4.7B
Texas Instruments$1.6B
GlobalFoundries$1.6B
SK hynix$0.5B
Amkor$0.4B
GlobalWafers$0.4B
Hemlock Semiconductor$0.3B
Source: GAO-26-107882, Semiconductors: Information on Projects Funded to Strengthen U.S. Supply Chain 51CSV

Taiwan, TSMC and the silicon shield

The world relies on Taiwan for most of its advanced chips. Taiwan’s foundries held 81.9 percent of the world’s contract chipmaking market in 2025, according to the Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association’s August 2026 report61. TSMC makes its 2 nm chips only in Taiwan46. Taiwan held 69 percent of the world’s logic capacity below 10 nm in 20224.

TSMC’s advanced packaging capacity could not keep up with demand. Asked in October 2025 how much packaging capacity he would add, TSMC’s chairman said only that the company was “working very hard to narrow the gap between the demand and supply”62. He called wafer and packaging capacity both “very tight”62.

The argument holds that this deters an attack on Taiwan, because so many countries rely on its chips46. The Stimson Center calls that open to debate, though many Taiwanese believe it46.

With an eye to that shield, Taiwan’s rules keep TSMC’s newest process at home first46. As a result, TSMC’s Arizona fabs have run a generation behind its fabs in Taiwan46. The Stimson Center expected 2 nm production in Arizona in 2028 at the earliest46. TSMC said in October 2025 that it was “preparing to upgrade our technologies faster to N2 and more advanced process technologies in Arizona”63. The four Arizona fabs it announced in July 2026 are to run at 2 nm or more advanced54.

TSMC has also announced two advanced packaging fabs for Arizona64. But TSMC’s work in Taiwan rests on a local supply chain of more than 300 firms, which the Stimson Center judged extremely difficult to copy in the United States46. The US push for chip plants at home has raised fears in Taiwan that the shield could weaken46.

What each country gains and loses

  • Taiwan and Korea. Fabs built abroad add capacity without taking any away from Taiwan and Korea. TSMC makes its 2 nm chips only in Taiwan46. Korean firms took 82.5 percent of the world’s high-bandwidth memory revenue in 2025, by the market research firm IDC’s count12.
  • The Netherlands and Japan. Their toolmakers build the controlled machines, so the two governments gain a say in who gets them. China accounts for a falling share of the firms’ sales. At ASML, China’s share of net system sales fell from 41 percent in 2024 to 33 percent in 202565. That measure leaves out ASML’s service and field option sales, which come from servicing and upgrading machines already installed66. Against total net sales, the measure in the chart, it fell from 36.1 percent to 29.1 percent50. At Tokyo Electron, China’s share of sales fell from 44.4 percent in the year to March 2024 to 34.1 percent in the year to March 202667. The company said China’s share of its sales dropped to 26.8 percent in the quarter to March 2026 because spending on leading-edge nodes grew faster than spending on mature nodes68.
  • The United States. The Semiconductor Industry Association, using data from World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Gartner and Omdia, put US firms’ share of all chip sales in 2025 at 53.4 percent, the highest since 198469. US firms also took 65 percent of the world’s logic chip sales in 202270. Commerce expects the CHIPS-funded projects to lift the US share of global leading-edge logic chip manufacturing from 0 percent in 2022 to 20 percent by 203051.
  • China. Chinese suppliers are replacing foreign ones at home, most visibly in mature-node and commodity chips2. In September 2025 SemiAnalysis expected China to make fewer Ascend chips in 2026 than in 2025 unless memory was smuggled in, because its own memory maker could supply too little48.

Flashcards

Recall each answer, then turn the card.

Card 1 of 5. Question

What does a country need for its export controls to work?

Card 1 of 5. Answer

Its own firms must sell something the buyer cannot get elsewhere.

Reread: The shape of the contest

Sources (70)

Source tiers A company filings, governments, standards bodies, universities and research institutions. B SemiAnalysis, Reuters, the Financial Times and Nikkei Asia.

