Chip Supply Chain
Specimen 00 · the whole chip

How AI chips are made

An introduction to the entire semiconductor supply chain.

17 paragraphs2,456 wordsabout 11 min

The chain at a glance

8 of the 15 stages are rated Extreme, meaning three or fewer firms could supply each today, or one firm holds more than half.

  1. 01Chip Design, EDA and IPExtreme concentration
  2. 02Silicon and WafersHigh concentration
  3. 03Chemicals, Gases and PhotoresistHigh concentration
  4. 04LithographyExtreme concentration
  5. 05Photomasks and PelliclesExtreme concentration
  6. 06Deposition and EtchHigh concentration
  7. 07Metrology and InspectionHigh concentration
  8. 08Transistors and the Front EndExtreme concentration
  9. 09Foundries and FabsExtreme concentration
  10. 10Memory and HBMExtreme concentration
  11. 11Advanced PackagingExtreme concentration
  12. 12Substrates and PCBsExtreme concentration
  13. 13Test and AssemblyHigh concentration
  14. 14Systems and NetworkingHigh concentration
  15. 15Data Centers and PowerHigh concentration
  1. Chapter 01Stage 1 of 15

    Chip Design, EDA and IP

    design turns an idea for a new chip into a complete blueprint. A chip holds billions of , tiny electrical switches. The blueprint fixes where each one sits and how it is wired to the others. The chip runs on a clock, and a signal has to cross those wires within one tick, less than a billionth of a second. Software from three companies, Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens, lays out the blueprint, checks it and signs it off. A , a factory that makes chips for other companies, accepts only designs that have passed that software's checks. The foundry prints each layer of the design onto silicon through a stencil called a . Changing the blueprint once the masks are made takes new masks and a few months.

    • The market for , simulation software and was about $18B in 2025, with Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens EDA holding over 85%, counting Ansys as part of Synopsys source
    • Synopsys reported $7.054B of revenue for fiscal year 2025, the twelve months to 31 October 2025, of which Ansys contributed $756.6M after the July close source

    Who leadsSynopsys USCadence USSiemens EDA US

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  2. Chapter 02Stage 2 of 15

    Silicon and Wafers

    Every is built on a , a thin round slice of silicon about 30 centimeters across that carries hundreds of chips at once. Making one starts with quartz rock, which is silicon bound to oxygen. The silicon is refined until metal impurities are no more than a few parts per billion. It is then melted, and a small seed crystal is lowered to the surface and drawn slowly back up. The melt freezes onto the seed as one long cylinder, a single crystal with its atoms lined up in one unbroken pattern from end to end. Saws cut the cylinder into discs, and each disc is polished to a mirror finish and made extremely flat across its whole face. In 2025 the top five wafer makers served around 75 percent of the world market, and none of them is American or Chinese.

    • Worldwide shipments rose 5.8% to 12,973 million square inches in 2025 while revenue fell 1.2% to $11.4 billion source
    • The top five wafer makers serve around 75% of the semiconductor silicon wafer market, which Siltronic sizes at $11.4bn for 2025 source

    Who leadsShin-Etsu Handotai JPSUMCO JPGlobalWafers TW

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  3. Chapter 03Stage 3 of 15

    Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist

    is a coating that changes wherever light hits it. A machine spins a coat of it, thinner than a soap bubble, across the . Light shines through a stencil onto the coat, and a liquid wash then takes away the parts the light reached. What remains is a pattern, and the next machine cuts that pattern into the wafer beneath, a step called . Hundreds of other chemicals, gases and materials lay down layers, strip them off and clean the wafer between steps. The are purified until metal and other impurities are down to parts per trillion, the Japanese chemical maker Sumitomo Chemical said in 2021. A chipmaker has to test and approve each new resist in its own factory before using it. Even a resist that passes the first time takes seven to 17 months to approve, the Semiconductor Industry Association wrote in 2023. Japanese companies held 78 percent of world photoresist sales in 2023, by a Fuji Keizai survey that Japan's trade ministry reproduced.

    • A January 2021 brief by Georgetown University's CSET, citing a 2019 estimate, put Japan's share of the semiconductor market at 90% and found that China could not make resists source
    • Japanese companies held 78% of world photoresist sales in 2023, counted by company nationality in Fuji Keizai data published by in December 2025 source

    Who leadsJSR JPTokyo Ohka Kogyo JPAir Liquide FR

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  4. Chapter 04Stage 4 of 15

    Lithography

    prints the pattern of a circuit onto the . A machine holds a stencil of one layer of the circuit up to a light source and projects the image, four times smaller, onto the silicon. The shorter the wavelength of the light, the finer the lines a machine can print. A machine can still print lines narrower than its light's wavelength. shine the light through a layer of water between lens and wafer, which lets them print smaller features with the same light. ASML rates its NXT:2150i immersion scanner at features of 38 or less with argon fluoride laser light. Air soaks up light, the shortest in use, so machines that print with it work in a vacuum. Only ASML, a Dutch company, makes them. are government rules on who a company may sell to. Every advanced passes through ASML's machines, so export controls on ASML affect all advanced chipmaking.

    • ASML sold 48 systems in 2025, versus 44 in 2024 source
    • ASML's total net sales were EUR 32.7 billion in 2025 at a 52.8% source

    Who leadsASML NLNikon JPCanon JP

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  5. Chapter 05Stage 5 of 15

    Photomasks and Pellicles

    A is the stencil that prints from, at least one for each layer of a . The same mask prints its layer on after wafer, so one mask shapes millions of chips. The most complicated layers are printed with (EUV) light, and the rest can often be printed with light shone through a quartz plate. No glass lets EUV light through, so the mask for those layers is a mirror. The mirror is built up from about forty pairs of thin layers, and the light bounces off it. A dark pattern drawn on top of the mirror soaks up the light wherever no line should print. Any speck of dust on the mask repeats on every wafer it prints. So a thin membrane on a frame, called a , sits just above the mask and catches dust where it is too far out of focus to print. Japan's AGC and Hoya are two of the three firms that make those mirrors.

    • AGC calls itself the world's only maker of that handles every step from glass material to coating. In April 2023 it said its capacity would grow by about 30% in 2025 under a supply-chain program of , Japan's industry ministry source
    • Hoya says it holds an exceptionally high share of the mask blank market, and that customers may gradually start buying EUV blanks from more than one supplier source

    Who leadsAGC JPHoya JPLasertec JP

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  6. Chapter 06Stage 6 of 15

    Deposition and Etch

    and build the itself, one layer at a time. Deposition lays down a thin film, sometimes only a few atoms thick. prints a pattern on it. Etch then eats away everything the pattern does not protect, and the next film goes down on top. Making one chip takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps, the Semiconductor Industry Association estimated in 2025. Some of the holes the etch cuts in memory chips are more than 50 times deeper than they are wide, like a finger-wide shaft about a meter deep. The film has to coat them right to the bottom. The etch has to eat one material and leave the one beside it untouched. Applied Materials and Lam Research in America, Tokyo Electron in Japan and ASM International in the Netherlands make most of these machines. Chinese toolmakers have gained share in both kinds of tool since 2019.

    • Producing one takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps, depending on how complex it is. A part-finished chip can cross international borders 70 or more times (SIA, 2025, with the border-crossing figure from a 2020 Accenture and Global Semiconductor Alliance study) source
    • Global sales of reached $135.1B in 2025, up 15% from $117.1B in 2024, with wafer processing equipment up 12% (SEMI) source

    Who leadsApplied Materials USLam Research USTokyo Electron JP

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  7. Chapter 07Stage 7 of 15

    Metrology and Inspection

    (measurement) and inspection are a 's quality control. Between the steps that build a , another machine looks the over. It checks whether the lines are the right width, whether this layer landed squarely on the last one, and whether a speck of dirt has killed a circuit. The main chip in an , the one that does the calculating, is one of the largest cut from a wafer. A bigger chip is a bigger target for a speck. In a textbook example with the same density of specks, 49.2 percent of chips 1 centimeter on a side come out flawless, but only 11.3 percent of chips 2 centimeters on a side. In 2025 one American firm, KLA, held 56.8 percent of the market for these tools, by CSET's count from TechInsights data. So a chip factory, or fab, cut off from KLA would find fewer of the faults that make its chips fail.

    • is (1 + D0A/a) to the power minus a, where a is 3 to 4 for modern , so die yield falls as and area grow source
    • KLA became the largest supplier of tools for advanced -level packaging in calendar 2025, adding 14 percentage points of share and growing that revenue about 70% source

    Who leadsKLA USApplied Materials USLasertec JP

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  8. Chapter 08Stage 8 of 15

    Transistors and the Front End

    The of a is the part that builds the , the billions of tiny switches in every . Each switch works like a valve. Current runs along a narrow strip of silicon called the channel, and a small voltage on a gate above the strip opens or shuts the flow. For decades chipmakers made the strips shorter, so they switched faster and more of them fit on a chip. But once the strip gets short enough, the valve stops sealing. Current leaks through even when the gate is off, and the chip burns power doing nothing. The newest kind of transistor, called , cuts this leak by wrapping the gate around all four sides of the strip. Building them takes a long sequence of steps that have to run in exact order. Only three companies, TSMC, Intel and Samsung, make these switches . In 2024 the United States put a worldwide license requirement on the know-how for building them, with an exception for countries that impose matching controls.

    • TSMC N2 entered in 4Q25, its first gate-all-around source
    • TSMC rates N2P at 18% more speed at the same power, 36% less power at the same speed, 1.2x and 1.15x chip density over N3E source

    Who leadsTSMC TWIntel USSamsung Foundry KR

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  9. Chapter 09Stage 9 of 15

    Foundries and Fabs

    A is a company that makes for other companies in its , or fabs. Those companies send in their designs, and the foundry runs them all through the same building on the same tools. The building costs tens of billions of dollars, and the air inside is cleaner than in an operating room. Even so, each , the silicon disc the chips are built on, moves from machine to machine inside sealed boxes and never touches that air. No chip company sells enough of one product to fill such a factory on its own, so chip companies share a handful of them. TSMC runs the biggest, and all six of its largest plants are in Taiwan, so a political crisis over Taiwan would affect the whole chip supply.

    • 7 and below was 79% of TSMC's revenue in 3Q26, on revenue of $46.72 billion at a 66.4% source
    • TSMC defines a GIGAFAB as a with monthly capacity above 100,000 wafers. It operates six, whose combined capacity exceeded 13 million 12-inch equivalent wafers in 2025 source

    Who leadsTSMC TWIntel Foundry USSamsung Foundry KR

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  10. Chapter 10Stage 10 of 15

    Memory and HBM

    , or HBM, is where an AI keeps the numbers it is working on, and it is built to hand them over fast. A memory maker tiny holes into each memory , fills them with copper and grinds the wafer until the copper shows through its back. It tests each of the wafer's chips and stacks up to sixteen good ones into a cube, with every layer wired to the ones below. The cube then sits beside the processor, the chip that does the calculating. Stacking is the hard part because each chip is ground thinner than a human hair and the finished cube has to stay within a set height. One chip that fails after stacking can scrap the whole cube. Only SK hynix, Samsung and Micron make HBM , and a single entry in the US export rules covers HBM from all three.

    • The standard sets a 2,048-bit interface with 32 channels, 2 per stack at 8 Gb/s per pin, and up to 64 GB per stack source
    • An HBM3E cube has 1,024 I/O pins split into 16 independent channels, or 32 pseudo-channels. Micron's runs above 9.2 Gbps per pin for more than 1.2 TB/s per stack source

    Who leadsSK hynix KRSamsung KRMicron US

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  11. Chapter 11Stage 11 of 15

    Advanced Packaging

    Packaging joins finished into one component and mounts them on a small , called a , wired far more coarsely than the chips themselves. A , which prints a chip's circuits, can cover only a rectangle about the size of a postage stamp in one shot. Many leading , Nvidia's Blackwell among them, need more logic than fits in that rectangle. So they are built from several chips, called , set side by side on an , a layer of much finer wiring that links them and sits on the substrate. Stacks of memory chips sit on the same interposer, a few millimeters away. The interposer is either one piece of silicon or layers of fine copper wiring that often carry small where the links are densest. Silicon expands less than the resin beneath it when heated, so the package can warp and its joints crack. Preventing that in is hard. Nvidia, Google, AMD and Amazon all use TSMC's version, called , made in Taiwan.

    • A 's maximum exposure field is 26 mm by 33 mm, or 858 source
    • TSMC said in April 2026 that it was producing 5.5- and planning larger versions source

    Who leadsTSMC TWIntel USASE Technology TW

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  12. Chapter 12Stage 12 of 15

    Substrates and PCBs

    A is the adapter between a and the under it. The chip's connections are finer than a human hair, but the board is wired in millimeters. The substrate is built in layers, like plywood, around a stiff core of and resin. Thin sheets of epoxy film are pressed onto both faces of the core. A laser burns holes through each sheet, and copper plated into the holes carries signals from one layer to the next. Every added layer is another set of holes that can fail. A handful of firms build these substrates. Japan's Ajinomoto dominates the film, and Japan's Nitto Boseki dominates the low-expansion glass cloth in the core.

    • TSMC's chief executive told the July 2026 earnings call that packaging capacity is so tight it now limits customers' growth source
    • Ajinomoto first developed its in 1999 and says major semiconductor manufacturers have used it as the de facto standard ever since source

    Who leadsAjinomoto JPNitto Boseki JPIbiden JP

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  13. Chapter 13Stage 13 of 15

    Test and Assembly

    Before a can be sold, a machine called a has to check that it works. While the chips are still on the , thousands of needles press onto small metal pads on each one. The tester sends signals through the needles and reads what comes back, and any chip that fails goes no further. A modern is a dozen expensive pieces bonded into one package, and if one piece is bad, all of them are thrown away. So the industry now tests chips earlier, at higher temperatures and for longer, to make weak ones fail during testing before they reach a finished product. Two firms, Advantest in Japan and Teradyne in the United States, sell most of the testers.

    • Advantest estimates that it held about 65% of the market by value in calendar 2025. It puts its share of (SoC) testers at 66%, up about 10 points in a year, and of memory test at about 60% source
    • The tester market was about $9.0 billion in calendar 2025: $6.9 billion of SoC testers, up about 68% year on year, and $2.1 billion of memory testers source

    Who leadsAdvantest JPTeradyne USASE TW

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  14. Chapter 14Stage 14 of 15

    Systems and Networking

    One AI is not enough to train a model. So seventy-two of them are wired together in a , a cabinet the size of a wardrobe, and run as one computer. Each chip sits on its own board and draws more than a thousand amps, several times the current a whole house is wired to carry. The chips have to swap results with each other all the time. A copper wire can carry those signals only a few meters before they fade, so the longer links send them as light down glass fiber. Many companies can build the rack, but in 2026 the lasers that send the light were scarce.

    • carries 3,600 per and a moves 260 TB/s, by Nvidia's Rubin launch release of January 2026 source
    • A GB300 NVL72 rack holds 18 compute trays and 9 NVLink switch trays with two NVSwitch each, and draws up to 142 source

    Who leadsNvidia USBroadcom USFoxconn TW

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  15. Chapter 15Stage 15 of 15

    Data Centers and Power

    A data center feeds electricity to the machines inside it and carries away the heat they give off. One of AI , a cabinet taller than a door, can draw 142 . Every watt of it comes back out as heat, and liquid piped through the rack carries the heat away. A large training site already holds more than a hundred thousand chips. The newest sites are planned in gigawatts. One gigawatt is the whole output of a large power station, and OpenAI's seven Stargate sites in the United States add up to more than nine of them by 2029. Getting that much electricity to the site is harder than putting up the building. and heavy switches connect a site to the grid, and turbines make the power. All of them come from a few suppliers and take years to arrive.

    • A draws up to 142 , fed by eight 33 kW source
    • Nvidia's 800-volt DC architecture is designed for racks from 100 kW to over 1 MW, with megawatt racks from 2027. Nvidia is making the change because the 54-volt distribution in existing racks begins to hit physical limits once racks exceed 200 kW source

    Who leadsGE Vernova USHitachi Energy CHSiemens Energy DE

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  16. Chapter 16

    The Economics of AI Chips

    A is the list of parts inside a product and what each one costs. Epoch AI estimated in December 2025 that Nvidia's B200, an AI from its Blackwell line, cost about $6,400 to build. The two , the pieces of silicon that do the calculating, cost about $900 of that. The beside them accounted for about half, and the packaging that wires the and memory together cost more than the dies. Three firms, SK hynix, Samsung and Micron, dominate the world market for that memory. One Taiwanese firm, TSMC, does that packaging.

    • Epoch AI estimated in December 2025 that a B200 cost about $6,400 to build, within a range of $5,700 to $7,300. Reports in March 2024 put its selling price at $30,000 to $40,000 per source
    • In that estimate memory was half the cost, $2,900 for 192 GB of at $14 to $17 per gigabyte. The cost $900 source
  17. Chapter 17

    Who Controls the Chain

    An is a rule that requires the government's permission for a sale. The government names an item and a country or a buyer. From then on its own companies must hold a license before they ship that item to that country or buyer. The American government extends some of these rules to goods made abroad with American technology. Few governments can use such a rule to much effect, because it works only when their own firms sell something the buyer cannot get elsewhere. The machines, software and chemicals used to make an advanced come from a short list of firms in the United States, the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea. China can copy the simpler machines within a few years. It cannot yet copy the machine that prints the finest circuits, or the chemicals that machine needs. It has also yet to show it can make , the stacked memory beside an AI chip, .

    • Taiwan held 69% of the world's logic chipmaking capacity below 10 in 2022 and South Korea 31%, on the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group's count source
    • Korean suppliers took 82.5% of 2025 revenue (SK hynix 63.2%, Samsung 19.3%) and 76.9% in the first quarter of 2026. The figures come from the market research firm IDC, relayed in SK hynix's July 2026 US prospectus source

Flashcards

Ten cards on the whole chain. Recall each answer, then turn the card.

Card 1 of 10Question

Whose software checks a chip design before a foundry will accept it?

Card 1 of 10Answer

Software from three companies: Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens EDA.

The software lays out the blueprint, checks it and signs it off, and a foundry accepts only designs that have passed its checks. In 2025 the three held over 85 percent of the market for chip design software and licensed circuit blocks, counting Ansys as part of Synopsys. Read: Chip Design, EDA and IP

AI Chips

The chips that train and run AI models, from the A100 of 2020 to the parts shipping in 2026. Each entry names the foundry, process node, memory supplier and packaging plant behind the chip wherever the maker or a cited source has published them.

Choose two chips to compare. Add up to four.

Browse all chips by maker

Packages at one scale

The logic dies are the pieces of silicon that do the computing, and the memory stacks feed them data. The interposer is the layer of wiring that connects the two, and the substrate is the small circuit board underneath.

Specs side by side

TFLOPS counts trillions of calculations a second. FP16, FP8 and FP4 are number formats that use 16, 8 and 4 bits per number. The fewer the bits, the more calculations a chip can do.

Suppliers

What each of the 226 firms makes, where it is based, and how hard it would be to replace.

What each country makes

The route of one chip

All countries Choose one to light its stops on the route

  1. 01Chip Design, EDA & IPSan Jose · US
  2. 02Silicon & WafersTokyo · JP
  3. 03Chemicals, Gases & PhotoresistKawasaki · JP
  4. 04LithographyVeldhoven · NL
  5. 05Photomasks & PelliclesYokohama · JP
  6. 06Deposition & EtchSanta Clara · US
  7. 07Metrology & InspectionMilpitas · US
  8. 08Transistors & the Front EndHsinchu · TW
  9. 09Foundries & FabsTainan · TW
  10. 10Memory & HBMIcheon · KR
  11. 11Advanced PackagingKaohsiung · TW
  12. 12Substrates & PCBsOgaki · JP
  13. 13Test & AssemblyPenang · MY
  14. 14Systems & NetworkingTaipei · TW
  15. 15Data Centers & PowerAshburn · US

No country chosen

Each numbered stop is one stage of the chain, pinned where a leading firm is based. Choose a country to see what it makes and which stages it leads.

Stages by number of firms, fewest first

Revenue is each company's latest annual figure as filed, in the currency and unit of its own report. For a company that does not report in US dollars, the dollar figure is converted at the average of the Federal Reserve's monthly exchange rates over the company's fiscal year (release G.5).

Export Controls

The main rules since 2018, what can still be sold to China, and China's share of revenue at 24 firms, from their filings.

    China share of revenue, from company filings

    China's share of the firm's revenue, by fiscal yearThe year it peakedUS export rules of Oct 2022, Oct 2023 and Dec 2024The firm changed how it counts ChinaSame scale on every panel, 0 to 60%

    Lithography

    ASMLNL · peak 36% in FY2024
    FY2021FY2025

    Deposition & Etch

    SCREEN HoldingsJP · peak 42% in year to Mar 2025
    FY2021FY2026
    Tokyo ElectronJP · peak 44% in year to Mar 2024
    FY2021FY2026
    Lam ResearchUS · peak 42% in year to Jun 2024
    FY2021FY2026
    Applied MaterialsUS · peak 37% in year to Oct 2024
    FY2021FY2025
    Veeco InstrumentsUS · peak 36% in FY2024
    FY2021FY2025

    Metrology & Inspection

    CamtekIL · peak 55% in FY2021
    FY2021FY2025
    NovaIL · peak 39% in FY2024
    FY2021FY2025
    KLAUS · peak 43% in year to Jun 2024
    FY2021FY2026
    Onto InnovationUS · peak 25% in FY2022
    FY2021FY2025

    Advanced Packaging & OSAT

    BesiNL · peak 38% in FY2021
    FY2021FY2025
    DiscoJP · peak 37% in year to Mar 2022
    FY2021FY2026

    Test

    AdvantestJP · peak 32% in year to Mar 2024
    FY2024FY2026
    TeradyneUS · peak 17% in FY2021
    FY2021FY2025

    Photomasks

    HoyaJP · peak 10% in year to Mar 2024
    FY2021FY2026

    Chemicals & Gases

    EntegrisUS · peak 21% in FY2024
    FY2021FY2025

    Foundry

    TSMCTW · peak 12% in FY2023
    FY2021FY2025

    Memory

    SK hynixKR · peak 37% in FY2021
    FY2021FY2025
    Samsung ElectronicsKR · peak 16% in FY2021
    FY2021FY2025
    MicronUS · peak 14% in year to Aug 2023
    FY2021FY2026

    AI Accelerator Vendor

    AMDUS · peak 25% in FY2021
    FY2021FY2025
    NvidiaUS · peak 26% in year to Jan 2022
    billingheadquartersFY2021FY2026

    Design & EDA

    CadenceUS · peak 17% in FY2023
    FY2021FY2025
    SynopsysUS · peak 17% in year to Oct 2022
    FY2021FY2025
    The same figures as a table

    The charts cover 24 firms, each of which gives a figure for China in its own filings. Other firms are not shown, and some, such as Lasertec, AGC and Axcelis, give no China figure. Each share is computed from the revenue amounts the firm filed, except Nova's, which its filings give only as a rounded percentage. Firms count China differently, for example by where the goods ship, where they are billed, or where the customer is based. Fiscal years are labeled by the calendar year in which they end.

    The Chain

    This page covers each of the fifteen stages of making an AI chip in detail, one chapter per stage, in the order a chip is made, from design software to the data center. Two more chapters at the end look across all the stages, at what a chip costs and who controls the chain. To help readers learn, each chapter has a 3D model, most have an animation, and every one ends with flashcards.

    How to read a chapter

    Each stage chapter opens with a chokepoint card. It rates the stage on two scales, gives a price or market size, and says where China and the United States stand.

    • Concentration. How many firms could supply the stage today. Every stage rates Extreme (three or fewer firms, or one with more than half) or High (four to six).
    • Substitutability. How hard it would be for a well-funded state or firm to build an alternative, rated Very hard, Hard or Moderately hard.
    • Price or market size. What one unit costs, or what the stage earns in a year.

    Download the chain as a PDF Download a short summary Read the summary online

    Contents

    The fifteen stages of the chain

    01Chip Design, EDA and IP

    Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens EDA sell the software used to design every leading-edge AI accelerator. In 2025 they took over 85 percent of an $18 billion market, licensed blocks included.

    02Silicon and Wafers

    Firms based in Japan, Taiwan, Germany and South Korea make most 300 mm wafers used for advanced chips. China makes most polysilicon, almost all of it for solar cells.

    03Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist

    Japanese companies held 78 percent of world photoresist sales in 2023. Supply of chip chemicals, gases and metals has been disrupted three times since 2019.

    04Lithography

    ASML, a Dutch firm, is the only maker of extreme ultraviolet scanners, the machines that print the finest layers of a chip. It sold 48 of them in 2025.

    05Photomasks and Pellicles

    Only three firms in the world make the blank plates for the masks used to print the finest layers of leading-edge chips. Japan's AGC and Hoya are two of them.

    06Deposition and Etch

    Deposition and etch tools build a chip layer by layer. They are among the chipmaking tools where Chinese toolmakers gained the most share from 2019 to 2024.

    07Metrology and Inspection

    KLA, an American firm, held 56.8 percent of the market for tools that measure and inspect wafers in 2025, by CSET's count.

    08Transistors and the Front End

    Only TSMC, Intel and Samsung make 2 nm-class transistors in volume. TSMC plans its A14 process for 2028, with more than 20 percent higher logic density than N2.

    09Foundries and Fabs

    TSMC's six largest plants are all in Taiwan. In 2025 they could make more than 13 million wafers a year, out of more than 17 million for the whole company.

    10Memory and HBM

    SK hynix, Samsung and Micron make nearly all high bandwidth memory (HBM), the stacked memory beside AI chips. SK hynix took 63.2 percent of HBM revenue in 2025.

    11Advanced Packaging

    Epoch AI estimates that in 2025 Nvidia, Google, AMD and Amazon used around 90 percent of the capacity for CoWoS, TSMC's packaging for AI chips.

    12Substrates and PCBs

    Ajinomoto, a Japanese food company, told investors in June 2026 that it holds over 95 percent of the market for the insulating film inside high-end chip packages.

    13Test and Assembly

    Testing finds bad chips before they go into an expensive package. Japan's Advantest took about 65 percent of 2025 spending on chip testers, by its own estimate.

    14Systems and Networking

    AI chips are wired together 72 to a rack and run as one computer. Many firms can assemble the racks, but lasers for the optical links between them were scarce in 2026.

    15Data Centers and Power

    By mid-2026, companies had asked to connect about 474 GW of new demand to the Texas grid, mostly for data centers. Only about 205 GW of those requests had the engineering checks done in time to enter the grid operator's first review. The large transformers that connect such sites to the grid commonly took three years to arrive in 2024.

    Across the chain

    These two chapters are not stages. They look across all fifteen, at what a chip costs and at the contest over who controls each stage.

    16The Economics of AI Chips

    Epoch AI estimated in December 2025 that Nvidia's B200 AI chip cost about $6,400 to build, mostly for memory and packaging. Its processor silicon cost about $900.

    17Who Controls the Chain

    Since 2018 the United States has used export controls to limit China's access to advanced chips and chipmaking tools, and China has been building its own.

    Chapter 1: Chip Design, EDA and IP

    Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens EDA sell the software used to design every leading-edge AI accelerator. In 2025 they took over 85 percent of an $18 billion market, licensed blocks included.

    2,262 words / 10 minSpecimen: die floorplanUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    design turns an idea for a new chip into a complete blueprint. A chip holds billions of , tiny electrical switches. The blueprint fixes where each one sits and how it is wired to the others. The chip runs on a clock, and a signal has to cross those wires within one tick, less than a billionth of a second. Software from three companies, Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens, lays out the blueprint, checks it and signs it off. A , a factory that makes chips for other companies, accepts only designs that have passed that software's checks. The foundry prints each layer of the design onto silicon through a stencil called a . Changing the blueprint once the masks are made takes new masks and a few months1.

    In short

    The US government required a license to sell design software to anyone in China from late May to 2 July 20252. Since October 2022 a narrower requirement has covered software specially made for with , a design the rule calls key to processes at 3 and below3.

    As of 2025, the think tank found Chinese design tools still far from replacing the full range of advanced capabilities US firms offer, especially for 5 nm and 3 nm chip design4. But Chinese design-software companies were winning share at older manufacturing processes, the research firm SemiAnalysis reported5.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationThree or fewer firms could supply this stage today, or one firm holds more than half of it.
    SubstitutabilityOnly three complete sets of exist6. A fourth would have to be written from nothing and approved by a 5.
    Price or market size$18Bworld market for design software, simulation software and licensed circuit blocks in 20255. SemiAnalysis put a single respin at leading-edge nodes at $50-100M in May 20265
    Who leads
    • USSynopsys 90%+ of the timing-signoff market at advanced nodes as of 20265
    • USCadence 55-60% of the hardware emulator market at advanced nodes as of 20265
    • USSiemens EDA 85%+ of physical verification, the final layout check, at advanced nodes as of 20265
    • GBArm About 50% of processor compute at the top cloud firms as of May 20267
    • USBroadcom $16.7B of AI semiconductor revenue in the third quarter of fiscal 2026, custom accelerators and networking combined8
    Where it is made
    • USUnited States Synopsys, Cadence, Broadcom, Marvell and Nvidia
    • GBUnited Kingdom Arm processor and interconnect designs licensed from Cambridge, and since 2026 its own server chip
    • TWTaiwan Alchip, Global Unichip and MediaTek: design services that carry a chip to the factory
    • ILIsrael Annapurna Labs, the AWS design house behind Trainium and Graviton
    • INIndia Nearly 20% of the world's chip design engineers, on the Indian government's count
    Why substitution is slow
    Changing one tool, such as the synthesis tool, means re-running the later steps of the design5. The foundry that makes the also specifies which tools its customers must use5.
    Where China stands

    China designs its own AI , but Huawei's most powerful chip in 2026, the Ascend 950, delivers about half the computing performance of Nvidia's H100 from 2022, on Epoch AI's estimate9. found that as of 2025 Chinese design tools were still far from replacing the full range of advanced capabilities US firms offer, especially for 5 and 3 nm chips4.

    Where the US stands

    Synopsys and Cadence, the two largest design-software vendors by 2025 revenue, are American5.

    Design is the only stage of the supply chain that happens entirely in software, and the US government has already restricted it . In late May 2025 the government required a license to sell to anyone in China2. Cadence cut off its Chinese customers until the government lifted the requirement on 2 July2.

    How it works

    How a chip is designed

    1. A blueprint. Making a chip starts with design, which turns an idea into a complete blueprint. The blueprint fixes where each of the chip’s billions of switches sits and how each one is wired to the others.
    2. One tick. The chip works in ticks, each less than a billionth of a second. On every tick a signal leaves a register, a small store that holds one number, and it has to cross its wire to the next register before the next tick.
    3. Too far. If the next register sits far away, the wire is long. The signal is still on its way when the next tick comes, so it arrives too late.
    4. Placed closer. Design software from three companies, Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens, places the parts and wires them together. Here it moves the register closer, and the signal arrives in time.
    5. Checked. The software checks that every signal arrives in time and that every shape can be printed, and a chip factory accepts only designs that pass the printing checks. The factory then prints the blueprint onto silicon through stencils, and changing it after that costs new stencils and a few months.

    Simplified. Not to scale. The floorplan follows a GPU die. One tick, less than a billionth of a second, is slowed to about two seconds.

    Design runs in five stages, all in software, and each stage's output is the next one's input.

    • Architecture. Engineers fix the shape of the : the width of the block that multiplies numbers, the amount of fast beside it and the number of stacks along the chip's edges. The output is a plan.
    • . Engineers write the plan as register-transfer-level code, RTL, in the hardware language SystemVerilog. A register is a small store on the chip that holds one number. On each tick of the chip's clock, every register takes its next value at the same moment. The code says what every register holds on every tick. The output is a text description of the whole chip.
    • Verification. A large team checks that the code does what the plan says. They run it in simulation and prove parts of it correct with mathematics. They also load it into emulators, of reprogrammable chips that behave like the design, so the chip's own software can boot before any silicon exists.
    • Physical design. Software swaps each piece of the code for a logic cell, a small ready-made circuit the has already proved it can make. It then places the cells on the chip, wires them together and proves that every signal arrives in time.
    • . Engineers hand the finished layout to the foundry, a step called tape-out. Software then turns the layout into pattern files for the , in steps that run after tape-out10. First it pre-distorts each shape so that the shape prints as drawn, a step called optical proximity correction. Then it cuts the layout into the files a reads, a step called data preparation.

    All that checking exists because each revision after tape-out, called a respin, needs at least some new masks1. In 2022 SemiAnalysis put a full mask set at more than $1 million at 28 and more than $10 million at 7 nm1. The nanometer labels name process generations, called , each finer than the last, and no longer measure anything. That year SemiAnalysis also expected 3 nm sets to push into the $40 million range1. Its May 2026 primer still puts a mask set at $40 million, and a single leading-edge respin at $50 million to $100 million5.

    The same 2022 SemiAnalysis article reported that startups had taken chips on TSMC 7 nm, then a leading-edge process, from design to tape-out for $50 million to $75 million, everything included1.

    What one photomask set costs, by node, 2022. The 28 nm and 7 nm figures are minimums

    What one photomask set costs, by node, 2022. The 28 nm and 7 nm figures are minimums
    28 nm$1M
    7 nm$10M
    3 nm$40M

    Source: SemiAnalysis, The Dark Side of the Semiconductor Design Renaissance, July 2022. The 3 nm figure was a 2022 forecast. SemiAnalysis's May 2026 EDA Market Primer puts a leading-edge mask set at $40M

    Variants and trade-offs

    Merchant GPU versus custom ASIC

    Nvidia designs its Blackwell once and sells it to everyone, so the buyer gets mature software and a resale market. A , an ASIC, is built for one company's own workload. It handles a narrower range of tasks and is tuned to that workload. Ironwood, the seventh-generation (TPU) Google announced in April 2025, carries 192 GB of memory per chip, six times its predecessor's, and delivers twice the performance per watt11. In April 2026 Google announced its eighth generation as two chips, the TPU 8t for training and the TPU 8i for , with up to twice Ironwood's performance per watt12.

    The EDA flow

    Chip design software is known as electronic design automation, or EDA. Three complete EDA flows exist, each a set of tools that covers every step from code to 6. SemiAnalysis wrote in May 2026 that no startup can replicate one by writing it from scratch5. Changing the synthesis tool, which swaps the code for logic cells, means re-running the steps that follow: placing and wiring the cells, signoff and physical verification5. Foundries also specify which signoff tools their customers must use for tape-out5.

    For chips at advanced nodes, 7 nm and below, one vendor holds most of the market inside some steps of the flow. Synopsys alone has more than 90 percent of the market for static timing analysis, the check that every signal arrives in time at the chip's rated speed5. In May 2026 SemiAnalysis put Siemens EDA's Calibre at more than 85 percent of physical verification, the final layout check5. It put Cadence's Palladium at 55 to 60 percent of hardware emulation5.

    Each leading vendor's share of its own design-software segment at advanced nodes, 7 nm and below. Lower end of each reported range

    Each leading vendor's share of its own design-software segment at advanced nodes, 7 nm and below. Lower end of each reported range
    Static timing (Synopsys PrimeTime)90%
    Physical verification (Siemens Calibre)85%
    Synthesis (Synopsys Design Compiler)84%
    Emulation (Cadence Palladium)55%

    Source: SemiAnalysis, EDA Market Primer, May 2026, table of tool-level shares at advanced nodes

    Buy the IP or build it

    Design houses license ready-made circuit blocks, known as or IP, including the processor cores, the interface controllers and the blocks that drive high-bandwidth memory. Arm licenses processor designs. In fiscal 2026 it reported $4.92 billion of revenue, $2.61 billion of it royalties7. It said it held about 50 percent of processor compute at the top cloud firms7.

    In 2026 Arm also launched the Arm AGI CPU, its first production silicon product7. By May 2026, servers built on it could be ordered from ASRock, Lenovo, Quanta and Supermicro7.

    The memory interface is hard to design, because its signals have to stay on time across thousands of microscopic into a stacked memory .

    is an open instruction set, the basic list of commands a processor understands, and it needs no license. Small RISC-V processors handle control tasks on the chip, and Nvidia uses them in every GPU13.

    Chiplets

    The caps the size of a single die, one piece of silicon14. That limit is the largest area a , the machine that prints the chip's pattern, can expose in one shot. Many large are built from , several smaller dies wired together, and is an open industry standard for the links between them inside a package15. Version 3.0 of UCIe adds faster data rates, 48 and 64 gigatransfers per second15. In a December 2024 presentation, Broadcom said its 3.5D XDSiP platform packs more than 6,000 of silicon and 12 high-bandwidth memory stacks into one package14.

    Who makes it

    Design software, simulation software and licensed blocks made up an $18 billion market in 2025, on SemiAnalysis's count5. Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens EDA took more than 85 percent of it, counting Ansys as part of Synopsys5. No other vendor had more than 5 percent of any core category5. Siemens EDA is a US-based subsidiary of the German firm Siemens16.

    Synopsys is the largest. Its own results put revenue at $7.054 billion for the fiscal year to 31 October 2025, with Ansys, bought that July, contributing $756.6 million17. Cadence, whose year ends in December, took $5.297 billion in calendar 202518.

    The two fiscal years do not line up, so any total for this market depends on which twelve months are counted. It also depends on how much of Ansys it includes, because Ansys sells to other industries too. SemiAnalysis counts Synopsys at $8 billion for calendar 2025 with Ansys included5. On the same count Cadence is second, at $5.30 billion, and Siemens EDA third, at an estimated $2.2 billion to $2.5 billion5. It puts 31 percent of Ansys's business in semiconductors and high technology, 22 percent in aerospace and 18 percent in automotive5.

    Share of revenue from design software, simulation software and licensed blocks, 2025. Synopsys includes part of Ansys's revenue

    Synopsys44%Cadence30%Siemens EDA13%All others13%

    Source: SemiAnalysis, EDA Market Primer, May 2026, table of calendar 2025 vendor shares

    Some chip firms also build custom accelerators to a customer's design and sell the finished chips. Broadcom booked $16.7 billion of AI semiconductor revenue in the third quarter of fiscal 2026, up 221 percent year over year8. That figure covers both its custom AI accelerators and its AI networking chips8.

    In October 2025 OpenAI and Broadcom said they would deploy 10 of OpenAI-designed accelerators19. Broadcom would turn the design into silicon and supply the networking around it19. In April 2026 Broadcom and Meta extended their partnership to multiple gigawatts of MTIA, Meta's custom chip, including what they called the industry's first 2 nm AI accelerator20.

    Marvell, another US firm, also builds custom AI chips to each customer's specifications21. Below Broadcom and Marvell are the Taiwanese design-service houses. They carry a customer's circuit list all the way to a finished mask set on TSMC's newest nodes. One of them, Alchip, reported $992 million of revenue in 202522.

    Chip design engineers are spread across more countries than these firms are. India alone has nearly 20 percent of the world's chip design engineers, the Indian government said in July 202523.

    The chokepoint

    Before the 2025 letters, a narrower control already applied. Since 14 October 2022, design software specially made for chips with has needed a US for national-security reasons3. The rule calls that design key to processes at 3 nm and below3. That license requirement covers exports to China24. The control carried out a December 2021 decision of the Wassenaar Arrangement, a group of countries that coordinate export controls3.

    In late May 2025 the US , the agency that issues export licenses, told the design-software vendors that sales to China now needed a license2. Cadence got its letter on 23 May2. The letter required a license to export design software and technology classified and 3E991 to any party in China, or to a Chinese anywhere2. Synopsys got its letter on 29 May and a second letter lifting the requirement on 2 July25.

    Unlike the 2022 control, the 2025 requirement came from the United States alone and took effect immediately. Synopsys's China revenue fell from 16 percent of its total in fiscal 2024 to 12 percent in fiscal 20255. SemiAnalysis links the decline to tighter export restrictions and to local design-software companies winning share at 5. SemiAnalysis also quoted Synopsys's management saying that companies Synopsys cannot sell to look for alternatives, typically local design-software and licensed-block companies5.

    In October 2025 found that only a few companies, Cadence, Synopsys and Siemens, make design software that supports the entire chip design flow of more than 40 steps6. In a January 2021 report built on 2019 market data, CSET at Georgetown University found that one Chinese firm, Empyrean, could reportedly run a complete design flow only for certain analog and mixed-signal chips26. Mixed-signal chips combine analog and digital circuits. For all other chips, Chinese designers then relied on US tools26. The report found that other Chinese tools covered only narrow parts of the design flow or supplemented US tools, and largely did not support processes at 14 nm and below26.

    In its 2025 annual report, filed in April 2026, Empyrean says it now has complete design flows for analog, memory, radio-frequency and flat-panel display circuits27. It says its digital tools cover 80 percent of the main tools for digital design28. The same report lists foundry certifications for its circuit simulator at 8, 5 and 4 nm and for its physical verification tool, the final layout check, at 28 nm29. But CSIS found that as of 2025 Chinese design tools were still far from replacing the full range of advanced capabilities US firms offer, especially for 5 nm and 3 nm chip design4.

    China can design accelerators, but it cannot finish one at the leading edge without foreign tools, or build what it designs without foreign equipment. SMIC, China's leading foundry, makes chips for Huawei9. In June 2024 CSET found that SMIC's limited 7 nm capacity forced Huawei to choose between making its most advanced phone chips and its AI chips30.

    On Epoch AI's estimates, Huawei's flagship chip for 2026, the Ascend 950, delivers about half the computing performance of Nvidia's H100, which began shipping in 20229. Epoch puts Nvidia's B300 at 6.75 times the 950's theoretical peak performance9. Epoch's median estimate is that Huawei will make about 1.5 million Ascend chips in 2026, against 5.9 million for Nvidia9. On those estimates, Huawei's 2026 output would carry less than 4 percent of the computing power Nvidia ships that year9.

    Epoch puts Huawei's chips three to four years behind Nvidia's until at least 2030, for three reasons9. SMIC cannot pack transistors as densely as TSMC, which makes Nvidia's. Chinese memory makers are only starting to produce high-bandwidth memory. And Huawei's software for programming its chips is far less mature than Nvidia's9.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 5Question

    What does chip design produce?

    Card 1 of 5Answer

    A blueprint of the chip that shows where each transistor sits and how the transistors are wired together.

    A chip factory builds only designs that have passed checks in approved design software. Reread: How it works

    Sources (30)
    1. BThe Dark Side Of The Semiconductor Design Renaissance – Fixed Costs Soaring Due To Photomask Sets, Verification, and ValidationSemiAnalysis · 24 July 2022
    2. ACADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC, Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2025-07-02 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC) · 3 July 2025
    3. AImplementation of Certain 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Decisions on Four Section 1758 TechnologiesFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 15 August 2022
    4. AThe Double-Edged Sword of Semiconductor Export Controls: Electronic Design AutomationCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 6 October 2025 · p. 33
    5. BEDA Market PrimerSemiAnalysis · 21 May 2026
    6. AThe Double-Edged Sword of Semiconductor Export Controls: Electronic Design AutomationCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 6 October 2025 · p. 13
    7. AArm delivers record-breaking quarter and full-year resultsArm · 6 May 2026
    8. ABroadcom Inc., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-09-02 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Broadcom Inc.) · 2 September 2026
    9. AWill Huawei catch up to Nvidia by 2030?Epoch AI · 24 September 2026
    10. AUnlocking post-tapeout flow scalability and performance with cloud computingSiemens Digital Industries Software · 8 January 2025
    11. AIronwood: The first Google TPU for the age of inferenceGoogle · 9 April 2025
    12. AOur eighth generation TPUs: two chips for the agentic eraGoogle · 22 April 2026
    13. ABehind The Scenes of SHD Group's 2026 RISC-V Market ForecastRISC-V International · 19 June 2026
    14. A3.5D XDSiP Platform TechnologyBroadcom · 4 December 2024
    15. AUCIe specificationsUCIe Consortium · Accessed 9 September 2026
    16. AThe Double-Edged Sword of Semiconductor Export Controls: Electronic Design AutomationCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 6 October 2025 · p. 7
    17. ASYNOPSYS INC, Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2025-12-10 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by SYNOPSYS INC) · 10 December 2025
    18. ACADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC, Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-02-17 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC) · 17 February 2026
    19. AOpenAI and Broadcom announce strategic collaboration to deploy 10 gigawatts of OpenAI-designed AI acceleratorsBroadcom · 13 October 2025
    20. ABroadcom Announces Extended Partnership with Meta to Deploy Technology to Support Multi-Gigawatts of Meta's Custom Silicon, MTIABroadcom · 14 April 2026
    21. AMarvell Technology, Inc., Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2026-01-31 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Marvell Technology, Inc.) · 11 March 2026
    22. AAlchip Technologies, financials pageAlchip Technologies · Accessed 9 September 2026
    23. AIndia’s Semiconductor Vision Gathers Momentum with 3nm Chip Design and Large-Scale Talent Development InitiativesPress Information Bureau, Government of India · 25 July 2025
    24. ASupplement No. 1 to Part 738, Title 15 -- Commerce Country ChartElectronic Code of Federal Regulations · 30 September 2025
    25. ASYNOPSYS INC, Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2025-07-02 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by SYNOPSYS INC) · 3 July 2025
    26. AThe Semiconductor Supply Chain - Issue BriefCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 21 January 2021 · p. 50
    27. A北京华大九天科技股份有限公司2025年年度报告全文CNINFO · 27 April 2026 · p. 18
    28. A北京华大九天科技股份有限公司2025年年度报告全文CNINFO · 27 April 2026 · p. 14
    29. A北京华大九天科技股份有限公司2025年年度报告全文CNINFO · 27 April 2026 · p. 15
    30. APushing the Limits: Huawei's AI Chip Tests U.S. Export ControlsCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 17 June 2024

    Chapter 2: Silicon and Wafers

    Firms based in Japan, Taiwan, Germany and South Korea make most 300 mm wafers used for advanced chips. China makes most polysilicon, almost all of it for solar cells.

    1,959 words / 9 minSpecimen: boule and waferUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    Every is built on a , a thin round slice of silicon about 30 centimeters across that carries hundreds of chips at once. Making one starts with quartz rock, which is silicon bound to oxygen1. The silicon is refined until metal impurities are no more than a few parts per billion2. It is then melted, and a small seed crystal is lowered to the surface and drawn slowly back up. The melt freezes onto the seed as one long cylinder, a single crystal with its atoms lined up in one unbroken pattern from end to end. Saws cut the cylinder into discs, and each disc is polished to a mirror finish and made extremely flat across its whole face2. In 2025 the top five wafer makers served around 75 percent of the world market, and none of them is American or Chinese3.

    In short

    Japanese companies held 53 percent of the world's sales in 2023, by a Fuji Keizai survey that Japan's trade ministry reproduced4. Firms based in Taiwan, South Korea and Europe held most of the rest4. China's largest maker of 300 mm wafers, Eswin, says it ranked sixth in the world with about 7.7 percent of global shipments in the first half of 20265. also need , the raw material for wafers, and none of the five major suppliers of it that the German wafer maker Siltronic named for 2025 is Chinese6.

    GlobalWafers of Taiwan opened a $3.5 billion plant in Texas in May 2025, the first production line of its kind built in the United States in over twenty years7. US Presidential Proclamation 11052 sets a minimum import price of $100 per kilogram for polysilicon ingots and wafers from 4 December 20268.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationFour to six firms could supply this stage today, and the top two take most of the revenue.
    SubstitutabilitySeveral firms already make that have approved, but customers have to test and approve a new wafer plant before they buy from it9.
    Price or market size$11.4bnworld wafer market in 2025, on 12,973 million square inches shipped10
    Who leads
    • JPShin-Etsu Handotai Its parent's electronics materials segment, wafers included, had ¥1,015.7bn of sales in the year to March 202611
    • JPSUMCO ¥409,670m of net sales in 202512
    • TWGlobalWafers NT$60.6bn revenue in 202513
    • KRSK Siltron One of the top five wafer makers by revenue in the first three quarters of 20253
    • DESiltronic €1,346.7m revenue in 202514
    Where it is made
    • JPJapan Shin-Etsu and SUMCO crystal growth and polishing
    • TWTaiwan GlobalWafers headquarters and plants
    • DEGermany Siltronic plants in Burghausen and Freiberg, and Wacker semiconductor-grade polysilicon
    • KRSouth Korea SK Siltron
    • USUnited States Hemlock polysilicon in Michigan, and GlobalWafers plants in Sherman, Texas and St Peters, Missouri
    Why substitution is possible
    Losing one of the top five wafer makers leaves four, and a new wafer plant can still be built3. Customer approval of a new plant is called 9. Siltronic completed key customer qualifications at its new Singapore fab in July 20259.
    Where China stands

    China made about 93 percent of the world's in 2023, an estimated 98 percent of it 15. Eswin, mainland China's largest maker of 300 mm wafers, says it had about 7.7 percent of world shipments in the first half of 20265.

    Where the US stands

    None of the five largest wafer makers in 2025 was American3. GlobalWafers of Taiwan won awards of up to $406 million in December 2024 for wafer plants in Texas and Missouri16.

    The world market for was $11.4 billion in 2025, on 12,973 million square inches shipped10. That is a small fraction of Nvidia's data center revenue, which reached $193.7 billion in the fiscal year to 25 January 202617.

    How it works

    From sand to wafer

    1. Refine. Silicon starts as quartz rock. It is refined into rods so pure that metal impurities are no more than a few parts per billion.
    2. Grow. The rods are melted. A seed crystal touches the melt and is drawn slowly up, turning, and the silicon freezes onto it as one long crystal.
    3. Slice. A wire saw slices the crystal, called an ingot, into thin discs.
    4. Polish. Each disc is ground, etched and polished to a mirror finish, flat right out to the edge.

    Simplified. The ingot and the machines are not drawn to scale.

    Silicon starts as quartzite, a rock that is silicon bound to oxygen. An arc furnace melts it with carbon, and the carbon takes the oxygen away as gas, leaving rough silicon metal. Refiners turn the metal into a gas, trichlorosilane, and distill it, because the impurities boil at other temperatures and separate out.

    In the next step, the Siemens process, the clean gas flows over silicon filaments heated inside a bell jar. On the hot surface the gas breaks apart and its silicon settles onto the filaments. Over days the filaments thicken into gray rods of . Everything downstream is made from those rods. Polysilicon comes in two ultra-high-purity grades, one for semiconductors and one for solar cells, and use the 1.

    A grower melts the polysilicon at about 1,420 degrees Celsius, hotter than lava, and pulls a single crystal out of it by the Czochralski method2. The grower lowers a small seed crystal on the end of a rod to the surface of the melt and draws it back up, slowly turning. Silicon freezes onto the seed in the seed's own atomic pattern, and a cylinder, the ingot, grows beneath it. The pull starts with a thin neck so that flaws from the seed's first contact with the melt stay in the neck and never reach the ingot. Boron or phosphorus stirred into the melt, a step called doping, sets how readily the wafer conducts and whether negative or positive charges carry its current.

    A wire saw, a web of fine wire running through abrasive, slices the ingot into discs. The maker then laps each disc, both faces flat between rotating plates. It off the damaged surface with chemicals, then polishes the disc to a mirror with colloidal silica, a of silica particles far too small to see. Almost every step throws material away.

    get one more layer of near-perfect silicon, grown on top at about 1,200 degrees Celsius2. That is still hot enough to glow orange.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Polished versus epitaxial

    A polished wafer is a doped single crystal polished to a mirror finish2. An epitaxial wafer is a polished wafer with a thin layer of single-crystal silicon grown on top2. The are built in that layer, so flaws in it can make them leak current. SUMCO says an epitaxial wafer suits customers who need a near-perfect crystal or layers that differ in electrical resistance2. SEMI, the industry association, credits the 2025 rise in shipments to AI-driven demand for advanced epitaxial wafers for and polished wafers for 10.