  1. AWhere the Chips Fall: U.S. Export Controls Under the Biden Administration from 2022 to 2024Center for Strategic and International Studies · 12 December 2024
  2. AChina’s Localization Drive in Semiconductors Gains Impetus from Allied Chip Export ControlsCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 24 March 2026
  3. ANvidia, quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 26 July 2026U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Nvidia) · 26 August 2026
  4. AEmerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainBoston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association · May 2024 · p. 14
  5. ABreakthroughs or Boasts? Assessing Recent Chinese Lithography AdvancementsCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 24 September 2025
  6. ARemarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies SummitThe White House · 16 September 2022
  7. AChoking off China’s Access to the Future of AICenter for Strategic and International Studies · 11 October 2022
  8. AAddition of an Entity to the Entity ListFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 30 October 2018
  9. AImplementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List ModificationFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 13 October 2022
  10. ADocumentation: Semiconductor Supply Chain DatasetEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
  11. AMETI, Semiconductor and digital industry strategy: future direction (半導体・デジタル産業戦略の今後の方向性), 23 December 2025Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan) · 23 December 2025 · p. 8
  12. ASK hynix, prospectus on Form 424B4 dated 10 July 2026U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by SK hynix) · 10 July 2026
  13. AAddition of Huawei Non-U.S. Affiliates to the Entity List, the Removal of Temporary General License, and Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule)Federal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 20 August 2020
  14. ANvidia, annual report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 25 January 2026U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Nvidia) · 25 February 2026
  15. AStatement on UAE and Saudi Chip ExportsU.S. Department of Commerce · November 2025
  16. AEnhanced Favorable Treatment for the United Arab Emirates Under the Export Administration RegulationsFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 14 July 2026
  17. A15 CFR 734.13 -- Export.Electronic Code of Federal Regulations · 3 June 2016
  18. AFramework for Artificial Intelligence DiffusionFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 15 January 2025
  19. ADepartment of Commerce Announces Rescission of Biden-Era Artificial Intelligence Diffusion Rule, Strengthens Chip-Related Export ControlsU.S. Bureau of Industry and Security · 13 May 2025
  20. ARevision to License Review Policy for Advanced Computing CommoditiesU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 15 January 2026
  21. AExport, transshipment and transit of high-performance AI chips of US origin now subject to a Strategic Trade PermitMinistry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI), Malaysia · 14 July 2025
  22. AChinese National and Two U.S. Citizens Charged with Conspiring to Smuggle Artificial Intelligence Technology to ChinaU.S. Department of Justice · 25 March 2026
  23. AProtecting U.S. Tech: China Committee and Bipartisan, Bicameral Leaders Unite to Stop CCP AI Chip SmugglingU.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party · 7 July 2025
  24. AS.1705 – Chip Security Act, 119th Congress (2025-2026), bill textU.S. Congress (Congress.gov, Library of Congress) · 8 May 2025
  25. AUNANIMOUS: Bipartisan Huizenga Legislation to Curb AI Chip Smuggling Passes CommitteeU.S. House of Representatives (Office of Rep. Bill Huizenga) · 26 March 2026
  26. AThe Netherlands expands export control measure for advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipmentGovernment of the Netherlands · 6 September 2024
  27. AKlever: export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to be tightenedGovernment of the Netherlands · 15 January 2025
  28. ACSIS Translation: Updated Japanese Export Controls on High-Performance Semiconductor Manufacturing EquipmentCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 18 July 2023
  29. ARevocation of Validated End-User Authorizations in the People’s Republic of ChinaFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 2 September 2025
  30. ADepartment of Commerce Closes Export Controls Loophole for Foreign-Owned Semiconductor Fabs in ChinaU.S. Bureau of Industry and Security · 29 August 2025
  31. ASK hynix, prospectus on Form 424B4 dated 10 July 2026U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by SK hynix) · 10 July 2026
  32. AExpansion of End-User Controls To Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed EntitiesFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 30 September 2025
  33. AUpdate on invoking Goods Availability Act - 19 november 2025Government of the Netherlands · 19 November 2025
  34. AMinister of Economic Affairs invokes Goods Availability ActGovernment of the Netherlands · 12 October 2025
  35. ADevelopments concerning Nexperia, letter to the House of RepresentativesGovernment of the Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs) · 19 November 2025
  36. AOne Year Suspension of Expansion of End-User Controls for Affiliates of Certain Listed EntitiesFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 12 November 2025
  37. ARisch, Ricketts, Kim Introduce MATCH Act; Level the Global Playing Field for U.S. TechU.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations · 8 April 2026
  38. ACyberspace Administration of China, notice on the cybersecurity review of Micron products (美光公司在华销售的产品未通过网络安全审查), 21 May 2023Cyberspace Administration of China · 21 May 2023
  39. ABeijing blocks Nvidia sales in vote of confidence for Chinese chipmakers, the White House strikes a deal for 10 percent of Intel, and Commerce voids a $7.4B CHIPS Act grantCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 18 September 2025
  40. AMinistry of Commerce Notice 2024 No. 46: Notice Concerning Strengthening Controls on Exports of Relevant Dual-Use Items to the United StatesCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 3 December 2024
  41. AAnnouncement No.18 of 2025 of The Ministry of Commerce and The General Administration of Customs of The People’s Republic of China Announcing the decision to implement export control on some medium and heavy rare earth related itemsMinistry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China · 4 April 2025
  42. AMinistry of Commerce Notice 2025 No. 61: Announcement of the Decision to Implement Controls on Exports of Rare Earth-Related Items to Foreign Countries (translation)Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 9 October 2025
  43. AMOFCOM and GAC Announcement 2025 No. 70, suspending the October 2025 export-control measures, Announcements Nos. 55 to 58, 61 and 62 (商务部、海关总署公告2025年第70号)Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China · 7 November 2025
  44. A商务部公告2025年第72号 公布调整实施商务部公告2024年第46号的决定Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China · 9 November 2025
  45. AThe U.S.-China Trade Truce Has Not Solved the Gallium ProblemCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 11 May 2026
  46. AWhy Taiwan Fears ‘America First’ Risks Eroding Its ‘Silicon Shield’Stimson Center · 10 October 2025
  47. BIs SMIC N+3’s Metal Pitch Smaller than Intel 18A’s?SemiAnalysis · 14 June 2026
  48. BHuawei Ascend Production Ramp: Die Banks, TSMC Continued Production, HBM is The BottleneckSemiAnalysis · 8 September 2025
  49. AGroundbreaking SuperPoD Interconnect: Leading a New Paradigm for AI InfrastructureHuawei · 18 September 2025
  50. AASML Holding, annual report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2025, financial statement tableU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASML Holding) · 25 February 2026
  51. AGAO-26-107882, SEMICONDUCTORS: Information on Projects Funded to Strengthen U.S. Supply ChainU.S. Government Accountability Office · 11 December 2025
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