    Silicon on insulator

    In a silicon-on- (SOI) wafer, a buried layer of oxide, which is glass, separates a thin working layer of silicon from the bulk beneath. Soitec says nearly all SOI wafers sold worldwide are made with its Smart Cut process18. Soitec's SOI product lines include RF-SOI for radio chips and fully depleted SOI (FD-SOI), and its markets run from mobile communications to cloud AI18. But SEMI tied the AI-driven growth in logic chips to advanced epitaxial wafers10.

    Who makes it

    The Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown University named five key wafer firms in a January 2021 brief19. They were Shin-Etsu and SUMCO of Japan, GlobalWafers of Taiwan, Siltronic of Germany and SK Siltron of South Korea19. CSET also listed nine Chinese-owned producers, among them Zhonghuan, Simgui, ZingSEMI and Finland's Okmetic, but said they generated little revenue in comparison19.

    As of 2018, five Chinese firms were making or planning 300 mm wafers20. In its October 2025 listing prospectus, Eswin, a Chinese wafer maker, counts seven Chinese firms, itself included, making 300 mm wafers at scale21. Their combined capacity was 2.94 million at the end of 202421.

    Silicon wafer sales by supplier headquarters, 2023. Japan held 53%, and the source shows no separate share for China or the United States

    Japan53%Taiwan19%South Korea13%Europe10%Other5%

    Source: METI, December 2025, from Fuji Keizai data (2023); Japan's and Europe's shares are printed, the others are read off METI's chart

    The chart shows shares of 2023 sales from a survey by Fuji Keizai, a Japanese research firm4. , Trade and Industry reproduced the figures in a December 2025 strategy deck4. The ministry's chart of the Fuji Keizai survey prints only Japan's 53 percent, so the other shares are read off it4. An earlier page of the ministry's deck prints Europe's share in the same Fuji Keizai survey as 10 percent22. The chart gives no separate share to Chinese or US companies4.

    Siltronic's April 2026 investor presentation says the top five wafer makers serve around 75 percent of the market, based on revenue in the first three quarters of 20253. It names the five as Shin-Etsu, SUMCO, GlobalWafers, SK Siltron and Siltronic itself3.

    The wafer makers' 2025 results show strong AI demand and weak demand for chips made on older, .

    • Shin-Etsu. Shin-Etsu Chemical's electronics materials segment, which includes its wafer business, sold ¥1,015.7 billion in the year to March 2026, up 9 percent11. AI-related demand stayed strong and demand in other sectors began to rise, lifting sales of silicon wafers, and 11. The segment also sells magnets and other materials, and the results release does not break out wafer sales23. So the figure cannot be compared with the wafer revenue of the other firms listed.
    • SUMCO. Sold ¥409,670 million and still lost ¥11,751 million, as fell from ¥36,924 million to ¥1,342 million24. In the same year it added capacity and reorganized production of 200 mm and smaller wafers, where demand stayed weak12.
    • Siltronic. Lost €77.9 million on €1,346.7 million of sales while investing €369.1 million, with its new Singapore as the focus14.
    • GlobalWafers. NT$60.6 billion of revenue, down 3.24 percent in local currency13.

    Worldwide, the wafer area shipped rose 5.8 percent in 2025, but revenue fell 1.2 percent10. SEMI attributes the softer revenue mostly to traditional chip applications, where demand and pricing had yet to improve10.

    China made 1.50 million metric tons of polysilicon, the raw material, in 2023, about 93 percent of world output15. Solar-grade material was an estimated 98 percent of that output and electronic-grade 2 percent15. The Commerce Department found in 2026 that semiconductor-grade polysilicon makes up only 2.4 percent of global production, a split close to China's8. These figures alone do not show whether Chinese polysilicon goes into chips.

    China's polysilicon output by grade, 2023. China made 1.50 million metric tons that year, about 93% of world output

    Solar-grade98%Electronic-grade2%

    Source: USGS Minerals Yearbook, China, 2023

    Siltronic put the 2025 market for electronic-grade silicon at $1.4 billion, with five major suppliers, none of them Chinese: Wacker, Hemlock, OCI, Tokuyama and Mitsubishi6.

    Siltronic of Germany describes itself as the only Western-based maker among the top five wafer makers, based on revenue in the first three quarters of 20253. GlobalWafers opened a $3.5 billion plant in Sherman, Texas in May 2025, the first production line of its kind built in the United States in over twenty years7. The same day it announced another $4 billion for phases three and four in Sherman7. The US government had awarded it up to $406 million under the program for wafer plants in Texas and Missouri16.

    Presidential Proclamation 11052, signed 6 August 2026, sets a minimum import price of $100 per kilogram for polysilicon ingots and wafers from 4 December 20268. From the same date it adds an extra 15 percent duty on imported ingots and other listed products made from polysilicon8. A September 2026 Commerce rule meant to stop stockpiling before the duties start lists tariff code 3818.00.0040 among the products it covers25. That code covers round, doped, single-crystal silicon wafers26.

    Commerce may approve plans to build US polysilicon, ingot, wafer or solar cell plants whose construction starts by 20 January 20298. Firms with approved plans can import equipment and some of those products without the new duties8.

    The chokepoint

    China makes most of the world's polysilicon, but in 2019 its firms had only a small share of the wafer market. As of 2019 Chinese firms held under 5 percent of the wafer market and under 1 percent of the 300 mm market19. As of 2018, Chinese producers made 12 percent of the wafers for Chinese-headquartered 300 mm fabs, against 18 percent for 100 to 200 mm fabs27.

    Eswin, mainland China's largest maker of 300 mm wafers, says it ranked sixth in the world with about 7.7 percent of global 300 mm shipments in the first half of 20265. Its October 2025 Shanghai listing prospectus, drawing on SEMI data, estimates that the five largest makers shipped 79.08 percent of 300 mm wafers in 202428. It puts Eswin at 6.01 percent and all other makers at 14.91 percent28.

    Making the smoothest, high-purity 300 mm wafers takes considerable know-how that is hard to write down20. Customers have to a new wafer plant before they buy from it, and Siltronic completed key customer qualifications at its new Singapore fab in July 20259.

    In SEMI figures from November 2020 cited by CSET, 99.7 percent of world fab capacity at 45 and below used 300 mm wafers20. SEMI estimated that 300 mm wafers made up about 78.8 percent of all wafer area shipped worldwide in 2025, according to Eswin's 2025 annual report summary29.

    The last increase in wafer size, to 300 mm, happened in 200230. Bigger discs make printing, or , a bigger share of the processing cost30. A 2013 University of Texas lecture cited by CSET put photolithography at half the cost of processing a 300 mm wafer, against a quarter for a 150 mm one30. Wafers are still produced in diameters of up to 300 mm10.

    Some fill the whole area a lithography tool can print in one exposure. One fatal defect on such a die ruins far more silicon than one on a small chip. printing also stays in focus over only a tiny range of heights (see Lithography), so the disc has to be flat at every point. SEMI's wafer group says the move to sub-3nm processes is raising requirements for wafer quality and consistency10.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What is a wafer?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    A thin disc of pure silicon, about 30 centimeters across, that carries hundreds of chips.

    It is sliced from a single crystal and polished to a mirror finish. Reread: How it works

    Sources (30)
    1. AMineral Commodity Summaries 2026: SiliconU.S. Geological Survey · 5 February 2026
    2. ASUMCO, production processes pageSUMCO · Accessed 9 September 2026
    3. AInvestor Presentation: Foundation of Digital LifeSiltronic · April 2026 · p. 6
    4. AMETI, Semiconductor and digital industry strategy: future direction (半導体・デジタル産業戦略の今後の方向性), 23 December 2025Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan) · 23 December 2025 · p. 8
    5. A西安奕斯伟材料科技股份有限公司2026年半年度报告CNINFO · 25 August 2026 · p. 18
    6. AInvestor Presentation: Foundation of Digital LifeSiltronic · April 2026 · p. 5
    7. AGlobalWafers America Officially Opens for BusinessGlobalWafers · 15 May 2025
    8. AAdjusting Imports of Polysilicon and Its Derivatives Into the United StatesFederal Register (Executive Office of the President) · 11 August 2026
    9. AInvestor Presentation: Foundation of Digital LifeSiltronic · April 2026 · p. 12
    10. ASEMI Reports 2025 Annual Worldwide Silicon Wafer Shipments and Revenue ResultsPR Newswire · 10 February 2026
    11. AConsolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2026Shin-Etsu Chemical · 27 April 2026 · p. 6
    12. ANotice of Convocation of the 27th Ordinary General Meeting of ShareholdersSUMCO · 6 March 2026 · p. 24
    13. AGlobalWafers Reports Full Year 2025 ResultsGlobalWafers · 3 March 2026
    14. ASiltronic AG: Robust business performance in 2025 demonstrates resilience despite challenging conditionsSiltronic · 27 August 2026
    15. A2023 Minerals Yearbook: China (advance release)U.S. Geological Survey · February 2026 · p. 7
    16. ABiden-Harris Administration Announces CHIPS Incentives Awards with GlobalWafers to Support Domestic Production of Silicon WafersNIST · 17 December 2024
    17. ANVIDIA Announces Financial Results for Fourth Quarter and Fiscal 2026Nvidia · 25 February 2026
    18. ASoitec, key figuresSoitec · Accessed 9 September 2026
    19. AThe Semiconductor Supply Chain - Issue BriefCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 21 January 2021 · p. 55
    20. AThe Semiconductor Supply Chain - Issue BriefCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 21 January 2021 · p. 57
    21. A西安奕材首次公开发行股票并在科创板上市招股说明书CNINFO · 22 October 2025 · p. 138
    22. AMETI, Semiconductor and digital industry strategy: future direction (半導体・デジタル産業戦略の今後の方向性), 23 December 2025Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan) · 23 December 2025 · p. 4
    23. AConsolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2026Shin-Etsu Chemical · 27 April 2026 · p. 20
    24. ANotice of Convocation of the 27th Ordinary General Meeting of ShareholdersSUMCO · 6 March 2026 · p. 26
    25. AMeasures To Restrict Stockpiling of Polysilicon and Polysilicon Derivatives Under Proclamation 11052Federal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 24 September 2026
    26. AHarmonized Tariff Schedule, heading 3818.00.00U.S. International Trade Commission · Accessed 9 September 2026
    27. AThe Semiconductor Supply Chain - Issue BriefCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 21 January 2021 · p. 58
    28. A西安奕材首次公开发行股票并在科创板上市招股说明书CNINFO · 22 October 2025 · p. 145
    29. A西安奕斯伟材料科技股份有限公司2025年年度报告摘要CNINFO · 21 April 2026 · p. 8
    30. AThe Semiconductor Supply Chain - Issue BriefCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 21 January 2021 · p. 80

    Chapter 3: Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist

    Japanese companies held 78 percent of world photoresist sales in 2023. Supply of chip chemicals, gases and metals has been disrupted three times since 2019.

    2,227 words / 10 minSpecimen: gas cabinetUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    is a coating that changes wherever light hits it. A machine spins a coat of it, thinner than a soap bubble, across the . Light shines through a stencil onto the coat, and a liquid wash then takes away the parts the light reached. What remains is a pattern, and the next machine cuts that pattern into the wafer beneath, a step called . Hundreds of other chemicals, gases and materials lay down layers, strip them off and clean the wafer between steps1. The are purified until metal and other impurities are down to parts per trillion, the Japanese chemical maker Sumitomo Chemical said in 20212. A chipmaker has to test and approve each new resist in its own factory before using it3. Even a resist that passes the first time takes seven to 17 months to approve, the Semiconductor Industry Association wrote in 20233. Japanese companies held 78 percent of world photoresist sales in 2023, by a Fuji Keizai survey that Japan's trade ministry reproduced4.

    In short

    In July 2019 Japan began requiring an for each contract to sell , or fluorinated polyimide to South Korea5. Japan's hydrogen fluoride exports to South Korea then fell 87.9 percent, but its photoresist exports did not5. Production of all three chemicals rose inside South Korea5.

    China banned exports of the metals , germanium and antimony to the United States in December 20246. In Europe, germanium metal averaged an estimated $4,100 a kilogram in 2025, against $1,392 in 2023, on Argus Media prices reported by the US Geological Survey7. In November 2025 China suspended the ban until 27 November 20268.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationFour to six firms could supply this stage today, and the top two take most of the revenue.
    SubstitutabilityRated on , the hardest input to replace at this stage9.
    Price or market size$45.8bnmarket for wafer fabrication materials in 202510. SEMI's count includes silicon wafers and photomasks11
    Who leads
    • JPJSR A vehicle of the state-backed Japan Investment Corporation bought 84.36% of JSR in April 202412
    • JPTokyo Ohka Kogyo Resist maker with ¥139,668m of sales in the first half of fiscal 202613
    • FRAir Liquide €2,465m of electronics revenue in 2025, 9.1% of group sales14
    • USEntegris Bought the polishing-slurry maker CMC Materials in July 202215
    • JPJX Advanced Metals Says it holds about 65% of the world market for semiconductor sputtering targets as of fiscal 202616
    Where it is made
    • JPJapan Photoresist, ultra-pure hydrofluoric acid, sputtering targets, polishing slurries
    • USUnited States Entegris polishing slurries, Qnity Electronics resist, Air Products gases
    • FRFrance Air Liquide electronics gases and precursors
    • KRSouth Korea Dongjin resist, with output of resist and hydrogen fluoride rising after 2019
    • CNChina Gallium, germanium and antimony refining
    Why substitution is possible
    Each formula is tuned to the layers it prints and has to pass in the 9. So a new supplier has to develop its version together with the fab, one layer at a time3. When Japan required individual for resist and two other chemicals sold to South Korea in 2019, South Korea imported more from the United States, Taiwan and Belgium5.
    Where China stands

    In March 2026 the Chinese resist maker Hubei Dinglong said China had yet to reach large-scale production of advanced resist for , or printing17. Since August 2023 China has required licenses to export 18.

    Where the US stands

    In photoresist, American companies ranked a distant second to Japanese companies by sales in 20234. In 2021 JSR of Japan agreed to buy Inpria, an Oregon maker of resist for extreme ultraviolet19.

    A draws on hundreds of chemicals, gases and other materials1. A shortage of any one of them can stop it. The French gas company Air Liquide alone supplies more than 200 molecules and roughly 50,000 cylinders a year14.

    How it works

    Why one missing material can stop a fab

    1. One layer. A chip is built up in layers. For each layer the wafer goes around a loop of steps like this one, and each step uses its own chemical, gas or metal.
    2. Many wafers. A fab runs many wafers at once, so every material is always in use. Deliveries keep each stock topped up.
    3. One runs out. If one material stops arriving, the fab works through its stock.
    4. The fab stops. When the stock runs out, wafers pile up at that step, and the rest of the fab stands idle.
    5. A new supplier. A new supplier’s resist goes through round after round of tests in the fab. Even one that passes the first time takes seven to 17 months to approve.

    Simplified diagram. Six steps and their materials stand for the many a fab uses, and each real layer uses its own mix.

    The has to change only where the light lands. It also has to work with very little light, so the , the machine that projects the pattern, can expose each patch of the in milliseconds.

    Since the 1990s the standard has been chemically amplified resist. In resists for and light, a photon absorbed in the film can free an acid molecule, and little more happens until the wafer is baked. In the bake, each acid molecule sets off hundreds of reactions around itself that turn the film soluble, so a little light does a lot of chemistry20. The wash then takes away the exposed film and leaves the rest.

    The 248 nm light comes from a krypton fluoride (KrF) laser. The 193 nm light comes from an argon fluoride (ArF) laser. also pass it through a layer of water, which sharpens the image.

    That chemistry works less well with (EUV) light (see Lithography). An absorbed EUV photon instead knocks electrons loose, and a cascade of lower-energy secondary electrons makes the chemical changes in the resist21. A 13.5 EUV photon carries about fourteen times the energy of a 193 nm one, so the same dose of light arrives as far fewer photons. With fewer photons, random variation in where each one lands matters more. It shows up as ragged line edges and missing contact holes, the tiny holes that link one layer of a chip to the next.

    Resist makers responded with , which are built on clusters with a tin-oxide core and absorb more of the EUV light than chemically amplified resists22. In 2021 the Japanese resist maker JSR agreed to buy Inpria, an Oregon maker of these resists19.

    The other chemicals and gases put material on the wafer, take it off or keep it clean. such as nitrogen come by pipeline or from plants built at the fab, and specialty gases come in cylinders14. Silane gas carries the silicon for new layers into the chamber that holds the wafer. A splits , and the fluorine it frees scrubs the chamber walls clean between wafers. cleans the wafer itself. grind each new layer flat before the next goes on.

    are slabs of pure metal. A plasma knocks atoms off them, and the atoms settle on the wafer as thin metal films, including the barrier and seed layers for copper wiring23. Electroplating then fills in the copper wiring itself24. Filters and wafer carriers keep contamination out.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Resist classWavelengthWhere it is usedLimit
    novolak365 nmPackaging, Resolution
    KrF chemically amplified248 nm, thick filmsResolution
    ArF immersion chemically amplified193 nmMost critical layers below 28 nmNeeds per layer
    EUV chemically amplified13.5 nm single-exposure layersShot noise from too few photons
    EUV metal-oxide13.5 nm, tightest Cost, defects, outgassing

    Each resist class is made for one kind of , such as EUV, ArF immersion, ArF, KrF or i-line25.

    Who makes it

    In a January 2021 brief, Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) put Japan's share of the semiconductor photoresist market at 90 percent, citing a 2019 estimate25. The brief put most of the rest with US and South Korean firms25. In a December 2025 strategy presentation, , Trade and Industry (METI) published figures from a separate survey by Fuji Keizai, a Japanese market research firm4. That survey counts sales by company nationality and puts Japanese companies at 77 percent in 2021 and 78 percent in 2023, with American and South Korean companies next4.

    Photoresist sales share by company nationality, 2023

    Japanese companies78%US, South Korean and other companies22%

    Source: METI, December 2025, from Fuji Keizai data

    CSET's January 2021 brief lists five Japanese resist makers: JSR, Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, Shin-Etsu Chemical, Fujifilm and Sumitomo Chemical26. It also lists Dongjin of South Korea, four Chinese firms and three firms it counts as American: DuPont, EMD Performance Materials and Inpria26. Qnity Electronics, the former DuPont electronics business, says in its 2025 annual report that it offers lithography materials for every wavelength, including EUV27. In its 2025 annual report summary, the Chinese firm Hubei Dinglong said China had yet to reach large-scale production of advanced resist for 248 nm, 193 nm or EUV printing17. The firm also said three of its own resists for 248 nm and 193 nm printing had moved into stable volume supply28.

    A vehicle of Japan Investment Corporation, a state-backed fund, bought 84.36 percent of JSR's shares at ¥4,350 each in a tender offer that closed on 16 April 202412. JSR's shares were delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange on 25 June 202429.

    Tokyo Ohka Kogyo sold ¥139,668 million in the first half of fiscal 2026, up 25.1 percent, as strong demand for AI servers in data centers raised demand for chips13. Fujifilm planned to raise its polishing-slurry capacity at Kumamoto by about 30 percent from January 202530. It also scheduled new production and quality-evaluation equipment for EUV resist at Shizuoka and Pyeongtaek to start in October 202531.

    World sales of wafer fabrication materials reached $45.8 billion in 2025, and sales of packaging materials reached $27.4 billion10. SEMI counts silicon wafers and among wafer fabrication materials, along with resists, gases, chemicals and polishing materials11.

    In electronic gases, CSET named Merck, Air Products and Air Liquide as the market leaders in January 202132. Air Liquide's electronics business sold €2,465 million in 2025, 9.1 percent of group revenue14. SK Specialty has made nitrogen trifluoride since 2001, when it became the first company to produce the gas in South Korea33. Kanto Denka Kogyo refines its own fluorine gas and turns it into specialty gases for , and cleaning34. Stella Chemifa makes ultra-high-purity hydrofluoric acid for chipmaking35. Morita Chemical Industries sells an hydrofluoric acid36.

    CSET's January 2021 brief, drawing on a 2019 report by the market research firm Mordor Intelligence, put five firms at more than 60 percent of the market32. Citing a 2019 report by the market research firm Market Reports World, it put DuPont and Cabot Microelectronics at about 56 percent of a $790 million market for polishing slurries25. Counting by company nationality, the same Fuji Keizai survey, as published by METI, puts Japanese companies at 51 percent of polishing-slurry sales and 59 percent of high-purity cleaning-liquid sales in 20234. Both shares were 49 percent in 20214.

    Cabot Microelectronics renamed itself CMC Materials in October 202037. The American firm Entegris completed its purchase of CMC Materials on 6 July 202215. DuPont separated its electronics business into an independent company, Qnity Electronics, on 1 November 202538. Qnity sells polishing slurries and pads39.

    In sputtering targets for semiconductors, JX Advanced Metals puts its own share of the world market at about 65 percent as of fiscal 202616.

    The chokepoint

    Supply at this stage has been disrupted three times since 2019, twice by governments and once by a war.

    In July 2019 Japan put photoresist, hydrogen fluoride and fluorinated polyimide under individual for South Korea, so each export contract needed its own license5. Japan had supplied more than 90 percent of South Korea's imports of two of the three5. Its hydrogen fluoride exports to South Korea then fell 87.9 percent5. Japanese photoresist exports to South Korea did not fall, possibly in part because Japan allowed three-year bulk licenses for some resist sales in December 20195.

    South Korea bought more hydrogen fluoride from the United States and Taiwan and more photoresist from Belgium5. Production of all three chemicals rose inside South Korea5. The rise came both from South Korean firms and from Japanese companies' affiliates in South Korea5.

    Researchers at Japan's Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) found that Japanese hydrogen fluoride exports to the United States rose5. They say some Japanese supply may have reached South Korea by way of the United States5. Japan ended the individual licenses on 23 March 2023, when it put exports of the three chemicals to South Korea under its bulk export license system40.

    In 2022 Russia invaded Ukraine, which supplied about 70 percent of the world's and 90 percent of the semiconductor-grade neon used by US industry41. Gas mixtures containing neon fill the lasers used in lithography, but EUV scanners use a tin light source instead42. Many chipmakers had added to their gas stockpiles after Russia annexed Crimea in 201441. Samsung, SK hynix, Renesas and Rohm reported adequate neon supplies from China41.

    At this stage, China's export controls cover metals. On 3 July 2023 China announced that exports of would need licenses from 1 August18. On 3 December 2024 it said it would in principle grant no licenses to export gallium, germanium, antimony or superhard materials to the United States6. On 9 November 2025 it suspended that ban until 27 November 20268. In February 2026 the US Geological Survey put China's share of world production of primary low-purity gallium at 99 percent43.

    The White House set out a trade deal with China on 1 November 202544. It said that under the deal China would also issue general licenses for exports of gallium, germanium and antimony for the benefit of US and their suppliers44.

    In the United States, germanium goes mainly into fiber optics, infrared optics, semiconductors and solar cells, and radiation detectors7. Of the gallium used in the United States in 2025, 73 percent went into integrated circuits built on gallium arsenide or gallium nitride43. Another 26 percent went into optoelectronic devices such as LEDs and laser diodes43. Gallium is recovered mostly as a byproduct of processing bauxite, the ore that aluminum is made from43. Germanium comes from certain zinc ores and coal deposits, so the supply of each metal depends on another industry's economics45.

    In Europe, germanium metal averaged an estimated $4,100 a kilogram in 2025, against $1,392 in 2023, on Argus Media prices reported by the US Geological Survey7. US imports of the metal fell an estimated 67 percent in 2025 because of China's ban7. In October 2024 the US Geological Survey estimated that a total Chinese ban on gallium and germanium exports could cut US GDP by $3.4 billion46.

    Germanium metal, annual average price in Europe. China required export licenses from August 2023, banned shipments to the US in December 2024 and suspended the ban from November 2025 to 27 November 2026

    Germanium metal, annual average price in Europe. China required export licenses from August 2023, banned shipments to the US in December 2024 and suspended the ban from November 2025 to 27 November 2026
    2021$1,187/kg
    2022$1,294/kg
    2023$1,392/kg
    2024$1,991/kg
    2025$4,100/kg

    Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, February 2026 (Argus Media European prices, 2025 estimated)

    A slower risk is the European Union's proposed restriction on PFAS, the long-lived fluorinated chemicals. These chemicals are used throughout a fab, from some etch gases to seals, filters and the plastic linings of chemical tanks and pipes. Most of the photoacid generators that free the acid in resist contain PFAS too47. The Semiconductor Industry Association wrote in 2023 that photoresist needs the most rigorous of any chemical a chipmaker uses, because each resist is tuned to the layers it prints9. The resist maker adjusts its formula over rounds of tests in the fab, and some resists have to be qualified one after another3.

    The national authorities of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden prepared the proposal and updated it after evaluating more than 5,600 comments48. ECHA, the EU chemicals agency, published the updated proposal on 20 August 202548. The updated proposal assessed options that would let electronics and semiconductor makers keep using PFAS where the risks can be controlled48.

    In March 2026 ECHA's two scientific committees backed an EU-wide restriction with targeted derogations, or exemptions49. One committee gave its backing in a final opinion and the other in a draft, and their evaluation is due to finish by the end of 202649. The European Commission will decide in consultation with the member states48.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What does photoresist do?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    It is a light-sensitive coating that holds the printed pattern, so the next step can etch that pattern into the wafer.

    A wash removes the parts the light reached. The pattern that remains guides the etch. Reread: How it works

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    45. AQuantifying Potential Effects of China’s Gallium and Germanium Export Restrictions on the U.S. Economy (Open-File Report 2024–1057)U.S. Geological Survey · 15 October 2024 · p. 11
    46. AQuantifying Potential Effects of China’s Gallium and Germanium Export Restrictions on the U.S. Economy (Open-File Report 2024–1057)U.S. Geological Survey · 15 October 2024 · p. 9
    47. APFAS-Containing Photo-Acid Generators Used in Semiconductor ManufacturingSemiconductor Industry Association (Semiconductor PFAS Consortium Photolithography Working Group) · 8 June 2023 · p. 4
    48. AECHA publishes updated PFAS restriction proposalEuropean Chemicals Agency · 20 August 2025
    49. AECHA supports PFAS restriction with targeted derogationsEuropean Chemicals Agency · 26 March 2026

    Chapter 4: Lithography

    ASML, a Dutch firm, is the only maker of extreme ultraviolet scanners, the machines that print the finest layers of a chip. It sold 48 of them in 2025.

    2,282 words / 10 minSpecimen: EUV scannerUpdated 25 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    prints the pattern of a circuit onto the . A machine holds a stencil of one layer of the circuit up to a light source and projects the image, four times smaller, onto the silicon. The shorter the wavelength of the light, the finer the lines a machine can print. A machine can still print lines narrower than its light's wavelength. shine the light through a layer of water between lens and wafer, which lets them print smaller features with the same light1. ASML rates its NXT:2150i immersion scanner at features of 38 or less with argon fluoride laser light2. Air soaks up light, the shortest in use, so machines that print with it work in a vacuum. Only ASML, a Dutch company, makes them. are government rules on who a company may sell to. Every advanced passes through ASML's machines, so export controls on ASML affect all advanced chipmaking.

    In short

    ASML also holds above 80 percent of the market for (DUV) , the kind that uses longer-wavelength light3. ASML says the production capacity of Zeiss, its sole supplier of optics, limits how many it can build4.

    bar (EUV) scanners from Chinese 5. In December 2025 Reuters reported a Chinese prototype that had made EUV light but had printed no chip6. In July 2026 Reuters reported, citing one unnamed source, that a Shanghai firm with two state shareholders has started producing tools, which shine their light through water7.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationThree or fewer firms could supply this stage today, or one firm holds more than half of it.
    SubstitutabilityASML is the only maker of , and Zeiss is its sole supplier of their mirrors4.
    Price or market sizeAbout $200Mfor a standard EUV scanner, an estimated $350-400M for the newer High-NA version and roughly $60M for a tool in the DUV segment, according to Reuters in July 20263
    Who leads
    • NLASML 100% of EUV (extreme ultraviolet) systems sold in 20258
    • JPNikon 22 new chip lithography systems in the year to March 20269
    • JPCanon 234 chip lithography systems in 2025, 188 of them i-line and 46 KrF10
    Where it is made
    • NLNetherlands ASML, the Dutch maker of every EUV scanner
    • DEGermany Zeiss SMT optics, Oberkochen, and Trumpf carbon dioxide drive lasers, Ditzingen
    • USUnited States ASML light-source research and manufacturing, San Diego
    • JPJapan Nikon and Canon lithography scanners and steppers
    Why substitution is slow
    A newcomer would first have to make mirrors a meter wide, polished smooth to within tens of , a picometer being a trillionth of a meter1. It would also need a light source that hits tin droplets with a laser 50,000 times a second11.
    Where China stands

    In September 2025 judged that EUV remained firmly out of reach for China despite massive state investment5. SMEE, the older Chinese supplier, had its largest share in tools, the coarsest kind, and even there held 4 percent of the world market as of 20255.

    Where the US stands

    No American firm makes , CSET found in 202112. But a US rule published in October 2023 covers certain bound for advanced chipmaking if they hold any American-made parts13. The US also requires a license to supply the firms it names14.

    ASML sold 327 in 2025, 48 of them (EUV)15. Nobody else makes EUV systems8.

    How it works

    The stencil is called a , and the machine a scanner (see Photomasks and pellicles).

    The is coated with , a film that changes wherever light touches it. The mask holds one layer of the circuit as a pattern of clear and dark areas, drawn at four times its size on the . The machine shines light through the mask, shrinks the image four times with a lens, and lands it on the film.

    A wash then removes the film where the light hit, or, with some films, where it did not, leaving the pattern standing on the wafer16. The film then serves as a stencil for the next step, which either the pattern into the layer beneath or fires ions into the open areas to change how the silicon conducts16. Then the film is stripped and the next mask goes in. Chips are made up of dozens of layers, ASML says16. Photronics, a US , says masks are typically sold in sets, with each layer's pattern on a different mask17.

    How lithography prints a chip

    1. Coat. The wafer is coated with a thin film that changes wherever light touches it.
    2. Stencil. A stencil, called a mask, holds the pattern for one layer of the chip, drawn four times larger than life.
    3. Shrink. Light shines through the stencil, and a lens shrinks the image four times and lands it on the film.
    4. Wash. A wash removes the film wherever the light landed, and the pattern is left on the wafer.
    5. Repeat. The machine steps across the wafer, printing one patch at a time, each about the size of a postage stamp.

    Simplified. The newest machines, which use extreme ultraviolet light, carry the image with mirrors in place of a lens.

    The image from one mask covers a patch of up to 26 by 33 mm18. The wafer moves under the lens one patch at a time, close to a hundred patches per wafer. ASML's own rating for an EUV scanner assumes 96 of them18. Before the wafer is exposed, the machine measures marks printed in earlier layers so the new layer lines up with them18. ASML rates the NXE:3400B's matched-machine overlay, a measure of that alignment, at 2 18. That model first shipped in 201719.

    Finer lines need shorter light. Glass and air both absorb the shortest light in use, at 13.5 nm20. So an EUV scanner works in a vacuum and uses mirrors instead of lenses, and its masks are mirrors too20. (DUV) machines use light with a wavelength more than fourteen times longer11. ASML calls its the workhorses of the industry, used in of the most advanced logic and memory chips21.

    When one exposure cannot draw a pattern finely enough, chipmakers use . In the litho-etch kind, the pattern is split between two or more masks printed in turn22. Each added mask brings more process steps, more cost and a risk that the parts of the pattern misalign23. Self-aligned double and quadruple patterning (SADP and SAQP) print the lines with one exposure and then multiply them with and etch steps22. In SAQP each printed line ends up as four22. Because one exposure places all those lines, they cannot misalign with each other, though a later exposure still prints blocks that break them where the circuit needs gaps22. ASML says one EUV exposure per layer cuts masks and process steps and lowers cost8.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Deep ultraviolet

    Deep ultraviolet (DUV) light comes from gas lasers called excimer lasers: 248 nanometers from (KrF), 193 from (ArF), shone through air or water11. Cymer, an independently run ASML business in San Diego, makes these excimer lasers, which generate the light that scanners use to print patterns on wafers24. Gigaphoton, a Komatsu company in Japan, also makes excimer lasers for tools25. Most of the machines sold are still DUV tools. Of the systems ASML sold in 2025, 131 were ArF immersion, 78 KrF and 16 ArF dry, all deep ultraviolet, and another 54 were older tools26. The i-line tools use 365 nm light from a mercury lamp, and ASML says they print features as small as 220 nm11.

    Reuters gives one price for the whole DUV segment, with tools costing roughly $60 million each3. In 2025, those 131 ArF immersion tools made up 42 percent of ASML's system sales and the 78 KrF tools only 4 percent26. In DUV, ASML competes with Nikon and Canon, and it still holds above 80 percent of that market3. Without EUV, chipmakers build their finest layers on immersion DUV scanners, in several passes per layer8. From 1 September 2023, Dutch covered the most advanced of these scanners, ASML's NXT:2000i and later models27.

    Extreme ultraviolet

    The 13.5 nm light comes from molten tin droplets shot from a generator11. A laser hits each droplet twice, first with a low-intensity pulse that flattens it and then with a more powerful one that vaporizes it into 11. The process repeats 50,000 times a second11. Mirrors made by Zeiss, a German optics company, carry the light to the wafer1. The largest are a meter across and smooth to within tens of picometers, a picometer being a thousandth of a nanometer1.

    Brighter light means more wafers an hour, and ASML demonstrated the first 1,000-watt EUV source in April 202528. Its TWINSCAN NXE:3800E ships at its full 220 wafers an hour, 37 percent more than the NXE:3600D29.

    High-NA EUV

    raise the numerical aperture (NA), a measure of how well the optics collect and focus light, from 0.33 to 0.5530. That cuts the smallest printable feature from 13 nm to 8 nm30. Their optics shrink the mask image four times in one direction and eight in the other, halving the patch of wafer one exposure covers and doubling the exposures per wafer30. The second-generation TWINSCAN EXE:5200B runs at 175 wafers an hour, 60 percent above the EXE:50008.

    Reuters puts a standard EUV tool at around $200 million and a High-NA machine at an estimated $350 to $400 million3.

    What one lithography system costs. The DUV bar is one figure for the whole segment, and the High-NA bar shows the low end of an estimated $350-400M range

    What one lithography system costs. The DUV bar is one figure for the whole segment, and the High-NA bar shows the low end of an estimated $350-400M range
    DUV tool$60M
    EUV, 0.33 NA$200M
    High-NA EUV$350M

    Source: Reuters explainer on ASML's lithography machines, first published 28 January 2026 and updated 28 July 2026

    Intel and TSMC have chosen differently on High-NA:

    • Intel says it uses High-NA in volume production for select layers of some Intel 18A products31. It installed the first EXE:5200B32. By September 2026 it had run more than one million wafers on High-NA tools, a count that includes tool testing and research as well as volume production31.
    • TSMC waited, and in September 2026 said it will use High-NA in high-volume manufacturing from 203033.

    ASML sold four High-NA (EXE) systems in 2025, against two in 202434. In its 2025 annual report, filed in February 2026, ASML said it expected High-NA to start supporting high-volume manufacturing in 20274. On 8 September 2026 ASML and TSMC announced a move from 6-inch photomasks to 12-inch ones, to remove stitching constraints33. Stitching constraints are the design limits that come from printing a large chip in two halves. They aim for a pilot line for the new masks by 2031 and for High-NA systems that use them to enter production by 203333.

    EUV systems ASML sold each year

    EUV systems ASML sold each year
    202353 tools
    202444 tools
    202548 tools

    Source: ASML 2025 annual report (2024 and 2025); 2023 from ASML's Q4 2023 investor presentation

    Who makes it

    ASML's net sales were EUR 32.7 billion in 2025, at a 52.8 percent 15. In October 2026 it expected 2026 net sales of EUR 44 to 45 billion, at a gross margin of around 56 percent35. Its 2025 annual report lists 5,100 suppliers4. Three of them and ASML's own San Diego site make the main parts of the EUV machine:

    • Zeiss SMT, Oberkochen, makes the illumination system and the six-mirror projection optics36.
    • Trumpf, Ditzingen, makes the carbon dioxide drive laser, which amplifies a few watts to 40 37.
    • ASML San Diego, which includes the light-source maker Cymer that ASML bought in 2013, designs the source where the laser turns tin into plasma, and builds the droplet generator24.
    • VDL ETG builds the frames that suspend and position the mirrors38.

    ASML says the production capacity of Zeiss, its sole supplier of optics, limits how many lithography systems it can build4.

    In Japan, Nikon and Canon also make lithography tools. Nikon sold 22 new chip lithography systems in the year to March 2026, in a market it sizes at 570 units for 20259. Its Precision Equipment business made an in the year to March 202639. Canon sold 234 chip lithography systems in 2025, 188 of them i-line and 46 KrF10. Its range runs from KrF scanners to i-line steppers, including some built for 40. Canon also makes a nanoimprint system, the FPA-1200NZ2C, which stamps the pattern instead of projecting it, down to a 14 nm linewidth41. Canon delivered one in 2024 to the Texas Institute for Electronics, to be used for research and prototypes41.

    In January 2021 CSET, a research center at Georgetown University, found that the United States lacked firms in a few key parts of the chip supply chain, above all lithography tools12.

    ASML net system sales by technology, 2025

    EUV48%ArF immersion42%KrF4%Metrology and inspection3%ArF dry2%i-line1%

    Source: ASML Q4 2025 investor presentation

    Controls and China's answer

    Export controls bar EUV from Chinese foundries5. In September 2025 judged that EUV remained "firmly out of reach" for China despite massive state investment5. For DUV scanners and other tools, the restrictions came in this order:

    • Dutch national licensing of advanced DUV took effect on 1 September 202342.
    • A US rule published on 25 October 2023 put certain immersion scanners bound for advanced chipmaking under US export rules if they held any American content at all13. The rule did not apply if the country the scanners were first exported from already controlled them13.
    • A partial license revocation by the Dutch government, disclosed by ASML on 1 January 2024, stopped shipments of NXT:2050i and NXT:2100i immersion scanners to a few Chinese customers43.
    • The Netherlands widened its licensing from 7 September 202442. On 15 January 2025 it announced that from 1 April 2025 the license requirement would also cover a very limited number of further goods, among them specific measuring and inspection equipment44.
    • The , issued by the US Bureau of Industry and Security, extended controls to affiliates owned 50 percent or more by listed entities from 29 September 202514. BIS then suspended it until 9 November 202645. Exporting goods covered by US export rules to a firm on the entity list needs a US license14.
    • The EU added certain Dutch controls to the EU Control List in November 20254. ASML says this changed nothing for its immersion tools, because they already needed a Dutch license4.

    China's share of ASML's net system sales fell from 41 percent in 2024 to 33 percent in 202526.

    On DUV, Reuters reported in July 2026, citing one unnamed source, that Shanghai Aishengna Electronic Technology Group has started producing home-grown immersion DUV tools7. The firm was registered in August 2023 with 7 billion yuan of capital and two state shareholders, Shanghai Electric Holding and a Shanghai International Trust subsidiary7. It has no website and has taken in teams from SMEE, China's older scanner maker, and the startup Yuliangsheng7. SMEE is strongest in i-line, the coarsest kind of lithography tool, and even there holds only four percent of the world market5.

    On EUV there is less evidence. Reuters reported in December 2025 that a Shenzhen team of former ASML engineers had built a prototype that made extreme ultraviolet light but had printed no chip6. To print a chip, a machine also needs mirrors that carry that light to the wafer, and ASML's sole supplier of those mirrors is Zeiss4.

    ASML net system sales by the region tools shipped to, 2025

    China33%South Korea25%Taiwan22%United States12%Japan5%Rest of Asia2%EMEA1%

    Source: ASML Q4 2025 investor presentation

    The chokepoint

    If ASML stopped shipping, no anywhere could add EUV capacity, because no other company makes EUV scanners8. The scanners already in fabs would keep printing only as long as they were serviced. ASML has around 10,000 customer support employees who maintain and upgrade those machines around the clock46. Serviced this way, ASML's machines stay in use for a long time. In its 2025 annual report ASML said about 95 percent of the systems it had sold in the previous 30 years were still in use4. The same report warned that export controls may limit the service ASML can provide for machines already installed47.

    ASML has a of its own. Zeiss SMT is its only supplier of lenses, mirrors and other critical optics48. ASML says that if Zeiss could not supply them for a long period, it would effectively be unable to run its business48.

    In July 2026 ASML put its 2026 capacity at around 65 standard (low-NA) EUV scanners and said it plans to add 30 percent for 202749.

    For AI , EUV is the point of control, because it prints the finest layers, the ones that set how densely and wires pack20. TSMC expects the number of layers needing High-NA to rise, driven mainly by the more complex transistors that AI chips need33.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What does lithography do?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    It prints each layer of a chip's circuit onto the wafer.

    The machine projects the image of a stencil, four times smaller, onto the silicon. Reread: How it works

    Sources (49)
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    2. ATWINSCAN NXT:2150iASML · Accessed 18 October 2026
    3. BExplainer: The $400 million ASML 'printers' key for the AI chip boomReuters · 28 July 2026
    4. AASML HOLDING NV, Form 6-K report of foreign private issuer for the period ended 2025-12-31 (6-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASML HOLDING NV) · 25 February 2026
    5. ABreakthroughs or Boasts? Assessing Recent Chinese Lithography AdvancementsCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 24 September 2025
    6. BHow China built its 'Manhattan Project' to rival the West in AI chipsReuters · 17 December 2025
    7. BChina starts production of home-grown immersion DUV chipmaking tools, source saysReuters · 28 July 2026
    8. AStrategic report: From ASML's Annual Report 2025ASML · 24 February 2026 · p. 16
    9. AFinancial Results: The Year Ended March 31, 2026Nikon · 8 May 2026 · p. 8
    10. ACanon Inc. FY 2025 ResultsCanon · 29 January 2026 · p. 22
    11. AAll about light and lasers in lithographyASML · Accessed 9 September 2026
    12. AThe Semiconductor Supply Chain - Issue BriefCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 21 January 2021 · p. 4
    13. AExport Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 25 October 2023
    14. AExpansion of End-User Controls To Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed EntitiesFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 30 September 2025
    15. AFinancial performance: From ASML's Annual Report 2025ASML · 24 February 2026 · p. 5
    16. A6 crucial steps in semiconductor manufacturingASML · 4 October 2023
    17. APHOTRONICS INC, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-10-31 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by PHOTRONICS INC) · 17 December 2025
    18. ATWINSCAN NXE:3400B: EUV lithography systemsASML · Accessed 27 September 2026
    19. AStronger than expected demand drives ASML Q1 salesU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASML HOLDING NV) · 19 April 2017
    20. AASML EUV lithography systemsASML · Accessed 9 September 2026
    21. ASee ASML's DUV lithography systemsASML · Accessed 9 September 2026
    22. AEUV lithography: weighing the optionsimec · 6 June 2019
    23. AApplied Materials’ Innovative Pattern-Shaping Technology Reduces the Cost, Complexity and Environmental Impact of Advanced Chip ManufacturingApplied Materials · 28 February 2023
    24. AExplore ASML San DiegoASML · Accessed 9 September 2026
    25. AGigaphoton, company profileGigaphoton · Accessed 9 September 2026
    26. AASML 2025 fourth-quarter and full-year results (investor presentation)ASML · 28 January 2026 · p. 9
    27. AStatement regarding export control regulations Dutch governmentASML · 30 June 2023
    28. AStrategic report: From ASML's Annual Report 2025ASML · 24 February 2026 · p. 30
    29. AStrategic report: From ASML's Annual Report 2025ASML · 24 February 2026 · p. 17
    30. A5 things you should know about High NA in EUVASML · 25 January 2024
    31. AIntel Foundry and ASML Accelerate Industry Readiness for High-NA EUVIntel · 7 September 2026
    32. AHigh NA EUV reaches new readiness milestone with first high-volume Logic productASML · 15 July 2026
    33. AASML and TSMC Announce Initiative to Pioneer Industry Transition to Large-Format Photomasks for High NA EUVTSMC · 8 September 2026
    34. AFinancial performance: From ASML's Annual Report 2025ASML · 24 February 2026 · p. 7
    35. AASML reports €11.7 billion total net sales and €5.0 billion net income in Q3 2026U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASML HOLDING NV) · 14 October 2026
    36. AEUV lithography and technologyCarl Zeiss · Accessed 9 September 2026
    37. AGood things come in ever-smaller packagesTRUMPF · Accessed 9 September 2026
    38. AVDL ETG builds complex frames for ZeissVDL Groep · 22 March 2019
    39. AFinancial Results: The Year Ended March 31, 2026Nikon · 8 May 2026 · p. 6
    40. ASemiconductor Lithography EquipmentCanon · Accessed 18 October 2026
    41. ACanon delivers FPA -1200NZ2C nanoimprint lithography system for semiconductor manufacturing to the Texas Institute for ElectronicsCanon · 26 September 2024
    42. AThe Netherlands expands export control measure for advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipmentGovernment of the Netherlands · 6 September 2024
    43. AStatement regarding partial revocation export licenseASML · 1 January 2024
    44. AKlever: export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to be tightenedGovernment of the Netherlands · 15 January 2025
    45. AOne Year Suspension of Expansion of End-User Controls for Affiliates of Certain Listed EntitiesFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 12 November 2025
    46. AStrategic report: From ASML's Annual Report 2025ASML · 24 February 2026 · p. 40
    47. AStrategic report: From ASML's Annual Report 2025ASML · 24 February 2026 · p. 65
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    49. APress Release Financial Results Q2 2026ASML · 15 July 2026

    Chapter 5: Photomasks and Pellicles

    Only three firms in the world make the blank plates for the masks used to print the finest layers of leading-edge chips. Japan's AGC and Hoya are two of them.

    2,011 words / 9 minSpecimen: photomaskUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    A is the stencil that prints from, at least one for each layer of a 1. The same mask prints its layer on after wafer, so one mask shapes millions of chips. The most complicated layers are printed with (EUV) light, and the rest can often be printed with light shone through a quartz plate. No glass lets EUV light through, so the mask for those layers is a mirror. The mirror is built up from about forty pairs of thin layers, and the light bounces off it. A dark pattern drawn on top of the mirror soaks up the light wherever no line should print. Any speck of dust on the mask repeats on every wafer it prints. So a thin membrane on a frame, called a , sits just above the mask and catches dust where it is too far out of focus to print. Japan's AGC and Hoya are two of the three firms that make those mirrors.

    In short

    On CSET's count from TechInsights data, Austria's IMS Nanofabrication held 46.6 percent of the 2025 world market for , which draw the pattern onto a 2. Hoya says its share of the market is exceptionally high3.

    SemiAnalysis put a full set of masks for a at $40 million in May 20264. In July 2022 it wrote that more companies will lack the volume to spread the fixed cost of mask sets5. On 8 September 2026 ASML and TSMC announced a plan to move from 6-inch to 12-inch masks6. They expect the change to raise productivity and lower chipmaking costs6.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationThree or fewer firms could supply this stage today, or one firm holds more than half of it.
    SubstitutabilityAGC said in December 2024 that only three firms supply the blank plates for 7.
    Price or market size$40Mfor a leading-edge mask set, SemiAnalysis's May 2026 figure4. In July 2022 it put a 7 nm set above $10M5
    Who leads
    • JPAGC Ranks itself No.2 worldwide in EUV mask blanks on its own fiscal 2026 estimates8
    • JPHoya Said in its 2026 report that its share of mask blanks is exceptionally high3
    • JPLasertec Launched the world's first tool that inspects patterned EUV masks at the scanner's own wavelength in 20199
    • ATIMS Nanofabrication CSET puts its 2025 share of the market for all electron-beam mask writers at 46.6%, using TechInsights data2
    • USPhotronics $849.3M of revenue in fiscal 202510
    Where it is made
    • JPJapan Mask blanks (AGC, Hoya), DUV blanks (Shin-Etsu), inspection (Lasertec), writers (NuFlare), pellicles (Mitsui Chemicals)
    • ATAustria IMS Nanofabrication multi-beam mask writers
    • DEGermany Zeiss mask checking in EUV light (AIMS EUV) and mask repair
    • USUnited States Photronics merchant mask shops, KLA inspection
    • TWTaiwan TSMC, which held 10% of IMS at the end of 2024
    Why substitution is slow
    AGC says it spent more than a decade meeting the blank's requirements, and began only in 20177. Germany's Zeiss calls its AIMS the only system that tests how a mask will print under conditions equivalent to the 's11.
    Where China stands

    As of 2026 SMIC runs two of its own in Shanghai12. No Chinese firm appears in CSET's 2025 market shares for , the machines that draw the pattern onto a mask2.

    Where the US stands

    In December 2025 Photronics called itself a leading worldwide maker of photomasks10. As of 2026 KLA sells tools that inspect EUV and optical masks13.

    Each layer of an is printed from a built on a . Only three companies worldwide supply those plates, and Japan's AGC is one of them7. Hoya, also Japanese, is another3. AGC says it is the only company in the world that takes an EUV blank all the way from the glass to the finished coating14.

    How it works

    How a photomask prints its pattern

    1. The scanner. A photomask is the stencil that lithography prints from, at least one for each layer of a chip. Inside the scanner, light bounces off the mask and carries its pattern down to the wafer.
    2. A mirror. No glass lets extreme ultraviolet (EUV) light through. So the mask for EUV layers is a mirror, built up from about forty pairs of very thin layers laid on glass, and the light bounces off it.
    3. The pattern. A dark pattern drawn on the mirror soaks up the light wherever no line should print. The light that bounces back carries the pattern of one layer.
    4. Wafer after wafer. The same mask prints its layer on wafer after wafer, so one plate shapes millions of chips.
    5. One speck. A speck of dust on the mask prints on every wafer, until someone finds it. So a thin membrane on a frame, called a pellicle, covers the mask's patterned side and catches dust where it is too far out of focus to print.

    Simplified. The mask is drawn face down, as it sits in the scanner. The mirror layers and the dark pattern are drawn far thicker than they are, and the light's path through the scanner's mirrors is cut to one bounce.

    ASML says a 's most complicated layers are made on EUV machines, while the rest can often be printed on older machines15. A mask starts as a blank, a polished plate with no pattern on it yet. For deep ultraviolet the blank is a window of quartz carrying a light-blocking film such as molybdenum silicide, and Shin-Etsu is one maker of those blanks16. For EUV the blank is a mirror of about 40 molybdenum and silicon layer pairs, 7 to a pair, laid on glass17. A dark tantalum film on top, called the absorber, will carry the pattern18.

    The blank is coated with a sensitive film called . A then draws the design into the resist with electrons. A single-beam writer flashes one shape at a time, while NuFlare's multi-beam writer for the most advanced masks controls 260,000 beams at once19.

    A wash removes the drawn resist. An then removes the blocking film or absorber wherever the resist is gone, and the rest of the resist is stripped. The plate now passes light, or reflects it, in the shape of one layer of the chip. On standard EUV scanners the pattern is drawn four times larger than it will print20. An inspection tool compares the plate to the design, and a repair tool fixes the stray defects it finds.

    EUV masks bring problems of their own:

    • Mask 3D effects. Light strikes the mirror at a slant, and the absorber has height, so its edges cast small shadows that distort the printed shape. Software has to correct for the shadows in advance.
    • Write precision. Every edge of the absorber has to sit within a few nanometers of where the design says.
    • Particles. Anything on the mirror prints on every until someone finds it.

    , the newest EUV machines, print finer lines with larger mirrors. To keep masks at their usual size, their mirrors shrink the pattern four times in one direction and eight times in the other20. So each exposure covers half the area of a standard exposure, and a wafer takes twice as many exposures20.

    On 8 September 2026 ASML and TSMC announced a plan to move from the current 6-inch masks to 12-inch masks6. They expect the change to raise productivity, lower chipmaking costs and remove stitching constraints, the design limits that come from printing a large chip in two halves6. They aim to set up a 12-inch mask pilot line by 2031, so that High-NA scanners using 12-inch masks can enter advanced chip production by 20336.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Blanks

    AGC says it spent more than a decade meeting the blank's requirements, which include near-zero , perfectly smooth and flat surfaces and no particle contamination7. It says began only in 20177.

    AGC publishes no market share figure for EUV blanks. In its data book, AGC ranks itself No.2 worldwide in EUV blanks, based on its own fiscal 2026 estimates8. Hoya says its share of the mask blank market is exceptionally high, and that customers may gradually start buying EUV blanks from more than one supplier3.

    In April 2023 AGC said its EUV blank capacity would grow by about 30 percent in 202514. The growth would come from a line in Fukushima, a project that , Japan's industry ministry, selected under a program to strengthen supply chains14. AGC also said it was aiming for more than ¥40 billion of sales in the business by 202514. Its EUV blank sales grew 50 percent in 2023, AGC said in December 20247. In February 2025 AGC reported that the sales reached ¥40 billion in 2024, a year ahead of the 2025 target21.

    The sales then declined in 2025 and were recovering in 2026, AGC said in June 202622. In August 2026 AGC set out capacity expansions of 20 to 50 percent across EUV blanks, and lens materials for tools23. It gave no separate figure for the blanks, and mass production on the added capacity is to begin in 202823.

    Writers

    An electron-beam writer draws the pattern into the resist on the blank. Multi-beam writers fire many beams at once, and Japan's NuFlare sells them for the 3 nm 19.

    In September 2023 Intel called Austria's IMS Nanofabrication the established industry leader in the mask writing tools that advanced EUV requires24. Counting all electron-beam mask writers, CSET, a research center at Georgetown University, put IMS's share of a $994 million world market at 46.6 percent in 2025, using TechInsights data2. NuFlare had 39.2 percent and JEOL 14.2 percent, in the same CSET analysis of TechInsights data2.

    Intel agreed in September 2023 to sell roughly 10 percent of IMS to TSMC at a valuation of about $4.3 billion24. TSMC's subsidiary TSMC Development held that 10 percent at the end of 2024, at a fair value of $432.8 million in TSMC's accounts25. Intel sold a combined 32 percent of IMS in 2023 and still held the other 68 percent on 27 December 202526.

    Inspection and repair

    A mask defect cuts the number of good chips on every wafer that mask prints, so masks are checked as blanks, after patterning and again at the fab. Actinic inspection uses 13.5 nm light, the wavelength of EUV lithography9. In 2019 Lasertec launched the world's first actinic inspection system for patterned EUV masks, the ACTIS A1509. In October 2025 it launched the ACTIS A200HiT series, which it says triples the A150's inspection speed9. Lasertec reported net sales of JPY 230,485 million in the year to June 202627.

    As of 2026 KLA's Teron systems for detect pattern and particle defects on both EUV and optical masks13.

    Zeiss makes AIMS EUV, which checks a mask in EUV light under the 's own imaging conditions to judge how a defect will affect printing11. Zeiss calls AIMS the only system that tests how a mask will print under conditions equivalent to the scanner's11. Zeiss says the tool can be extended to ASML's High-NA scanner, the EXE:500011. Zeiss also sells electron-beam repair tools that work on EUV masks28.

    Pellicles

    A is a thin membrane on a frame above the mask. Particles land on it, too far out of focus to print, and the pattern below stays clean.

    In 2022 ASML described its most advanced EUV pellicle as a membrane 13 nanometers thick that can withstand up to 500 degrees Celsius in a high vacuum29. Every photon it absorbs is light that never reaches the wafer29. The light crosses it twice, on the way in and on the way back off the mirror, so absorption counts double. ASML released its first EUV pellicles in 2016 and calls the pellicle one of the breakthroughs that brought EUV lithography to high-volume manufacturing29.

    Carbon nanotube membranes are the next step, aimed at next-generation High-NA, high-output EUV scanners30. In 2020 imec, a Belgian chip research center, mounted them on masks and exposed them in an ASML NXE:3300 scanner31. The membranes passed up to 97 percent of the light in a single crossing, and imec found their effect on imaging low and correctable31.

    Mitsui Chemicals began commercial production of silicon-based EUV pellicles under an ASML license in 202130. In 2024 it said it would build a carbon nanotube membrane plant at Iwakuni-Ohtake, tentatively due to finish in December 202530. In December 2025 Mitsui Chemicals said the plant was scheduled for completion in its fiscal 2025, in line with its initial plan32. The membranes are designed to pass 92 percent or more of the light and to withstand exposure power above 1 30.

    Cost and design economics

    In July 2022 SemiAnalysis put mask sets above $1 million at 28 nm and above $10 million at 7 nm5. It expected 3 nm mask sets to reach the $40 million range5. Its May 2026 primer still puts a mask set at $40 million4. The same primer puts a single respin, remaking a chip after a design flaw, at $50 million to $100 million at leading-edge nodes4.

    Mask costs restrict which firms can use a node. SemiAnalysis wrote that at 5 nm and 3 nm, only firms with large wafer volume see the cost per fall5. It wrote that more companies will lack the volume to spread the fixed cost of mask sets5. It expected failed chip designs to show up first among AI chip startups, which work on much tighter budgets5.

    What one mask set costs, by node, 2022. The 28 nm and 7 nm figures are minimums and 3 nm was a projection

    What one mask set costs, by node, 2022. The 28 nm and 7 nm figures are minimums and 3 nm was a projection
    28 nm$1M
    7 nm$10M
    3 nm$40M

    Source: SemiAnalysis, The Dark Side of the Semiconductor Design Renaissance, July 2022. SemiAnalysis's May 2026 EDA Market Primer puts a leading-edge mask set at $40M

    Who makes it

    Mask making splits between chipmakers that make masks for their own use and independent merchant firms that sell to them and others1. Photronics says that chipmakers' own shops once supplied most of the market, and that production has more recently tended to move toward the independents1. TSMC makes masks too, and lists mask making among the services it offers besides making wafers33.

    Photronics calls itself a leading worldwide maker of masks for chips and flat panel displays10. It had $849.3 million of revenue in fiscal 2025, $615.1 million of it from chip masks10. The competitors it names in chip and display masks include Dai Nippon Printing, Hoya, Tekscend Photomask and two Chinese firms, Shenzhen Newway Photomask and Shenzhen Qingyi Photomask1. It also competes with chipmakers' own mask shops1.

    SMIC, a Chinese , runs two in-house mask shops in Shanghai that make masks for deep ultraviolet machines and older ones12. Photronics began operating two mask plants in China, in Hefei and Xiamen, in 20191. Its chip mask business in Xiamen is a joint venture in which Dai Nippon Printing holds 49.99 percent1. No Chinese firm appears in CSET's 2025 market shares for electron-beam mask writers2.

    The chokepoint

    Mask blanks are a small, highly concentrated business. In 2019 Lasertec launched the first tool that inspects patterned EUV masks in EUV light9.

    Pellicles already work in high-volume EUV manufacturing29. But ASML says no material is completely transparent to EUV light, so any pellicle in the light's path costs customers productivity29. In 2024 Mitsui Chemicals said it would set up production of carbon nanotube membranes for next-generation High-NA, high-output EUV scanners30.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What is a photomask?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    The stencil that lithography prints from, at least one for each layer of a chip.

    Each mask prints its layer on wafer after wafer, so any flaw on it repeats on every wafer. Reread: How it works

    Sources (33)
    1. APHOTRONICS INC, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-10-31 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by PHOTRONICS INC) · 17 December 2025
    2. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    3. AHOYA, Information Technology business, review of operations, Integrated Report 2026HOYA · Accessed 9 September 2026
    4. BEDA Market PrimerSemiAnalysis · 21 May 2026
    5. BThe Dark Side Of The Semiconductor Design Renaissance – Fixed Costs Soaring Due To Photomask Sets, Verification, and ValidationSemiAnalysis · 24 July 2022
    6. AASML and TSMC Announce Initiative to Pioneer Industry Transition to Large-Format Photomasks for High NA EUVTSMC · 8 September 2026
    7. AThe Japanese glass behind next-generation chipsAGC · 13 December 2024
    8. AAGC Data BookAGC Inc. · 29 May 2026 · p. 8
    9. ALasertec Releases ACTIS A200HiT Series Actinic EUV Patterned Mask Inspection SystemLasertec · 31 October 2025
    10. APhotronics Reports Full Year and Fourth Quarter Fiscal 2025 ResultsGlobeNewswire (release by Photronics) · 10 December 2025
    11. AMask Qualification Solutions by ZEISS SMTCarl Zeiss · Accessed 9 September 2026
    12. AMask ServiceSMIC · Accessed 9 September 2026
    13. AReticle QualificationKLA Corporation · Accessed 20 October 2026
    14. AAGC to Boost Production Capacity of EUVL Photomask BlanksAGC · 27 April 2023
    15. ASee ASML's DUV lithography systemsASML · Accessed 9 September 2026
    16. APhotomask blanksShin-Etsu Chemical · 3 April 2019
    17. AThe refined EUV mask modelarXiv · 19 December 2019 · p. 2
    18. AThe refined EUV mask modelarXiv · 19 December 2019 · p. 1
    19. AEB Mask WriterNuFlare Technology · Accessed 9 September 2026
    20. A5 things you should know about High NA in EUVASML · 25 January 2024
    21. AFinancial Results for FY2024AGC Inc. · 7 February 2025 · p. 45
    22. ASemiconductor-related Business Briefing: Event SummaryAGC Inc. · 2 June 2026 · p. 17
    23. AAGC Company OverviewAGC Inc. · August 2026 · p. 52
    24. AIntel to Sell Minority Stake in IMS Nanofabrication Business to TSMCIntel · 12 September 2023
    25. ATAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CO LTD, Form 6-K report of foreign private issuer for the period ended 2024-12-31 (6-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CO LTD) · 27 February 2025
    26. AINTEL CORP, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-27 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by INTEL CORP) · 23 January 2026
    27. ALasertec, business reportLasertec · September 2026
    28. AMask Repair Solutions by ZEISS SMTCarl Zeiss · Accessed 9 September 2026
    29. AIndistinguishable from magic: the EUV pellicleASML · 14 September 2022
    30. AMitsui Chemicals Sets up Production Facilities for CNT Pellicles to Be Used in Next-Gen EUV LithographyMitsui Chemicals · 28 May 2024
    31. AImec demonstrates CNT pellicle utilization on EUV scannerimec · 6 October 2020
    32. ABusiness Strategy Presentation (L&HC, Mobility, ICT) in December 2025Mitsui Chemicals · 17 December 2025 · p. 31
    33. ATAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CO LTD, Form 20-F annual report for the period ended 2025-12-31 (20-F)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CO LTD) · 16 April 2026

    Chapter 6: Deposition and Etch

    Deposition and etch tools build a chip layer by layer. They are among the chipmaking tools where Chinese toolmakers gained the most share from 2019 to 2024.

    2,098 words / 9 minSpecimen: process chamberUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    and build the itself, one layer at a time. Deposition lays down a thin film, sometimes only a few atoms thick. prints a pattern on it. Etch then eats away everything the pattern does not protect, and the next film goes down on top. Making one chip takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps, the Semiconductor Industry Association estimated in 20251. Some of the holes the etch cuts in memory chips are more than 50 times deeper than they are wide, like a finger-wide shaft about a meter deep2. The film has to coat them right to the bottom. The etch has to eat one material and leave the one beside it untouched. Applied Materials and Lam Research in America, Tokyo Electron in Japan and ASM International in the Netherlands make most of these machines. Chinese toolmakers have gained share in both kinds of tool since 2019.

    In short

    American companies held 60.3 percent of the world market for tools in 2025, Japanese companies 14.0 percent and China-based companies 9.8 percent, by CSET's count from TechInsights data3. In and cleaning tools that year, American companies held 52.6 percent, Japanese companies 32.6 percent and China-based companies 10.1 percent4.

    tools coat a hole's walls and floor as evenly as its rim5. China-based companies held only 2.6 percent of the world market for them in 2025, by CSET's count from TechInsights data6. The December 2024 US export rule targets tools for advanced atomic layer deposition and for coating holes more than 200 times deeper than they are wide7.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationFour to six firms could supply this stage today, and the top two take most of the revenue.
    SubstitutabilityIn 2025 Lam Research held 41.1 percent of tools, Tokyo Electron 23.4 percent and Applied Materials 17.4 percent, by CSET's count from TechInsights data8.
    Price or market size$26.2Bdeposition tool market in 2025, by CSET's count from TechInsights data3. Dry etch tools were a $21.9B market in 20258
    Who leads
    • USApplied Materials 82.4% of physical vapor deposition tools in 2025, by CSET's count from TechInsights data9
    • USLam Research 51.2% of conductor etch tools in 202510
    • JPTokyo Electron 55.9% of dielectric etch tools in 202511
    • NLASM International 54.5% of atomic layer deposition tools in 20256
    • CNNaura 14.7% of physical vapor deposition tools in 20259
    Where it is made
    • USUnited States Applied Materials, Lam Research
    • JPJapan Tokyo Electron, Kokusai Electric
    • NLNetherlands ASM International, atomic layer deposition
    • KRSouth Korea Large equipment buyer
    • CNChina Naura, AMEC and Piotech, in the largest equipment market ($49.3B in 2025)
    Why substitution is possible
    lays down a film a fraction of a layer of atoms at a time5. At least five makers sell it6.
    Where China stands

    Chinese toolmakers held 12.4 percent of dry etch in 2025, according to CSET's analysis of TechInsights data8. CSET's earlier analysis of TechInsights data had them under 1 percent of atomic layer deposition in 202412.

    Where the US stands

    A December 2024 US rule lists some dry etch, atomic layer deposition and deep-hole tools as controlled exports13. Its reaches some tools built outside the United States14.

    Applied Materials and Lam Research are the two largest and suppliers. Applied Materials booked $28.368 billion of revenue in fiscal 202515. Lam Research booked $23.233 billion in fiscal 202616.

    How it works

    One round of deposition and etch

    1. The wafer. A slice through one spot on a wafer, magnified until its layers show.
    2. Deposit. A thin film is laid over the whole wafer.
    3. Coat. A light-sensitive coating, the resist, is spun on top.
    4. Expose. Light shines through a stencil and changes the resist wherever it lands.
    5. Develop. A wash removes the resist the light reached, leaving the stencil’s pattern.
    6. Etch. A plasma cuts straight down through the film wherever the resist is gone.
    7. Strip. The leftover resist is removed. The pattern now sits in the film.
    8. Repeat. Insulator fills the gaps and the next layer goes on. Making one chip takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps, the Semiconductor Industry Association estimated in 2025.

    Simplified cross-section. The layers are drawn much thicker than they are.

    Most etch steps, and many deposition steps, happen in a vacuum chamber that holds one at a time. A pump empties the chamber of air, and a measured flow of gas comes in. A radio-frequency field, an electric field that reverses millions of times a second, turns the gas into a . The field splits the gas into charged ions and into neutral fragments called radicals, which are more reactive than whole molecules17. Batch furnaces such as Tokyo Electron's TELINDY PLUS instead heat as many as 125 wafers at once, usually without plasma, for oxidation, low-pressure and some 18.

    In most deposition steps, the gas carries the material the film will be made of. The molecules, or the radicals a plasma splits from them, land on the wafer and stick. The film builds up a few atoms at a time.

    To coat the floor of a deep hole as thickly as its rim, the machine can work in cycles, a method called atomic layer deposition. First one gas settles in a single layer on every surface, and the pump removes the rest. Then a second gas reacts with that layer and nothing else, and the pump empties the chamber again. Each cycle adds a fraction of a layer of atoms wherever the gas reached, so the film grows as evenly on a hole's walls and floor as on its rim5.

    For etch, the gas attacks one material and leaves the one beside it. Wherever the covers the wafer, it shields the film beneath. Wherever it does not, the radicals react with the surface and turn it into a gas, which the pump carries away. A second field pulls the ions straight down at the wafer, so the etch cuts vertically and a narrow hole keeps its width as it deepens17. When the etch reaches the material underneath, which the gas was chosen not to touch, it slows almost to a stop, and the tool ends the step.

    The US describe each deposition or etch tool by the process it is designed to run19.

    Accenture and the Global Semiconductor Alliance estimated in 2020 that a part-finished can cross international borders 70 or more times on its way to the end customer1. The Semiconductor Industry Association repeated the figure in 20251.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Deposition families

    The market sizes and leading shares below are 2025 figures from Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), based on data from the research firm TechInsights. CSET puts the deposition tool market at $26.2 billion3. It puts the dry etch market at $21.9 billion8.

    • (PVD), which knocks atoms off a solid target and lands them on the wafer, was a $4.9 billion market in 20259. Applied Materials held 82.4 percent of it and China's Naura 14.7 percent9.
    • Chemical vapor deposition (CVD), which reacts gases at the wafer surface to grow a film, was an $11.2 billion market in 2025, led by Applied Materials at 47 percent20. The plasma-enhanced version (PECVD) runs cooler and made up most of it, $7.5 billion21.
    • Atomic layer deposition (ALD) lays down less than one atomic layer at a time. Each step stops once every surface is covered, so it coats vertical walls as evenly as horizontal floors. US regulators say that even coating makes it important for building 3D structures, such as 3D , , and the and in 5. ASM International leads it with 54.5 percent of a $4.1 billion market in 20256.
    • grows layers that line up with the crystal beneath them, using high-temperature CVD tools22. Electroplating deposits the copper used for wiring across the wafer23.

    Etch families

    • Conductor etch, which cuts gates, metals and silicon, was a $12.2 billion market in 2025, led by Lam at 51.2 percent, by CSET's count from TechInsights data10.
    • , which cuts the insulating oxides and nitrides between them, was an $8.7 billion market in 2025, led by Tokyo Electron at 55.9 percent, by CSET's count from TechInsights data11.
    • High-aspect-ratio etch cuts the deep, narrow channels that let 3D NAND stack layers of memory cells24. Lam says slight departures from a channel's intended shape can hurt 24. Lam runs this etch well below 0 degrees Celsius24. It says its Cryo 3.0 technology can etch channels up to 10 deep whose width varies from top to bottom by less than 0.1 percent of their depth24.

    AI hardware needs sideways cuts, deeper holes and a second stack of metal wiring on the back of the wafer.

    • Gate-all-around need highly selective isotropic etch, which cuts sideways25. The US (BIS) controls isotropic dry etch tools that remove silicon- at least 100 times faster than silicon, a selectivity of 100:1 or more19.
    • (high-bandwidth memory) needs holes etched straight through the silicon, called (TSVs), so chips can be stacked and wired26. BIS controls the tools that etch these holes at aspect ratios (depth to width) of 10:1 or more and at rates above 7 microns a minute13. The control covers only tools that also keep the holes' depth even to within 2 percent across the wafer13.
    • moves the wires that carry power to the back of the wafer27. In July 2024 Applied Materials said it expected backside power to add $1 billion to the market for its wiring tools, for every 100,000 of new capacity28.

    Tokyo Electron world market share by tool type, 2025

    Tokyo Electron world market share by tool type, 2025
    Coater/developer91%
    Tube and low-pressure CVD38%
    Oxidation/diffusion31%
    Deposition (furnace, ALD, LPCVD)27%
    Dry etch23%
    Cleaning20%
    ALD15%

    Source: Gartner, as reported in Tokyo Electron's FY2026 Q4 results presentation

    Who makes it

    The industry association SEMI put world sales of at $135.1 billion in 2025, up 15 percent from $117.1 billion30. Sales of wafer processing equipment, the category that includes deposition and etch tools, rose 12 percent30.

    No one firm dominates deposition and etch the way ASML dominates . In dry etch, CSET's count for 2025 from TechInsights data puts Lam Research at 41.1 percent, Tokyo Electron at 23.4 percent and Applied Materials at 17.4 percent8. Tokyo Electron's own results presentation, citing Gartner, gives it 23 percent of dry etch, 27 percent of deposition systems (furnace, ALD and low-pressure CVD tools) and 15 percent of ALD in 202529. The same presentation, again citing Gartner, gives it 91 percent of coater/developers in 202529. These machines coat wafers with photoresist and develop the pattern after lithography.

    ASM International, the atomic layer deposition specialist, reached a record EUR 3.2 billion of revenue in 2025 as customers built 2 nm gate-all-around capacity31. Molybdenum ALD, a new use of its tools that deposits the metal molybdenum, entered that year31.

    What the world spent on chipmaking equipment

    What the world spent on chipmaking equipment
    2024$117.1B
    2025$135.1B

    Source: SEMI, Worldwide Semiconductor Equipment Market Statistics

    China and the controls

    China is the tool vendors' largest market, buying $49.3 billion of equipment in 2025, half a percent less than in 202430. Taiwan's spending rose 90 percent to $31.5 billion30. South Korea's rose 26 percent to $25.8 billion30. China still takes a large share of every major vendor's sales.

    • Tokyo Electron: 34.1 percent of sales in the year to March 2026, down from 41.7 percent32. It was 30.4 percent in the quarter to June 202633.
    • Lam Research: about 34 percent of revenue in the year to June 2026, the same as a year earlier34.
    • Applied Materials: 28 percent in the third fiscal quarter of 2026, down from 35 percent a year earlier35.
    • ASM International: more than 30 percent of 2025 revenue31.

    Between 2019 and 2024, by CSET's analysis of TechInsights data, China-based suppliers went from 2 to 7 percent of deposition and from under 3 to almost 9 percent of etch and clean12. In ALD they gained no share and held less than 1 percent in 202412.

    CSET's newer analysis of data that TechInsights published in July 2026 puts them at 9.8 percent of deposition in 20253. They held 10.1 percent of etch and clean that year4. In dry etch alone their share was 12.4 percent8. In ALD they held 2.6 percent in 2025, most of it from Piotech6.

    The Chinese toolmaker AMEC alone held 12.4 percent of dielectric etch in 2025, by CSET's count from TechInsights data11. Its revenue was RMB 12.385 billion that year, up about 36.62 percent, and it spent RMB 3.744 billion on research and development, 30.2 percent of sales36.

    The United States tightened its export controls at least five times between 2022 and 2025.

    • October 2022. The 7 October interim final rule required a license for certain chipmaking equipment, and for some activities by that support the making of certain chips in China37. It also extended US license rules to more foreign-made items bound for 28 Chinese entities on the , the US list of foreign firms that exporters need a license to supply37.
    • October 2023. The October rule, effective 17 November, rewrote the equipment entries38. It added sideways (isotropic) and vertical (anisotropic) dry etch ( ), spatial ALD (3B001.d.9), low-fluorine tungsten ALD and CVD (3B001.d.10) and carbon hard PECVD (3B001.d.5)5.
    • December 2024. BIS controlled 24 more types of equipment and three types of software, and added 140 entities to the Entity List14. The new equipment entries include TSV etch, and deposition into features with aspect ratios above 200:139. BIS also wrote a that reaches some tools built outside the United States14. The rule largely exempts foreign-made tools exported by firms located in Japan, the Netherlands and the 31 other countries it lists, whose governments can control these tools themselves40. Japan added advanced chipmaking equipment to its control list on 23 July 202341.
    • September 2025. BIS removed the Chinese units of Samsung and SK hynix, and Intel Semiconductor (Dalian), from the program, effective 31 December 202542. From that date, US tools bound for them need a license42. BIS estimated that the change would add 1,000 license applications a year42.
    • September 2025. The extended Entity List restrictions to any company at least 50 percent owned by a listed entity43. BIS then suspended it until 9 November 202644.

    The rules apply to the toolmakers as well as to their customers. In fiscal 2026 Applied Materials took a $253 million charge to settle an export controls compliance matter with BIS35.

    Of the tools in the chart below, China-based suppliers have their largest share in dry stripping, which clears leftover photoresist off the wafer and was a $314.6 million market in 2025, by CSET's count from TechInsights data45. Kokusai held 35.7 percent of it, Mattson Technology 22.6 percent and Naura 8.3 percent45. Mattson is a US-based firm that Beijing E-Town bought in 201612.

    China-based suppliers' share of global tool segments, 2025

    China-based suppliers' share of global tool segments, 2025
    Dry strip (mostly Mattson)31%
    PVD14.7%
    Dielectric etch13.4%
    Dry etch12.4%
    Etch and clean10.1%
    Deposition9.8%
    CVD8.8%
    Lithography (i-line)4.2%
    ALD2.6%

    Source: CSET analysis of TechInsights data (published July 2026), ETO Chip Explorer

    The chokepoint

    Deposition and etch tools are a , but a weaker one than lithography. Most deposition and etch steps have three or four credible vendors. Atomic layer deposition has at least five6. The December 2024 rule targets tools for advanced atomic layer deposition and for coating holes more than 200 times deeper than they are wide7.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What do deposition and etch do?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    Deposition lays down a thin film, and etch cuts away the parts the printed pattern leaves exposed.

    Making one chip takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps, the Semiconductor Industry Association estimated in 2025. Reread: How it works

    Sources (45)
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    3. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    4. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    5. AExport Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 25 October 2023 · p. 16
    6. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    7. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 33
    8. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
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    10. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    11. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    12. AInside Beijing’s Chipmaking OffensiveCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 14 July 2025
    13. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 32
    14. ACommerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors for Military ApplicationsU.S. Bureau of Industry and Security · 2 December 2024
    15. ARevenue from Contract with Customer, Excluding Assessed Tax (us-gaap:RevenueFromContractWithCustomerExcludingAssessedTax) reported by APPLIED MATERIALS INC /DE, XBRL company concept dataU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (XBRL data for APPLIED MATERIALS INC /DE) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    16. ALAM RESEARCH CORP, Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-07-29 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by LAM RESEARCH CORP) · 29 July 2026
    17. AEtch Essentials: The Building Blocks of AI Era Microchips (Semi 101)Lam Research · 12 June 2024
    18. ATELINDY™ SeriesTokyo Electron · Accessed 9 September 2026
    19. AExport Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 25 October 2023 · p. 28
    20. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
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    23. AThe Semiconductor Supply Chain - Issue BriefCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 21 January 2021 · p. 39
    24. ALam Research Introduces Lam Cryo™ 3.0 Cryogenic Etch Technology to Accelerate Scaling of 3D NAND for the AI EraLam Research · 31 July 2024
    25. AExport Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 25 October 2023 · p. 15
    26. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 15
    27. APowerVia Test Shows Industry-Leading PerformanceIntel · 5 June 2023
    28. AApplied Materials Unveils Chip Wiring Innovations for More Energy-Efficient ComputingGlobeNewswire (release by Applied Materials) · 8 July 2024
    29. AFY2026 (April 2025-March 2026) Financial Announcement, transcriptTokyo Electron · 30 April 2026 · p. 28
    30. ASEMI Reports Global Semiconductor Equipment Billings Reached $135 Billion in 2025, Up 15% Year-on-YearSEMI · 7 April 2026
    31. AASM reports Q4 and full-year 2025 resultsASM International · 3 March 2026 · p. 2
    32. AFY2026 (April 2025-March 2026) Financial Announcement, transcriptTokyo Electron · 30 April 2026 · p. 27
    33. AQ1 FY2027 (April-June 2026) Financial Announcement, transcriptTokyo Electron · 30 July 2026 · p. 6
    34. ALAM RESEARCH CORP, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2026-06-28 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by LAM RESEARCH CORP) · 7 August 2026
    35. AApplied Materials Announces Third Quarter 2026 ResultsGlobeNewswire (release by Applied Materials) · 13 August 2026
    36. AAMEC holds its 2025 annual results briefing (中微公司成功举办2025年度业绩说明会)Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC) · 1 April 2026
    37. AImplementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List ModificationU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 13 October 2022 · p. 1
    38. AExport Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 25 October 2023 · p. 1
    39. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 16
    40. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 28
    41. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 21
    42. ARevocation of Validated End-User Authorizations in the People's Republic of ChinaU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 2 September 2025
    43. AExpansion of End-User Controls To Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed EntitiesU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 30 September 2025 · p. 1
    44. AOne Year Suspension of Expansion of End-User Controls for Affiliates of Certain Listed EntitiesU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 12 November 2025
    45. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026

    Chapter 7: Metrology and Inspection

    KLA, an American firm, held 56.8 percent of the market for tools that measure and inspect wafers in 2025, by CSET's count.

    2,086 words / 9 minSpecimen: electron microscope columnUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    (measurement) and inspection are a 's quality control. Between the steps that build a , another machine looks the over. It checks whether the lines are the right width, whether this layer landed squarely on the last one, and whether a speck of dirt has killed a circuit. The main chip in an , the one that does the calculating, is one of the largest cut from a wafer. A bigger chip is a bigger target for a speck. In a textbook example with the same density of specks, 49.2 percent of chips 1 centimeter on a side come out flawless, but only 11.3 percent of chips 2 centimeters on a side1. In 2025 one American firm, KLA, held 56.8 percent of the market for these tools, by CSET's count from TechInsights data2. So a chip factory, or fab, cut off from KLA would find fewer of the faults that make its chips fail.

    In short

    By the count of CSET, a Georgetown University research center working from TechInsights data, defect inspection was the largest kind of measuring and inspection tool in 2025, a $6.7 billion market2. KLA held 85.9 percent of it2. Chinese makers held 0.7 percent of the whole market that year by the same count2. Yet China took 26 percent of KLA's revenue in the June 2026 quarter3.

    Since October 2022 the US has required a license for any tool subject to US export rules bound for Chinese that make advanced logic or memory 4. A December 2024 rule added specific tools to the list, among them that can find defects of 21 or smaller5.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationFour to six firms could supply this stage today, and the top two take most of the revenue.
    SubstitutabilityEvery kind of measuring and inspecting tool had a second maker in 20252.
    Price or market size$15.7Bprocess control tool market in 20252. KLA puts the 2025 wafer equipment market at about $120B6
    Who leads
    • USKLA 56.8% of process control tools in 2025 by CSET's count2
    • USApplied Materials 11.2% of process control tools in 20252
    • JPLasertec 6.4% of process control tools in 20252
    • JPHitachi High-Tech 6.2% of process control tools in 20252
    • NLASML 5.9% of process control tools in 20252
    • ILNova 4.3% of process control tools in 20252
    • USOnto Innovation 2.6% of process control tools in 20252
    Where it is made
    • USUnited States KLA (Milpitas), Onto Innovation (Wilmington, MA), Applied Materials
    • NLNetherlands ASML YieldStar and HMI e-beam, Veldhoven and San Jose
    • JPJapan Hitachi High-Tech (CD-SEM), Lasertec (mask inspection), Rigaku (X-ray)
    • ILIsrael Nova (Rehovot) and Camtek (Migdal Haemek)
    • CNChina Skyverse (Shenzhen), RSIC and other domestic makers, with 0.7% of the market in 2025 by CSET's count
    Why substitution is possible
    Eight firms besides KLA each held more than 1 percent of the market in 20252. But KLA alone held 85.9 percent of defect inspection, the largest kind, that year2.
    Where China stands

    Chinese firms held 0.7 percent of the world market for these tools in 2025, by CSET's count2. Skyverse, a Shenzhen maker of inspection and tools, reported 2,053,298,171.74 yuan of revenue in 2025, up 48.75 percent on 20247.

    Where the US stands

    In 2025 the American firm KLA was the world's largest maker of metrology and inspection tools2. Citing Gartner, KLA puts its 2024 share at 56.5 percent, or 6.5 times its nearest rival8.

    tools, the machines that measure and inspect and , were a $15.7 billion market in 2025, by CSET's count from TechInsights data2. KLA puts the whole wafer equipment market, including , at about $120 billion that year6.

    CSET's count for 2025, built on TechInsights data, puts KLA at 56.8 percent and Applied Materials, the next largest, at 11.2 percent2. At its March 2026 investor day KLA cited Gartner's figures for 2024, which put its share at 56.5 percent, 6.5 times its nearest competitor8. In April 2026 KLA said its 2025 share was about 7 times the nearest competitor's9.

    How it works

    An inspection tool sweeps a beam of light across the wafer, photographs it, and compares the image of each with the image of its neighbors. The chips on a wafer are meant to be identical, so the tool flags anything that shows in one and not the others as a possible defect. It records where each one is. For faults too small for light to show, a second tool scans a beam of electrons across a small patch and builds a picture from the electrons the beam knocks loose from the surface.

    A metrology tool measures known shapes. It shines light on a test pattern printed beside the circuits and works out from the reflected light how wide the lines are and how thick the film is. It also reads marks printed in this layer and the last to measure how far the two are out of line, which chipmakers call .

    The pays for all this to protect , the share of chips on a wafer that work. A wafer loses value two ways: whole regions ruined by mishandling, misalignment or over-, and single circuits killed by stray material or an airborne particle10.

    A bigger chip is a bigger target for the second kind, so the cost of each good chip grows faster than its area1. Chipmakers call each chip on a wafer a . In the standard formula, die yield is (1 + D0A/a) to the power minus a. Here is defects per square centimeter, A is die area, and a is a clustering constant of 3 to 4 that says how much defects bunch together. At a defect density of 0.8 per square centimeter, with a set to 3, a 1 square centimeter die yields 49.2 percent and a 2 by 2 centimeter die 11.3 percent1. Because the bigger die yields less and fits fewer times on a wafer, it costs 20.1 times as much as the small one1.

    In another textbook example, a fab makes 5,000 wafers a week, each holding 200 dies, and earns $15 from each 11. Each percentage point of yield is then worth $7.8 million a year11. Engineers raise yield by finding the process step that is losing dies and fixing it, work called yield learning.

    The formula's percentages are the share of dies with no killer defect. A chip built from many identical blocks can carry spares and switch off a faulty block12. Nvidia's full H100 design has 144 of its main computing blocks, called streaming multiprocessors, and the SXM5 version it ships has 132 turned on13. So the share of dies that can be sold is higher than the formula gives. But the formula shows how fast flawless dies get scarce as chips grow.

    Why big chips lose more to defects

    1. Specks land. Specks of dust and tiny flaws land at random on every wafer. A textbook example assumes 0.8 per square centimeter.
    2. Small chips. Of chips 1 centimeter on a side, 49.2 percent miss every speck and come out flawless.
    3. Big chips. Chips 2 centimeters on a side are bigger targets for the same specks. Only 11.3 percent come out flawless.
    4. The cost. The big chip yields less and fits fewer times on a wafer, so it costs 20.1 times as much as the small one.

    Simulated wafer laid out like the textbook example: 120 chips 1 centimeter on a side, or 26 chips 2 centimeters on a side. Specks land at random in loose clusters, 0.8 per square centimeter. The share of flawless chips follows the formula above, with a clustering constant of 3, as closely as whole chips allow.

    Variants and trade-offs

    The tools trade sensitivity against speed. All the market sizes and shares below are CSET's, for 2025, from TechInsights data2.

    • Defect inspection scans a whole wafer with light, or small areas of it with electrons, and compares each die against its neighbors. It is by far the largest family, at $6.7 billion, and KLA held 85.9 percent of it. ASML's HMI eScan 1100 runs 25 at once, up to 15 times the of single-beam inspection tools, and finds patterning defects down to 7 14.
    • Film and shape metrology measures how thick each film is and how flat the wafer is, without cutting it open. In this $2.6 billion family KLA held 45.6 percent, Nova 24.6 and Onto Innovation 10.9. Onto paid about $720 million in August 2026 for 27 percent of the Japanese X-ray tool maker Rigaku15.
    • Mask inspection and repair has its own tools, because a defect on a mask, the stencil the circuit pattern is printed from, repeats on every die. This $2.2 billion family is one of two where KLA has a close rival. KLA held 45.9 percent, Lasertec 42 and Zeiss 10.1. Lasertec also makes actinic inspection tools, which check masks with the same 13.5 nm light that prints them16. Lasertec calls its ACTIS A150 the world's first EUV patterned mask inspection system16. KLA's own actinic mask inspection tool was still at an early demo stage at its March 2026 investor day17.
    • Overlay metrology measures how well this layer lines up with the one below. Its $991.4 million market was split almost evenly between KLA at 51.5 percent and ASML at 47.9.
    • metrology, also called line-width measurement, measures how wide a printed feature came out. It is the one family Japan leads. Hitachi held 71.9 percent of this $1.2 billion market and Applied Materials 27.5.
    • Electron-beam metrology resolves detail too fine for light. Applied Materials led this $1.3 billion family at 45.1 percent, with ASML at 35.6 and KLA at 18.8.

    Process control market by tool family, 2025

    Process control market by tool family, 2025
    Defect inspection$6,700M
    Film and shape metrology$2,600M
    Mask inspection and repair$2,200M
    E-beam metrology$1,300M
    CD metrology$1,200M
    Overlay metrology$991.4M
    Defect review$729.1M

    Source: ETO Supply Chain Explorer, CSET

    Who makes it

    KLA says its share grew 3.6 percentage points from 2021 to 20259. It says it gained share again in 2025 across mask, optical wafer and e-beam inspection9. Its revenue for fiscal 2026, the year to June 2026, was $13.579 billion, up from $12.156 billion in fiscal 202518.

    Process control tool revenue share, 2025

    KLA56.8%Applied Materials11.2%Lasertec6.4%Hitachi High-Tech6.2%ASML5.9%Nova4.3%Onto Innovation2.6%Camtek1.6%Rigaku1.2%All others3.8%

    Source: ETO Supply Chain Explorer, CSET

    The rest are specialists, and none holds more than 11.2 percent, by CSET's count from TechInsights data for 20252. Eight of them each held more than 1 percent of the market that year2.

    • Applied Materials is the largest of them. It sells e-beam defect review tools, CD-SEMs (electron microscopes that measure line width) and e-beam metrology tools next to the and etch tools whose work they check.
    • Lasertec holds 6.4 percent, almost all of it mask inspection2. Hitachi High-Tech holds 6.2 percent, most of it from CD-SEMs2. ASML holds 5.9 percent through YieldStar overlay and HMI e-beam metrology2.
    • Nova holds 4.3 percent, through film metrology2. It took $880.6 million of revenue in 202519.
    • Onto Innovation holds 2.6 percent2. It took $1,005.3 million of revenue in 202520.
    • Camtek holds 1.6 percent2. It took $496.1 million of revenue in 202521.

    KLA's patterning line, which includes several metrology products and mask inspection, grew 61 percent year on year in the June 2026 quarter3. In that quarter Taiwan took 31 percent of KLA's revenue and China 26 percent3.

    KLA revenue by product line, June 2026 quarter

    Wafer inspection49%Services22%Patterning20%PCB and component inspection4%Specialty semiconductor process4%Other1%

    Source: KLA letter to shareholders, Q4 FY2026

    KLA says process control's share of spending on is still rising22. In memory chips, KLA credits the rise to higher performance specifications, less redundancy (fewer spare circuits) and more logic content in devices built for 23.

    KLA's systems analyze data with AI and also filter out noise23. In April 2026 KLA said it had added AI to every product line over the previous five years23.

    Packaging, AI and China

    KLA says the AI build-out is making advanced packaging, and the process control it needs, more important24. KLA became the largest supplier of process control tools for advanced wafer-level packaging in 2025, adding 14 percentage points of share9. It expects about $1.1 billion of packaging process control revenue in 2026, up more than 70 percent24. In February 2026 Onto said it had signed a volume purchase agreement estimated at over $240 million with a (HBM) maker for 2D inspection and 3D through 202720.

    Chinese makers are still small in process control, but one of them is growing fast. CSET's count, built on TechInsights data, puts all Chinese firms at 0.7 percent of the market in 20252. Skyverse (Shenzhen Zhongke Feice), a maker of wafer inspection and metrology tools, reported 2,053,298,171.74 yuan of revenue in 20257. That was up 48.75 percent on 20247. In its 2025 annual report Skyverse says Chinese makers still hold a low share of China's market for these tools and that KLA holds the largest share of it25.

    By CSET's 2025 count from TechInsights data, Chinese firms held 0.6 percent of defect inspection tools26. They held 0.4 percent of line-width measurement tools in 202527. In film and shape metrology they held 2 percent in 2025, all of it from Raintree Scientific Instruments, or RSIC28. They held no share of mask inspection and repair tools in 202529. Nor did they hold any share that year of the tools that inspect wafers during advanced packaging30.

    In October 2022 the US began requiring a license for any item subject to US export rules, process control tools included, bound for certain Chinese fabs4. The rule covered fabs that made at 16/14 nm or below, memory with 128 or more layers, or at 18 nm or below31.

    A December 2024 rule added specific process control tools to the list. It controls tools for defect inspection and measurement of patterned 300 mm wafers if they can find defects of 21 nm or smaller32. They must do this using light with a wavelength below 400 nm, an electron beam with a resolution of 1.65 nm or better, a cold field emission source, or two or more electron-beam sources32. The same rule controls overlay metrology accurate to 0.5 nm or better if the tool is built into the track (the machine that coats and develops the light-sensitive ) or can switch wavelengths quickly32. It also controls stand-alone wafer shape metrology that feeds corrections to immersion or EUV scanners32. A separate new entry, 3B994, covers optical film and line-width metrology for 300 mm wafers with software for measuring non-planar 33.

    , the US Commerce Department bureau that wrote the rule, placed these tools in new entries for items it says also have legitimate uses in older chipmaking34. So they carry narrower license requirements than tools built only for advanced chips34. A new extends US jurisdiction to specified foreign-made chipmaking tools bound for or for a destination such as China35.

    The chokepoint

    One firm, KLA, held more than half the process control market in 2025. Every kind of process control tool also had a second maker that year, by CSET's count from TechInsights data2. Several firms can build a good film metrology tool, but KLA led four of the eight kinds of process control tool in 2025, by CSET's count2. KLA says its share of the whole market grew from 2021 to 20259. A fab that can buy and etchers but not sensitive inspection tools finds fewer of the defects that lower its yield, so its yield rises more slowly.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What do metrology and inspection tools do?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    They check each wafer between steps for line width, layer alignment and defects.

    Their measurements help a fab find out why its chips fail. Reread: How it works

    Sources (35)
    1. ABehrooz Parhami, Dependable Computing: A Multilevel Approach, part 2University of California, Santa Barbara · 11 October 2020 · p. 8
    2. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    3. ALetter to Shareholders Q4 Fiscal 2026KLA Corporation · 28 July 2026 · p. 5
    4. AImplementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List ModificationU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 13 October 2022 · p. 5
    5. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 18
    6. ALetter to Shareholders Q4 Fiscal 2026KLA Corporation · 28 July 2026 · p. 7
    7. A深圳中科飞测科技股份有限公司2025年年度报告摘要CNINFO · 24 April 2026 · p. 12
    8. ACompounding Sustainable OutperformanceKLA Corporation · 12 March 2026 · p. 35
    9. ALetter to Shareholders Q3 Fiscal 2026KLA Corporation · 29 April 2026 · p. 3
    10. ABehrooz Parhami, Dependable Computing: A Multilevel Approach, part 2University of California, Santa Barbara · 11 October 2020 · p. 10
    11. ABehrooz Parhami, Dependable Computing: A Multilevel Approach, part 2University of California, Santa Barbara · 11 October 2020 · p. 7
    12. ABehrooz Parhami, Dependable Computing: A Multilevel Approach, part 2University of California, Santa Barbara · 11 October 2020 · p. 23
    13. ANVIDIA Hopper Architecture In-DepthNvidia · 22 March 2022
    14. AThe HMI eScan 1100ASML · Accessed 9 September 2026
    15. AOnto Innovation Completes Strategic Investment in Rigaku Holdings CorporationOnto Innovation · 10 August 2026
    16. AACTIS A150Lasertec · 12 September 2019
    17. ACompounding Sustainable OutperformanceKLA Corporation · 12 March 2026 · p. 91
    18. ARevenue from Contract with Customer, Excluding Assessed Tax (us-gaap:RevenueFromContractWithCustomerExcludingAssessedTax) reported by KLA CORP, XBRL company concept dataU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (XBRL data for KLA CORP) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    19. ARevenues (us-gaap:Revenues) reported by NOVA LTD., XBRL company concept dataU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (XBRL data for NOVA LTD.) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    20. AOnto Innovation Reports 2025 Fourth Quarter and Full Year ResultsOnto Innovation · 19 February 2026
    21. ACAMTEK LTD, Form 6-K report of foreign private issuer for the period ended 2026-02-18 (6-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by CAMTEK LTD) · 18 February 2026
    22. ALetter to Shareholders Q3 Fiscal 2026KLA Corporation · 29 April 2026 · p. 12
    23. ALetter to Shareholders Q3 Fiscal 2026KLA Corporation · 29 April 2026 · p. 4
    24. ALetter to Shareholders Q4 Fiscal 2026KLA Corporation · 28 July 2026 · p. 2
    25. A深圳中科飞测科技股份有限公司2025年年度报告摘要CNINFO · 24 April 2026 · p. 11
    26. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    27. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    28. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    29. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    30. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    31. AImplementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List ModificationU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 13 October 2022 · p. 16
    32. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 37
    33. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 38
    34. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 5 December 2024 · p. 17
    35. ACommerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors for Military ApplicationsU.S. Bureau of Industry and Security · 2 December 2024

    Chapter 8: Transistors and the Front End

    Only TSMC, Intel and Samsung make 2 nm-class transistors in volume. TSMC plans its A14 process for 2028, with more than 20 percent higher logic density than N2.

    2,143 words / 9 minSpecimen: gate-all-around transistorUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    The of a is the part that builds the , the billions of tiny switches in every . Each switch works like a valve. Current runs along a narrow strip of silicon called the channel, and a small voltage on a gate above the strip opens or shuts the flow. For decades chipmakers made the strips shorter, so they switched faster and more of them fit on a chip. But once the strip gets short enough, the valve stops sealing. Current leaks through even when the gate is off, and the chip burns power doing nothing. The newest kind of transistor, called , cuts this leak by wrapping the gate around all four sides of the strip. Building them takes a long sequence of steps that have to run in exact order. Only three companies, TSMC, Intel and Samsung, make these switches . In 2024 the United States put a worldwide license requirement on the know-how for building them, with an exception for countries that impose matching controls.

    In short

    Intel's 18A process shipped together with , a second power network built underneath them1. TSMC says its A14 process will give up to 15 percent more speed or up to 30 percent less power than N22. Rapidus, a state-backed newcomer in Japan, said in July 2025 that it would begin 2 in 20273.

    China's SMIC makes without (EUV) , the most advanced way to print chip patterns4. China has announced $43 billion to develop its own EUV5. In September 2025 the judged that EUV remains firmly out of reach5.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationThree or fewer firms could supply this stage today, or one firm holds more than half of it.
    SubstitutabilityTSMC, Intel and Samsung all make with , the newest kind6.
    Price or market size$17,000per 300 mm wafer on TSMC's 4NP process, Epoch AI's December 2025 estimate7
    Who leads
    • TWTSMC N2 in volume production since 4Q25, TSMC's first nanosheet node8
    • USIntel 18A in high-volume production in the United States, as of 20269
    • KRSamsung Foundry Started initial production of its 3 nm gate-all-around process in June 202210
    • CNSMIC N+3, a 7 nm-class process made without EUV, SemiAnalysis found in June 20264
    • JPRapidus Said in July 2025 it would begin 2 nm mass production in 20273
    Where it is made
    • TWTaiwan TSMC N2 at Fab 20 Hsinchu and Fab 22 Kaohsiung
    • USUnited States Intel 18A at Fab 52, Arizona
    • KRSouth Korea Samsung Hwaseong and Pyeongtaek
    • JPJapan Rapidus Chitose, Hokkaido
    • CNChina SMIC Shanghai and Beijing 300 mm lines
    Why substitution is slow
    Rapidus, a newcomer, is building on IBM's 2 technology under a December 2022 agreement11. Since September 2024 the United States has required a license to share the know-how for building these , except with countries that impose matching controls12.
    Where China stands

    SMIC ships its N+3 process, which SemiAnalysis measured in June 2026 at 113.4 million 4. It builds its tightest layers in several patterning steps because it cannot buy an 4.

    Where the US stands

    In August 2025 Intel called itself the only chipmaker that both develops and manufactures in the United States13. It says its 18A process brought gate-all-around transistors and to market together in 20251.

    Nvidia's Blackwell holds 208 billion switches on two , each die the largest a can print in one shot14. Every switch has to turn on fully, let almost no current through when off, and keep doing it for years. Making the switches is called the . Wiring them together is the .

    How it works

    Why the gate wraps around the channel

    1. Inside a chip. An AI chip does all its work with transistors, tiny switches built into the silicon. One Nvidia Blackwell GPU holds 208 billion of them. Making the switches is the front end of the factory, and wiring them together comes after.
    2. On. Each one is a switch. Seen end on, current flows through a strip of silicon, the channel, and the gate sits on top.
    3. Off, leaking. Switching off, the gate squeezes the flow shut, but only near itself. In a tiny transistor, current still leaks through the part it cannot reach.
    4. Fin. Stand the channel on edge as a fin, and the gate covers three sides. Much less gets through.
    5. All around. Split it into thin sheets and wrap the gate around every side, and it shuts far tighter. That lets the switches keep shrinking, so each new chip can pack in more of them.

    Simplified. The channel is seen end on, cut across the gate, with current drawn as points of light. Not to scale.

    The front end builds the in a fixed order, starting with the channel. In a , the older design, the the silicon into thin fins that stand up from the . The gate then goes over the top and both sides of each fin, three sides instead of one.

    In a transistor, the fab instead grows alternating layers of silicon and silicon- and cuts the stack into narrow bars15. It lays a placeholder, called a dummy gate, across each bar where the real gate will go16. On either side of the placeholder it cuts deep trenches where the source and drain, the two ends of the channel, will go17. Through those trenches it etches the silicon-germanium layers back a little and fills the gaps with an , the inner spacer, which keeps the gate apart from the source and drain15. Then it grows the source and drain as crystal inside the trenches, a step called 17.

    Only then does the fab remove the placeholder and etch away the silicon-germanium, leaving thin silicon sheets that hang between the source and drain like shelves15. The inner spacer shields the source and drain from that etch16. The fab coats every sheet with an insulating film a few atoms thick, so the gate can control the channel without touching it. Gate metal then fills the gaps above, below and beside each sheet, covering all four sides18. Last come the contacts, small metal plugs down to the source, the drain and the gate, ready for the wiring layers above.

    Each of those steps is a separate , etch or . An implant step, called ion implantation, fires atoms of boron or phosphorus into chosen patches of silicon so they conduct the way the design needs. The steps have to run in exact order, because later layers cover earlier ones. Once gate metal surrounds a sheet, the insulator can no longer go between them.

    Current leaks in two main ways, straight through the gate insulator and along the channel from end to end while the gate is off. The second grows as the channel gets shorter, and wrapping the gate around the channel reduces it. Three fixes deal with the two leaks:

    • Better insulator. A thicker hafnium-based film, paired with a metal gate, lets fewer electrons slip straight through yet controls the channel as tightly as before. Intel replaced the silicon dioxide insulator with it at 45 in 200719. It said the new film cut leakage through the insulator more than tenfold19. With the metal gate, it could either raise the current a switch carries when on by more than 20 percent or cut leakage along the channel more than fivefold19.
    • More gate. Fins and nanosheets wrap gate metal around more sides of the channel.
    • Thinner channel. The fab thins the silicon until no current can flow where the gate cannot reach it.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Planar and FinFET

    A planar transistor lays the gate on one side of a flat channel. As the channel shortens, the gate loses control of it. A fin stands the channel on edge so the gate covers three sides. But each fin adds a fixed amount of current, so a designer who needs more current has to add a whole fin.

    Gate-all-around nanosheets

    A nanosheet transistor lays the channel flat again, stacks two to four thin sheets and wraps gate metal around each one. The sheets can be drawn at different widths, so current can be set in finer steps. TSMC sells this as NanoFlex, which lets designers mix short logic cells for small area with tall cells for performance20.

    TSMC's N2, its first nanosheet , entered in the fourth quarter of 20258. TSMC rates the follow-on N2P at 18 percent more speed at the same power and 36 percent less power at the same speed than its earlier N3E21. It gives N2P 1.2 times the of N3E and 1.15 times its chip density, two separate measures21.

    Intel's version, called RibbonFET, is built into its 18A process, which Intel says is in high-volume production in the United States9. An improved version, 18A-P, adds another 9 percent performance at the same power1. Samsung got there first, starting initial production of its 3 nm gate-all-around process in June 202210. But SemiAnalysis reported in February 2023 that, because of problems, high-volume on Samsung's 3 nm gate-all-around technology were expected only in 202422.

    Those numbers are the ' own claims until someone measures the silicon. Each foundry picks its own baseline, and none publishes a density figure that can be compared with a rival's.

    TSMC's published chip density gains (a separate measure from the logic density it also quotes), each over the baseline TSMC names, with A16 at its stated maximum

    TSMC's published chip density gains (a separate measure from the logic density it also quotes), each over the baseline TSMC names, with A16 at its stated maximum
    N2P vs N3E, chip density15%
    A16 vs N2P, chip density10%

    Source: TSMC advanced technologies, HPC platform

    Backside power delivery

    In a conventional chip, power and signal share one stack of copper wiring above the transistors, where wide power rails crowd out the signal wires. With , the fab grinds the wafer thin and builds a second network for power underneath it.

    Intel's version, PowerVia, is part of 18A, and Intel calls it an industry first9. It cut routed area by 11 percent and dynamic voltage droop tenfold1. Droop is the sag in supply voltage when a block of logic switches on at once. TSMC's Super Power Rail connects the backside network directly to each transistor's source and drain, the two ends of its channel23. Against N2P, TSMC rates A16, which uses Super Power Rail, at 8 to 10 percent more speed, 15 to 20 percent less power and up to 1.10 times the chip density21.

    TSMC plans to start A14 production in 2028, with more than 20 percent higher logic density than N22. It said in April 2026 that two more processes, A13 and A12, are scheduled to enter production in 202924. A13 is a direct shrink of A14 with 6 percent area savings, and A12 adds Super Power Rail to the A14 platform24.

    TSMC's logic roadmap beyond N2, from its own announcements

    1. N2U, 3-4% faster or 8-10% lower power than N2P
    2. A14, the base node for A13 and A12
    3. A13, a direct shrink of A14 for 6% area savings
    4. A12, the A14 platform with Super Power Rail backside power

    Source: TSMC, 2026 North America Technology Symposium

    CFET and what comes after

    A basic logic circuit needs two transistors that switch on opposite signals, and in production chips the two sit side by side. Complementary field-effect transistors, or CFETs, stack the two on top of each other25. The research institute imec sees them as an attractive design for logic nodes beyond 1 nm25.

    The back end of line

    Wiring has become as hard to make as the transistor. Copper seeps into the insulator around it, so every wire needs a barrier, a liner and a cap26. As the most critical wiring levels drop below a 20 nm , those extra layers take a large share of the wire's width26. Pitch is the distance from the center of one wire to the center of the next. Two metals are moving into those narrow levels.

    • Ruthenium shows promise for use without a barrier, which would keep the wire's resistance low26. imec has demonstrated ruthenium lines at a 16 nm pitch27.
    • Molybdenum conducts worse than copper in bulk, with a resistivity of 5.3 microhm-cm against copper's 1.6828. But in a thin film it has up to 30 percent lower resistivity than tungsten and needs no barrier either, so chipmakers are putting it into some contacts and local wiring layers28.

    Who makes it

    TSMC, Intel and Samsung build gate-all-around nodes with (EUV) . China's SMIC builds nodes without it4.

    SemiAnalysis reported in September 2026 that Intel's Panther Lake, Samsung's Exynos 2600 and Apple's A20 Pro, made on TSMC's N2, all use gate-all-around transistors6. In August 2025 Intel called itself the only semiconductor company that both develops and manufactures in the United States13.

    In July 2025 Rapidus, a state-backed newcomer in Japan, said it had started making 2 nm prototypes at its plant in Chitose, Hokkaido, and would begin mass production in 20273. Its process builds on IBM's 2 nm technology, which the two firms agreed in December 2022 to develop further for production at Rapidus's plant in Japan11. By June 2026 Rapidus had raised 424.95 billion yen in equity, the latest 150 billion yen from a state agency29. It has also received government research subsidies since fiscal 202229.

    A node's name, such as 7 nm, does not measure any feature on the chip. Applied Materials, a toolmaker, said in 2022 that chipmakers raise density in two ways, by printing smaller features and by laying out each logic cell more tightly18. SMIC's N+3, its third-generation 7 nm process, sets its narrowest wires 32.5 nm apart, tighter than the 36 nm in Intel's Panther Lake chips on 18A4. But 18A allows 32 nm, and SemiAnalysis called the comparison an incomplete, cherry-picked metric4. N+3 packs 113.4 million transistors per square millimeter, against 107.7 for TSMC's N64.

    AI have usually trailed the leading edge. A die as large as theirs is more likely to hold a defect30. So the share of dies that work, called the yield, gets high enough only once a process has run long enough to cut its defect rate.

    Blackwell uses a custom TSMC 4NP process14. Epoch AI estimated in December 2025 that a 300 mm wafer on that process costs $17,0007. AMD's MI455X, launched on 23 July 2026, lists TSMC 2 nm and 3 nm silicon31. It spreads its compute across eight separate dies32.

    is the fast memory on the logic die. SemiAnalysis reported in 2024 that the cell that holds one bit had barely shrunk since the 5 nm node23. TSMC said in 2025 that its 2 nm SRAM uses a 0.021 square-micrometer cell and gets 1.1 times the density of its previous node by tuning design and process together33. See Memory and HBM.

    The chokepoint

    TSMC, Intel and Samsung do not sell their leading-edge process flows, which set the steps, their order and the tools for each. In September 2024 the United States put a worldwide license requirement on the know-how for building gate-all-around transistors, with an exception for countries that impose matching controls12.

    China launched its third in May 2024 with 344 billion yuan, about $47 billion34. But China cannot buy EUV scanners. Its 7 nm chips have been made instead on machines, a generation behind EUV, stockpiled from ASML, the Dutch scanner maker, before export restrictions took effect5. SMIC gets fine features out of them by building its tightest layers in several patterning steps4.

    In July 2026 Reuters reported that a Shanghai state firm had begun making home-grown scanners35. Citing The Information, it said the firm planned about five that year and roughly 20 in 202735. Reuters's own source said the firm's machine still needed testing and was far from matching ASML's models35.

    Domestic EUV is further off. China has announced $43 billion to develop it5. In September 2025 the (CSIS) judged that EUV remains firmly out of reach despite massive state investment5.

    See Lithography and Who Controls the Chain.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    Why do the newest transistors wrap the gate around the channel?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    To cut the current that leaks when the switch is off.

    The gate turns the current along the channel on and off. Shorter channels switch faster but leak more. A gate on all four sides cuts that leakage further than a fin, whose gate covers three sides. Reread: How it works

    Sources (35)
    1. AIntel Foundry Details Process Milestones and Future Innovation at VLSI SymposiumIntel · 16 June 2026
    2. ATSMC Unveils Next-Generation A14 Process at North America Technology SymposiumTSMC · 24 April 2025
    3. ARapidus Achieves Significant Milestone at its State-of-the-Art Foundry with Prototyping of Leading-Edge 2nm GAA TransistorsRapidus · 18 July 2025
    4. BIs SMIC N+3’s Metal Pitch Smaller than Intel 18A’s?SemiAnalysis · 14 June 2026
    5. ABreakthroughs or Boasts? Assessing Recent Chinese Lithography AdvancementsCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 24 September 2025
    6. BIntel Panther Lake TeardownSemiAnalysis · 26 September 2026
    7. ANVIDIA's B200 costs around $6,400 to produceEpoch AI · 10 December 2025
    8. A2nm TechnologyTSMC · Accessed 9 September 2026
    9. AIntel 18A: See Our Biggest Process InnovationIntel · Accessed 18 October 2026
    10. ASamsung Begins Chip Production Using 3nm Process Technology With GAA ArchitectureSamsung Global Newsroom · 30 June 2022
    11. AIBM and Rapidus Form Strategic Partnership to Build Advanced Semiconductor Technology and Ecosystem in JapanRapidus · 13 December 2022
    12. ACommerce Control List Additions and Revisions; Implementation of Controls on Advanced Technologies Consistent With Controls Implemented by International PartnersFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 6 September 2024
    13. AIntel and Trump Administration Reach Historic Agreement to Accelerate American Technology and Manufacturing LeadershipIntel · 22 August 2025
    14. ANVIDIA Blackwell ArchitectureNvidia · 18 December 2025
    15. AEntering the nanosheet transistor eraimec · 11 February 2022
    16. ADevelopment of SiGe Indentation Process Control for Gate-All-Around FET Technology EnablementarXiv · 12 January 2022
    17. AApplied Materials Unveils Next-Gen Chipmaking Products to Supercharge AI PerformanceApplied Materials · 7 October 2025
    18. AApplied Materials Technologies Enable 2D Scaling with EUV and 3D Gate-All-Around TransistorsApplied Materials · 21 April 2022
    19. AIntel's Transistor Technology Breakthrough Represents Biggest Change to Computer Chips in 40 YearsIntel · 27 January 2007
    20. ATSMC Celebrates 30th North America Technology Symposium with Innovations Powering AI with Silicon LeadershipTSMC · 24 April 2024
    21. AHPC Platform – Advanced TechnologiesTSMC · Accessed 9 September 2026
    22. BThe Future of the TransistorSemiAnalysis · 21 February 2023
    23. BClash of the Foundries: Gate All Around + Backside Power at 2nmSemiAnalysis · 1 October 2024
    24. ATSMC Debuts A13 Technology at 2026 North America Technology SymposiumTSMC · 23 April 2026
    25. ACFET (complementary FET)imec · 16 June 2022
    26. ASemi-damascene metallizationimec · 31 October 2024
    27. A16nm Ru lines using semi-damascene integration approachimec · 3 June 2025
    28. AMolybdenum’s Role in Ultra-Fast Computing: The Metal Behind the SpeedEntegris · 18 May 2026
    29. ARapidus Completes 150 Billion Yen Funding Round from Japan GovernmentRapidus · 5 June 2026
    30. ABehrooz Parhami, Dependable Computing: A Multilevel Approach, part 2University of California, Santa Barbara · 11 October 2020 · p. 8
    31. AAMD Instinct™ MI455X GPUsAMD · Accessed 9 September 2026
    32. AAMD Instinct MI455X GPUAMD · 20 July 2026
    33. AA 38.1Mb/mm2 SRAM in a 2nm-CMOS-Nanosheet Technology for High-Density and Energy-Efficient ComputeTSMC · 2025
    34. BChina launches $47bn chip fund to counter U.S. restrictionsNikkei Asia · 27 May 2024
    35. BChina starts production of home-grown immersion DUV chipmaking tools, source saysReuters · 28 July 2026

    Chapter 9: Foundries and Fabs

    TSMC's six largest plants are all in Taiwan. In 2025 they could make more than 13 million wafers a year, out of more than 17 million for the whole company.

    1,884 words / 8 minSpecimen: wafer carrier (FOUP)Updated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    A is a company that makes for other companies in its , or fabs. Those companies send in their designs, and the foundry runs them all through the same building on the same tools. The building costs tens of billions of dollars, and the air inside is cleaner than in an operating room. Even so, each , the silicon disc the chips are built on, moves from machine to machine inside sealed boxes and never touches that air. No chip company sells enough of one product to fill such a factory on its own, so chip companies share a handful of them. TSMC runs the biggest, and all six of its largest plants are in Taiwan, so a political crisis over Taiwan would affect the whole chip supply.

    In short

    In 2022 Taiwan held 69 percent of the world's capacity for advanced , those below 10 , and the United States almost none1. In July 2026 TSMC raised its planned investment in Arizona to $265 billion across 12 facilities2.

    The industry association SEMI projected in 2026 that China would keep the world's largest installed capacity in 2026 and 20273. China's SMIC cannot buy an , the machine that prints the finest layers, yet it makes by printing those layers in on older 4.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationThree or fewer firms could supply this stage today, or one firm holds more than half of it.
    SubstitutabilityTSMC has not built one of its six largest outside Taiwan5.
    Price or market size$35-43 billionover ten years to own a new 2 nm-class fab completed in 2026, BCG's 2023 estimate6
    Who leads
    • TWTSMC 79% of its wafer revenue from 7 nm and below, 3Q267
    • USIntel Foundry $5.8bn segment revenue in 2Q26, only $293m of it from outside customers8
    • KRSamsung Foundry Over $37bn planned in Texas (CHIPS award, Dec 2024)9
    • CNSMIC $9.327bn revenue in 202510
    • JPRapidus Raised 267.6 billion yen in February 2026 to reach 2 nm mass production by 202711
    Where it is made
    • TWTaiwan TSMC (six gigafabs, N2 and N3 lines) and UMC
    • KRSouth Korea Samsung Foundry, Hwaseong and Pyeongtaek
    • CNChina SMIC and Hua Hong
    • USUnited States Intel Foundry, GlobalFoundries, TSMC Arizona, Samsung Taylor
    • JPJapan TSMC Kumamoto, Rapidus Chitose
    Why substitution is slow
    In March 2026 SIA put the cost to build and equip a fab at as much as $20 to $25 billion12. SemiAnalysis judged in December 2025 that finding the highly skilled engineers a needs remained a major challenge for TSMC in Arizona13.
    Where China stands

    Georgetown University's CSET reported in June 2024 that Huawei's Ascend 910B AI is believed to be made on SMIC's N+2 process14. But SemiAnalysis judged in April 2025 that most 910B and 910C chips were made at TSMC15.

    Where the US stands

    The US government agreed in August 2025 to buy a passive 9.9 percent stake in Intel16. Announcing the deal, Intel called itself the only chipmaker that both develops and manufactures leading-edge in the United States16. Intel Foundry lost $2.089 billion in the second quarter of 202617.

    TSMC calls a plant a GIGAFAB once it can run more than 100,000 , each a disc, twelve inches across18. It operates six of them, and every one is in Taiwan5.

    How it works

    Inside, a is built up in layers, and a similar loop of steps repeats for each one. travel in batches, called , inside a sealed pod called a FOUP, short for front-opening unified pod. Entegris, a US maker of these pods, offers a standard version that holds 25 wafers19. An overhead track carries the pod from tool to tool.

    At each tool a robot lifts one wafer out and the tool does its one job, such as depositing a film, printing a pattern, it, cleaning it or measuring it. Then the robot puts the wafer back. The pod moves on to the next tool, often across the building. When a layer is finished, the loop starts again with the next one.

    Turning silicon into a finished, packaged chip takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps, depending on how complex the chip is, the Semiconductor Industry Association said in 202520. In 2021 the association put the time to make a finished wafer at about 12 weeks on average, and up to 14 to 20 weeks for advanced processes21.

    How a fab builds a chip, layer by layer

    1. The fab. Sealed pods carry wafers from tool to tool on a track near the ceiling.
    2. Deposit. The first tool lays a thin film on the wafer.
    3. Print. The next prints a pattern on it with light.
    4. Etch. An etch tool cuts the pattern into the film.
    5. Clean, measure. The wafer is cleaned, then measured to check the layer came out right.
    6. Next layer. Then the loop starts again for the next layer. The transistors come first, then the wiring above them.
    7. Finished. Making one chip takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps, the Semiconductor Industry Association estimated in 2025.

    Simplified. A real fab has many tools of each kind, spread across the building, and a chip has far more layers than the seven shown. The layers are drawn far thicker than they are.

    The pod keeps the wafer clean for all of that time because the wafer never meets the room's air. Intel said in 2018 that the air in its cleanrooms is filtered to 1,000 times fewer airborne particles than a sterile hospital operating room22.

    Every design in the building runs on the same tools because each tool is set by a recipe, the list of gases, temperatures and times for one step. A offers each customer the same list of recipes on shared machines. The tools run day and night, because an idle tool earns nothing. The finished wafer is tested (see Test and assembly), then cut and packaged.

    TSMC, founded in 1987, pioneered the pure-play model, in which a foundry makes only its customers' products23. In 2023 the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) estimated that a new fab for chips at 2 and below, completed in 2026, would cost $35 to $43 billion to own over ten years6. That is 33 to 66 percent above 2023 costs6. In March 2026 the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) told the US Senate that building and equipping a fab takes as much as $20 to $25 billion of capital12.

    Together, the plants TSMC and its subsidiaries run had capacity for more than 17 million wafers a year in 2025, counted as if each were the standard 12-inch size5. The six largest plants, called gigafabs, had a combined capacity of more than 13 million18. The other plants are five smaller fabs in Taiwan, two in China, two in the United States and one in Japan5.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Pure-play foundries

    TSMC and UMC, both based in Taiwan, make chips only for other companies. Chips at 7 nm and below, meaning the newest processes, were 79 percent of TSMC's wafer revenue in the third quarter of 20267. That share split into 33 percent at 3 nm, 28 at 5 nm, 10 at 7 nm and 8 at 2 nm7. TSMC's revenue for the quarter was $46.72 billion, at a 66.4 percent 7.

    TSMC wafer revenue by node, 3Q26% of wafer revenue

    2 nm83 nm335 nm287 nm1010 nm and above21

    Source: TSMC 3Q26 results, filed with the SEC

    Integrated device makers turned foundry

    Intel and Samsung design and sell their own chips and rent out capacity too. Renting out capacity is harder for them, because customers dislike handing designs to a competitor and the company's own products take the best capacity. Intel Foundry reported $5.8 billion of segment revenue in the second quarter of 2026 and an of $2.089 billion17. Only $293 million of that revenue came from outside customers8. Intel says substantially all of its foundry business still makes Intel's own products8.

    National champions

    China's SMIC and Hua Hong and Japan's Rapidus have government backing. SMIC's revenue rose 16.2 percent to $9.327 billion in 2025, at a 21 percent gross margin10. Its lines ran 93.5 percent full, on monthly capacity above a million wafers counted in the smaller 8-inch size10. SMIC cannot buy an , yet it makes chips on its N+2 and N+3 processes by printing the tightest layers in on older 4.

    Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) reported in June 2024 that Huawei's Ascend 910B AI chip is believed to be made on N+214. It also reported that SMIC's limited 7 nm capacity forced Huawei to choose between its most advanced phone chips and its AI chips14. But the research firm SemiAnalysis judged in April 2025 that most 910B and 910C chips were made on TSMC's 7 nm process, from wafers Huawei bought through another company15.

    In February 2026 Rapidus raised 267.6 billion yen from the Japanese government and 32 companies to reach 2 nm by 202711.

    Mature-node capacity

    Most wafers come off . These make power devices, analog chips and microcontrollers, and they compete on price. In January 2025 the industry association SEMI forecast that foundry capacity at all would rise from 11.3 million wafers a month in 2024 to a record 12.6 million in 2025, counted in the 8-inch size24. Its June 2024 forecast had credited much of that growth to Intel's new foundry business and China's expansion25. But in July 2025 Intel scaled back its own expansion plans, saying it would no longer go ahead with planned projects in Germany and Poland and would slow construction in Ohio26.

    Capacity and cost

    In March 2025 TSMC announced plans to add $100 billion to the $65 billion it was already investing in Phoenix, for three more fabs, two packaging plants and an R&D center27. In July 2026 it announced another $100 billion for four more fabs at 2 nm or below, taking its planned investment in Arizona to $265 billion across 12 facilities2.

    Some customers pay TSMC in advance to hold capacity at its fabs28. These deposits stood at NT$189,858.2 million at the end of 2025, down from NT$291,101.8 million a year earlier28. Epoch AI estimated that in 2025 the four largest AI chip designers used around 90 percent of the world's packaging capacity and memory supply, against only 12 percent of advanced logic production29. See Advanced packaging.

    Who makes it

    In August 2025 the US government agreed to buy 433.3 million newly issued Intel shares at $20.47 each, or $8.9 billion in all, for a 9.9 percent stake16. It would pay with $5.7 billion of that Intel had not yet received and $3.2 billion from the Secure Enclave program16. Announcing the deal, Intel's chief executive, Lip-Bu Tan, called Intel the only semiconductor company that both develops and manufactures leading-edge in the United States16. The deal closed on 27 August 2025 and made the government one of Intel's largest stockholders, Intel said in its annual report for 202530.

    The stake is passive, with no board seat16. The government agreed to vote with Intel's board on matters that need shareholder approval, with limited exceptions16. The deal also gave the government a five-year warrant, a right to buy a further 5 percent of Intel at $20 a share16. The government can use that right only if Intel's ownership of its foundry business falls below 51 percent16.

    In 2026 Intel began high-volume manufacturing of some of its Panther Lake processors using ASML's extreme ultraviolet scanners17. It also put its 18A-P process into risk production, the trial runs a process goes through before it is 17.

    In 2022 Samsung broke ground in Taylor, Texas, on a plant with an initial minimum investment of $17 billion, split into $6 billion for buildings and $11 billion for equipment31. In December 2024 the Commerce Department awarded Samsung up to $4.745 billion of CHIPS Act funding, to support more than $37 billion of planned investment in Central Texas9. That plan covers two new leading-edge logic fabs and a research fab in Taylor, and an expansion of Samsung's existing plant in Austin9.

    The chokepoint

    In 2022 South Korea and Taiwan held almost all of the world's logic capacity below 10 nm32. The United States had almost no capacity below 10 nm that year32. In May 2024 SIA and BCG projected that the US share of that capacity would reach 28 percent by 20321. They also projected that new fab investment worldwide would reach around $2.3 trillion from 2024 to 203233.

    Across all nodes, old and new, SEMI forecast in June 2024 that China would have installed capacity of 10.1 million wafers a month in 2025, the most of any region25. It forecast 5.8 million for Taiwan, out of a world total of 33.7 million, all counted in the 8-inch size25. In the third-quarter 2026 update of its World Fab Forecast, SEMI projected that China would keep the largest installed capacity in 2026 and 20273. Little of China's capacity is advanced34.

    SEMI's June 2024 forecast of installed wafer fab capacity by region in 2025, all nodesmillion 8-inch-equivalent wafers per month

    SEMI's June 2024 forecast of installed wafer fab capacity by region in 2025, all nodes
    China10.1 million 8-inch-equivalent wafers per month
    Taiwan5.8 million 8-inch-equivalent wafers per month
    South Korea5.4 million 8-inch-equivalent wafers per month
    Japan4.7 million 8-inch-equivalent wafers per month
    Americas3.2 million 8-inch-equivalent wafers per month
    Europe and Mideast2.7 million 8-inch-equivalent wafers per month
    SE Asia1.8 million 8-inch-equivalent wafers per month

    Source: SEMI World Fab Forecast, June 2024

    Chip production in Taiwan faces three risks:

    • Seismic. Taiwan sits on an active plate boundary, and after an earthquake in January 2025 TSMC had to scrap some wafers in process35.
    • Power. A gigafab is a large industrial load on a small island grid.
    • Political. Taiwan held 69 percent of the world's logic capacity below 10 nm in 20221. In December 2025 SemiAnalysis put Taiwan's share of the world's advanced-node capacity at over 90 percent, though it did not say which node sizes count as advanced13. So a blockade or conflict would cut most of that output off from the world market at once. See Who Controls the Chain.

    Building capacity outside Taiwan is slow, and TSMC has yet to build a gigafab anywhere else5. SemiAnalysis wrote in December 2025 that a foundry needs highly skilled engineers to get the most working chips from each wafer13. It judged that finding enough workers remained a major challenge for TSMC in Arizona13.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What is a foundry?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    A company that makes chips designed by other companies.

    A chip factory, or fab, costs tens of billions of dollars, and no chip company sells enough of one product to fill a fab by itself. Reread: How it works

    Sources (35)
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    2. ATSMC Announces Additional $100 Billion Investment In ArizonaCity of Phoenix · 16 July 2026
    3. AWorld Fab ForecastSEMI · Accessed 9 September 2026
    4. BIs SMIC N+3’s Metal Pitch Smaller than Intel 18A’s?SemiAnalysis · 14 June 2026
    5. AFab CapacityTSMC · Accessed 9 September 2026
    6. ANavigating the Costly Economics of Chip MakingBoston Consulting Group · 28 September 2023
    7. ATSMC Reports Third Quarter EPS of NT$29.43U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CO LTD) · 15 October 2026
    8. AINTEL CORP, Form 10-Q quarterly report for the period ended 2026-06-27 (10-Q)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by INTEL CORP) · 24 July 2026
    9. ABiden-Harris Administration Announces CHIPS Incentives Award with Samsung Electronics to Solidify U.S. Leadership in Leading-Edge Semiconductor ProductionNIST · 20 December 2024
    10. ASMIC Announces 2025 Annual ResultsSMIC · 26 March 2026
    11. ARapidus Secures 267.6 Billion Yen in Funding from Japan Government and Private Sector CompaniesRapidus · 27 February 2026
    12. ATestimony of the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) before the Senate Committee on Environment & Public WorksU.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works · 4 March 2026 · p. 3
    13. BTSMC Overseas Fabs – A Success?SemiAnalysis · 1 December 2025
    14. APushing the Limits: Huawei's AI Chip Tests U.S. Export ControlsCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 17 June 2024
    15. BHuawei AI CloudMatrix 384SemiAnalysis · 16 April 2025
    16. AIntel and Trump Administration Reach Historic Agreement to Accelerate American Technology and Manufacturing LeadershipIntel · 22 August 2025
    17. AIntel Reports Second-Quarter 2026 Financial ResultsIntel · 23 July 2026
    18. AGIGAFAB® FacilitiesTSMC · Accessed 9 September 2026
    19. AA300 FOUPs: Front opening unified pod platform with super microenvironment controlEntegris · 2021
    20. ATestimony of David Isaacs, Semiconductor Industry Association, hearing on “Trade in Critical Supply Chains”U.S. Senate Committee on Finance · 14 May 2025 · p. 2
    21. AChipmakers Are Ramping Up Production to Address Semiconductor Shortage. Here’s Why that Takes TimeSemiconductor Industry Association · 26 February 2021
    22. AInside An Intel Chip Fab: One Of The Cleanest Conference Rooms On EarthIntel · 28 March 2018
    23. ATSMC, company profile pageTSMC · Accessed 9 September 2026
    24. AEighteen New Semiconductor Fabs to Start Construction in 2025, SEMI ReportsSEMI · 7 January 2025
    25. AGlobal Semiconductor Fab Capacity Projected to Expand 6% in 2024 and 7% in 2025, SEMI ReportsSEMI · 18 June 2024
    26. AIntel Reports Second-Quarter 2025 Financial ResultsIntel · 24 July 2025
    27. ATSMC Intends to Expand Its Investment in the United States to US$165 Billion to Power the Future of AITSMC · 4 March 2025
    28. ATAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CO LTD, Form 20-F annual report for the period ended 2025-12-31 (20-F)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CO LTD) · 16 April 2026
    29. AAdvanced packaging and HBM, not logic dies, were the bottlenecks on AI chip production in 2025Epoch AI · 12 March 2026
    30. AINTEL CORP, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-27 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by INTEL CORP) · 23 January 2026
    31. ATaylor, US FabSamsung Electronics · 11 September 2025
    32. AEmerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainBoston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association · May 2024 · p. 13
    33. AEmerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainBoston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association · May 2024 · p. 4
    34. AEmerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainBoston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association · May 2024 · p. 30
    35. ATSMC January 2025 Revenue Report and the Statement on the Impact of EarthquakeTSMC · 10 February 2025

    Chapter 10: Memory and HBM

    SK hynix, Samsung and Micron make nearly all high bandwidth memory (HBM), the stacked memory beside AI chips. SK hynix took 63.2 percent of HBM revenue in 2025.

    1,891 words / 8 minSpecimen: HBM stackUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    , or HBM, is where an AI keeps the numbers it is working on, and it is built to hand them over fast. A memory maker tiny holes into each memory , fills them with copper and grinds the wafer until the copper shows through its back. It tests each of the wafer's chips and stacks up to sixteen good ones into a cube, with every layer wired to the ones below. The cube then sits beside the processor, the chip that does the calculating. Stacking is the hard part because each chip is ground thinner than a human hair and the finished cube has to stay within a set height. One chip that fails after stacking can scrap the whole cube. Only SK hynix, Samsung and Micron make HBM , and a single entry in the US export rules covers HBM from all three.

    In short

    US-based Micron went from 5.8 percent of revenue in 2024 to 23.1 percent in the first quarter of 2026, according to IDC figures in SK hynix's US prospectus1. Over the same period, Samsung's share fell from 37.8 percent to 20.5 percent1.

    Since December 2024, a US license has been required, unless an exception applies, to export to China any HBM moving more than 2 GB per second per of its area2. The Institute for Progress reported in October 2025 that China's CXMT planned to produce HBM3 in 20263. Even so, working from TrendForce's estimate of world HBM shipments, the institute projected that producers outside China would make 70 times as much HBM as China in 20263. In June 2026 SemiAnalysis judged that CXMT was still struggling to stabilize supply of eight-high HBM34.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationThree or fewer firms could supply this stage today, or one firm holds more than half of it.
    SubstitutabilityThree firms took nearly all revenue in 20251.
    Price or market sizeAbout $35BHBM market in 2025, Micron's December 2025 estimate5
    Who leads
    • KRSK hynix 63.2% of HBM revenue in 20251
    • KRSamsung 19.3% of HBM revenue in 20251
    • USMicron 17.4% of HBM revenue in 20251
    Where it is made
    • KRSouth Korea SK hynix in Cheongju and Icheon, Samsung in Pyeongtaek and Hwaseong
    • USUnited States Micron headquarters and R&D, and an SK hynix packaging plant under construction in Indiana
    • TWTaiwan Micron DRAM and HBM production
    • JPJapan Micron Hiroshima, 1-gamma DRAM
    • SGSingapore Micron HBM advanced packaging plant, adding capacity from 2027
    Why substitution is slow
    SK hynix says only a few firms have the expertise and resources to design, make and package memory 1. It says HBM also needs advanced processes such as packaging and must pass customers' rigorous testing and approval1.
    Where China stands

    The Institute for Progress estimated in October 2025 that China would make virtually no HBM that year3. Huawei said in September 2025 that its Ascend 950 chips would use two HBM designs of its own, without saying who would manufacture the memory6.

    Where the US stands

    Micron is the only American HBM maker1. As of October 2026, exporters headquartered in the United States or a A:5 ally can ship HBM below 3.3 GB per second per under 7.

    An moves numbers from memory to its arithmetic units and back. The cost of arithmetic has fallen faster than the cost of moving numbers. The US office wrote in December 2024 that a processor cannot reach its full capabilities unless its memory capacity and bandwidth rise with its speed2.

    How it works

    Each layer in the cube is a , the ordinary kind of computer memory. Each layer is ground thin and bonded to the one below through tiny metal called microbumps. The whole stack sits on a , a chip that manages it. The copper-filled holes are called , or TSVs. They let a signal reach any layer without a wire running around the outside.

    An cube has a 1,024-bit interface, meaning it exchanges data with the processor over 1,024 wires at once8. That is sixteen times wider than a standard DDR5 memory module, the memory stick in a PC8. HBM4 doubles that to 2,048 wires9. Ordinary memory cannot be made that wide, because the pins would not fit on a . The stack can, since its wires run down through the TSVs and across a to the processor beside it, with no board in the way8.

    Inside a memory stack

    1. Base chip. A memory stack sits beside the GPU on a shared silicon base. It starts with a base chip, which controls the memory chips above it.
    2. Thin. Each memory chip is ground to about 30 micrometers, thinner than a human hair.
    3. Stack. Twelve chips are joined by dots of solder, and copper-filled holes run straight down through all but the top one.
    4. Height. The stack has to fit under the cooling plate. Twelve chips reach 0.72 mm, the old limit. HBM4 raised the limit to 775 micrometers and fits up to sixteen chips.
    5. Width. An HBM3E stack talks to the processor over 1,024 wires at once, sixteen times as many as a PC memory module. HBM4 doubles that to 2,048.

    Simplified cross-section. Heights follow the published limits and are drawn to one vertical scale. Widths are not to scale.

    A chip needs the width most when it answers a prompt. Training reuses each stored number across a huge multiplication, so a chip can fetch little and compute a lot. But to generate one word of an answer, the chip reads the whole model from memory, plus the whole record of the conversation so far. Then it does a little arithmetic and waits for the next read. That record grows with the length of the conversation and the number of users served at once. So memory size and speed usually set how many people one chip can serve.

    Variants and trade-offs

    GenerationInterfaceBandwidth per stackCapacity per stack
    HBM3E1,024-bit, 16 channels (32 pseudo-channels)over 1.2 24 GB (8 chips), 36 GB (12 chips)
    HBM42,048-bit, 32 channelsover 2.0 TB/s, up to 3.3 TB/sup to 64 GB (16 chips, 32 Gb )

    HBM3E

    Micron's HBM3E comes in two sizes, 24 GB with eight chips stacked and 36 GB with twelve10.

    HBM4

    The standards body published JESD270-4 in April 2025, setting the 2,048-bit interface and 2 TB/s per stack at 8 Gb/s per pin9. SK hynix says it was first to complete HBM4 development, in September 2025, at over 10 Gb/s per pin11. Samsung says it began and shipped the first commercial HBM4 in February 2026, at 11.7 Gb/s per pin, with a 4 logic base die12. Micron's parts run above 11 Gb/s for more than 2.8 TB/s per stack13. Micron says it began volume production of its 36 GB twelve-high HBM4 in fiscal 2026 and expects to volume of HBM4E, the next generation, in calendar 202714.

    Through HBM3E, SK hynix made its own base dies, the chips at the bottom of each stack15. For HBM4 it chose TSMC's advanced logic process, so the base die can hold more functions15. As a result, TSMC, which does not make HBM, makes the base die for SK hynix's HBM4.

    Bandwidth per HBM stack

    Bandwidth per HBM stack
    HBM3E, 1,024-bit1,200 GB/s
    HBM4, 2,048-bit2,000 GB/s
    HBM4, advanced configurations3,300 GB/s

    Source: Siemens EDA, HBM3E and HBM4 IC design guide, April 2026

    How a stack is built

    • and thin. Etch vertical holes, the through-silicon vias, into a memory , fill them with copper, then grind the wafer from behind until the copper comes through.
    • Stack and join. joins the chips through metal bumps under heat and pressure, and it comes in several forms17. SK hynix uses , which stacks the chips, injects a liquid protective material between them and hardens it11. SK hynix says the process controls warping and dissipates heat well11. Samsung said in February 2024 that its twelve-high HBM3E uses TC-NCF, thermocompression with a thin non-conductive film between the chips18. Samsung expected TC-NCF to help limit warping as chips get thinner18.
    • Stay under the height limit. HBM4 raised the height allowed for a finished cube from 720 micrometers to 775, still under a millimeter17.

    is the next step, but it is not ready. It would join the chips copper to copper and to insulator, with no solder and no filler17. In chip packaging generally, microbumps sit about 20 micrometers apart, and hybrid bonds can sit less than 1 micrometer apart17. A tech note on SK hynix's newsroom says full-scale adoption in HBM is most likely at HBM4E or HBM5, where stacks are projected to pass twenty layers17. Heat builds up in the stack, and removing it becomes a major challenge at 16 to 20 layers17.

    Who makes it

    Three firms took more than 90 percent of the revenue from ordinary computer memory, or DRAM, in the first quarter of 2026, according to IDC figures in SK hynix's US prospectus1. HBM comes from the same three, SK hynix, Samsung and Micron1. No other company has both DRAM and a stacking line of its own. SK hynix says only a few firms have the expertise and resources to design, make and package memory chips1.

    SK hynix says it was the first company to mass-produce several generations of HBM, including HBM3 and HBM3E1.

    SK hynix broke ground in August 2026 on an plant in West Lafayette, Indiana, an investment of over $4 billion19. Micron is modernizing and expanding its DRAM and HBM production capacity in Taiwan14. It has also broken ground on an HBM advanced packaging plant in Singapore to expand its packaging capacity from early 202714.

    Of 2025 HBM revenue, SK hynix took 63.2 percent, Samsung 19.3 and Micron 17.41. The split is public because SK hynix registered shares in the United States1. Its US prospectus credits the research firm IDC. Market shares move fast. In 2024 the same three stood at 56.4, 37.8 and 5.8 percent1. In the first quarter of 2026 they stood at 56.4, 20.5 and 23.1 percent, which put SK hynix back at its 2024 share1.

    Global HBM revenue by supplier, 2025

    SK hynix (KR)63.2%Samsung (KR)19.3%Micron (US)17.4%

    Source: SK hynix Form 424B4 prospectus, 10 July 2026, on IDC data

    HBM market, Micron's estimate for 2025 and forecast for 2028

    HBM market, Micron's estimate for 2025 and forecast for 2028
    2025$35B
    2028$100B

    Source: Micron prepared remarks, fiscal first quarter 2026, 17 December 2025

    In December 2025 Micron put the HBM market at about $35 billion in 2025 and forecast that it would reach around $100 billion in 20285. Micron says HBM needs more wafers than traditional DRAM, the kind used in PCs and phones, to make the same number of bits14. SK hynix says the industry's shift of production capacity to HBM has left traditional DRAM undersupplied1. The shortage, it says, helped drive a significant price recovery for that DRAM from the third quarter of 20251.

    The chokepoint

    The leading accelerators made outside China use HBM from SK hynix, Samsung or Micron. Nvidia's carries 20 TB of HBM3E at up to 576 TB/s20. Each Nvidia Rubin carries up to 288 GB of HBM4 at up to 22 TB/s21. AMD's MI355X carries 288 GB of HBM3E at 8 TB/s22.

    On 5 December 2024 the (BIS), the US export control office, published a rule at 96790. It added an export classification, .c, for "High bandwidth memory (HBM) having a '' greater than 2 gigabytes per second per ". Its technical note defines that density as the memory bandwidth in gigabytes per second divided by the area of the package or stack in square millimeters. The rule also covers stacks made outside the United States, through a , which applies US controls to goods made abroad with American technology2. BIS stated in the rule that all HBM stacks then in production exceeded that threshold2.

    Under (b)(10)(ii), BIS reviews license applications to send 3A090.c items to or a destination such as China23. It reviews them with a when neither the buyer nor its ultimate parent is headquartered in one of those places, and with a otherwise23.

    Two provisions narrow the control. , at 15 CFR 740.25, applies to exporters headquartered in the United States or a Country Group A:5 ally7. It lets them ship HBM below 3.3 GB per second per square millimeter without a license7. The HBM must be bought directly by the designer of the chip it will be packaged into and must go straight to the packaging site7. The rule also excludes chips that combine HBM and logic and whose main function is processing, which other chip controls may cover instead2.

    The think tank said in December 2024 that the rules still allowed HBM2, a generation introduced in 2016, to go to China, with limits on who could buy it and what for24. It also said Nvidia's H20, whose HBM3 is packaged with the processor, was then still exportable under the performance limits for AI chips24.

    In December 2024 CSIS called China's strongest DRAM maker, CXMT, one of only two Chinese firms with a credible path to producing advanced HBM24. The Institute for Progress reported in October 2025 that CXMT was planning to produce HBM3 in 20263. It also estimated that China would make virtually no HBM in 20253. In June 2026 SemiAnalysis judged that CXMT was still struggling to stabilize supply of eight-high HBM3, with even greater challenges at twelve-high4.

    Huawei said in September 2025 that its Ascend 950 chips would use two HBM designs of its own, HiBL 1.0 and HiZQ 2.06. It said the 950DT, due in the fourth quarter of 2026, would carry 144 GB of HiZQ 2.0 at 4 TB/s6. The announcement did not say who would manufacture the memory6. SK hynix says HBM needs advanced production processes, such as TSV packaging, and must pass the rigorous testing and approval processes its customers set1.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What is HBM?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    High-bandwidth memory, made of memory chips stacked into a cube beside the processor and wired to pass data fast.

    Before stacking, each chip gets holes filled with copper, which wire every layer to the ones below. A stack holds up to sixteen chips. Reread: How it works

    Sources (24)
    1. ASK hynix Inc., Form 424B4 prospectus for the period ended 2026-07-10 (424(B)(4))U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by SK hynix Inc.) · 10 July 2026
    2. AForeign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing ItemsFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 5 December 2024
    3. AShould the US Sell Blackwell Chips to China?Institute for Progress · 25 October 2025
    4. BChina's CXMT Is Set to Challenge DRAM IncumbentsSemiAnalysis · 23 June 2026
    5. AFiscal Q1 2026 Earnings Call Prepared RemarksMicron Technology · 17 December 2025
    6. AGroundbreaking SuperPoD Interconnect: Leading a New Paradigm for AI InfrastructureHuawei · 18 September 2025
    7. A15 CFR 740.25 -- License Exception High Bandwidth Memory (HBM).Electronic Code of Federal Regulations · 5 December 2024
    8. AHigh-bandwidth memory (HBM)Micron Technology · Accessed 9 September 2026
    9. AJEDEC® and Industry Leaders Collaborate to Release JESD270-4 HBM4 Standard: Advancing Bandwidth, Efficiency, and Capacity for AI and HPCJEDEC Solid State Technology Association · 16 April 2025
    10. AMicron, HBM3E product pageMicron Technology · Accessed 9 September 2026
    11. ASK hynix Completes World’s First HBM4 Development and Readies Mass ProductionSK hynix · 12 September 2025
    12. ASamsung Ships Industry-First Commercial HBM4 With Ultimate Performance for AI ComputingSamsung Global Newsroom · 12 February 2026
    13. AMicron, HBM4 product pageMicron Technology · Accessed 9 September 2026
    14. AMICRON TECHNOLOGY INC, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2026-09-03 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC) · 9 October 2026
    15. ASK hynix Partners with TSMC to Strengthen HBM Technological LeadershipSK hynix · 19 April 2024
    16. AHBM3e and HBM4: IC design guide for next-generation high bandwidth memorySiemens Digital Industries Software · 24 April 2026
    17. A[Tech Note] Hybrid Bonding: Evolving into a Foundational Technology for Improving Semiconductor PerformanceSK hynix · 25 August 2026
    18. ASamsung Develops Industry-First 36GB HBM3E 12H DRAMSamsung Global Newsroom · 27 February 2024
    19. ASK hynix breaks ground on $4 billion advanced packaging production facility in Purdue Research ParkPurdue University · 27 August 2026
    20. ANVIDIA GB300 NVL72Nvidia · 23 July 2026
    21. AInside NVIDIA Rubin GPU Architecture: Powering the Era of Agentic AINvidia · 21 July 2026
    22. AAMD Instinct™ MI355X GPUsAMD · Accessed 9 September 2026
    23. A15 CFR 742.6, Regional stabilityElectronic Code of Federal Regulations · 23 July 2026
    24. AUnderstanding the Biden Administration’s Updated Export ControlsCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 11 December 2024

    Chapter 11: Advanced Packaging

    Epoch AI estimates that in 2025 Nvidia, Google, AMD and Amazon used around 90 percent of the capacity for CoWoS, TSMC's packaging for AI chips.

    2,097 words / 9 minSpecimen: CoWoS package, explodedUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    Packaging joins finished into one component and mounts them on a small , called a , wired far more coarsely than the chips themselves. A , which prints a chip's circuits, can cover only a rectangle about the size of a postage stamp in one shot. Many leading , Nvidia's Blackwell among them, need more logic than fits in that rectangle. So they are built from several chips, called , set side by side on an , a layer of much finer wiring that links them and sits on the substrate. Stacks of memory chips sit on the same interposer, a few millimeters away. The interposer is either one piece of silicon or layers of fine copper wiring that often carry small where the links are densest. Silicon expands less than the resin beneath it when heated, so the package can warp and its joints crack. Preventing that in is hard. Nvidia, Google, AMD and Amazon all use TSMC's version, called , made in Taiwan.

    In short

    Epoch AI estimates that in 2025 Nvidia used 60.3 percent of all capacity for , TSMC's packaging1. On the July 2026 earnings call, TSMC's chief executive, C.C. Wei, said its packaging capacity was so tight that it limited customers' growth2. Asked about Intel's -T packaging, he said he hoped it would take some of the load off TSMC2.

    In a TrendForce ranking by 2024 revenue, which CSET cites, four of the top ten outsourced firms that package and test are headquartered in China3. But in 2025 Chinese firms had 5.3 percent of the market for fabrication tools, against 65.8 percent for US firms, by CSET's analysis of TechInsights data4.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationThree or fewer firms could supply this stage today, or one firm holds more than half of it.
    SubstitutabilityRated on capacity, which TSMC said in July 2026 was so tight that it limited its customers' growth2.
    Price or market sizeAbout $1,100for the CoWoS-L packaging of one Nvidia B200, against about $900 for its two logic dies, by Epoch AI's December 2025 estimate5
    Who leads
    • TWTSMC CoWoS packaging used by Nvidia, Google, AMD and Amazon in 20251
    • USIntel Foveros 3D packaging in volume at Rio Rancho, New Mexico, since January 20246
    • TWASE Technology NT$389.2B assembly, test and materials revenue, 20257
    • USAmkor $6.71B net sales, 20258
    • CNJCET RMB 38.87B revenue, 20259
    • SGASMPT Thermocompression bonders, with $532.1M of advanced packaging revenue in 202510
    Where it is made
    • TWTaiwan TSMC advanced packaging fabs and a cluster of outsourced assembly and test firms
    • USUnited States Intel Foveros packaging in volume at Rio Rancho, New Mexico
    • CNChina Four of the top ten outsourced assembly and test firms by 2024 revenue are Chinese, in a TrendForce ranking cited by CSET
    • NLNetherlands Besi hybrid bonders
    • JPJapan Disco grinders and dicers
    Why substitution is possible
    CoWoS packaging has been outsourced to assembly firms such as ASE and Amkor before11. Intel's is another option, and Amazon's Trainium and Google's were adopting it to different degrees as of March 202611. But a newcomer would have to match TSMC, which said in April 2026 that it was producing CoWoS at 5.5 times the area a prints in one shot12.
    Where China stands

    Chinese firms had 5.3 percent of the market for fabrication tools built for advanced packaging in 2025, by CSET's analysis of TechInsights data4. Between 2019 and 2024 they gained 5 percentage points of share in test tools but lost share in bonding and other conventional assembly and packaging tools3.

    Where the US stands

    Intel opened 9 in Rio Rancho, New Mexico, in January 2024 to make its Foveros 3D packages 6. Amkor broke ground in October 2025 on a $7B packaging and test campus in Peoria, Arizona, and expects production to start in early 202813.

    A prints a rectangle 26 mm by 33 mm, or 858 , in one exposure14. That area is called the . Every leading is bigger than that. Packaging is the stage that lets an accelerator be larger than one reticle field, and the packaging method limits how much larger it can be.

    How it works

    A second reason for the is (HBM). An HBM4 stack connects through 2,048 data signals, packed too tightly for a standard , so the memory sits beside the logic on the interposer15. Even Nvidia's H100, whose single is 814 mm2 and fits inside one reticle field, carries five HBM stacks16. Epoch AI counts TSMC's packaging among the three inputs the H100 needs, along with its logic die and its HBM1.

    The parts of an AI accelerator

    1. Package base. An AI chip is built from several parts. First comes the package base, a layered board that connects everything to the circuit board below.
    2. Interposer. On it sits an interposer, a thin layer of very fine wiring that joins everything placed on top.
    3. Logic chips. Two logic chips go in the middle. They do the calculating, and each is as large as a chipmaking machine can print.
    4. Memory. Eight stacks of memory go beside them, a few millimeters away. They hold the AI model’s weights and the record of each conversation so far.
    5. One package. Together they make one AI accelerator. Most are put together by TSMC, in Taiwan.

    Simplified view of a two-die, eight-stack accelerator. Footprints follow the sizes given in this chapter and chapter 10. Heights are exaggerated so each layer shows.

    CoWoS stands for chip on wafer on substrate, the order in which the parts are joined. For CoWoS-S, TSMC makes a that carries wiring and but no . Vias are metal-filled holes that join one layer of wiring to the next.

    TSMC bonds the logic dies and memory stacks face down onto that wafer with . These are dots of solder, and each dot is one electrical joint. In Intel's version of this packaging the microbumps sit 36 apart, less than half a hair's width17. Then TSMC cuts the interposer out of the wafer and attaches it to the resin substrate, which later goes onto a .

    One cracked joint can scrap a package holding eight tested HBM stacks and two large, expensive logic dies. Epoch AI estimated in December 2025 that CoWoS-L packaging added about $1,100 to the cost of building one Nvidia B200, more than the $900 of its two logic dies5.

    Variants and trade-offs

    FamilyCarrierSize limitUsed for
    CoWoS-SFull silicon interposerUp to 3.3x H100-class parts
    CoWoS-RResin interposer with fine Above 3.3x reticleCost-sensitive, fewer HBM stacks
    CoWoS-LRedistribution wiring with 5.5x reticle in production, 9.5x in developmentBlackwell, Rubin

    2.5D: silicon, RDL and bridges

    In the sit side by side and connect through an interposer or silicon bridges beneath them. TSMC has run CoWoS since 201218. CoWoS-S has the finest wiring, but its interposer is one unbroken piece of silicon whose (the share of interposers that work) falls as the area grows. CoWoS-L replaces that piece of silicon with redistribution layers (RDL) of fine copper wiring and embeds small silicon bridges where the wiring is densest19.

    Intel's EMIB embeds similar silicon bridges in the resin substrate17. SemiAnalysis reported in March 2026 that Amazon's Trainium and Google's were adopting it to different degrees11.

    Blackwell was the first high-volume design on CoWoS-L, and packaging problems at TSMC and in Nvidia's design limited its supply20. The bridges that carry the 10 link between the two logic dies must be placed very precisely20. The , bridges, interposer and substrate also expand at different rates, and that mismatch caused warpage20.

    3D: SoIC and Foveros

    Intel's Foveros stacks dies face to face and joins them with solder microbumps17. Its newer drops the solder and bonds the copper pads directly, a method called hybrid bonding17. Hybrid bonding joins the around the pads as well as the copper, with no bumps in between21. That lets the connections sit far closer together than microbumps allow17. TSMC's SoIC also uses hybrid bonding, and AMD's 3D V- processors use it to bond an extra cache die to the processor die22.

    TSMC put SoIC into volume production in 2022, stacking SRAM memory chips on logic wafers23. Its 3 nm SoIC entered volume production in 202519. An A14-on-A14 version, stacking dies made on TSMC's 1.4 nm process, is due in 202912. It will carry 1.8 times the die-to-die connection density of the 2 nm version12.

    In a stack the bottom die is the hardest to cool and the top die is the hardest to power. Because of the heat, 3D designs often put cache memory underneath and compute circuits on top.

    SoIC bonding also brings optics into the package. TSMC's COUPE uses SoIC to join a silicon photonics chip, which sends data as light, to its electrical control chip19. TSMC said in April 2026 that COUPE on substrate would begin production in 202612. It also said that putting COUPE inside the package gives twice the power efficiency of a pluggable version on the circuit board12.

    Two ways off the silicon interposer

    replaces the round wafer with a rectangular panel, which wastes far less area. See Test and assembly. , the semiconductor standards body, published a standard called SPHBM4 on 13 July 2026. It puts HBM4 memory on a carrying 512 data signals instead of 2,048, each running four times as fast to keep the same bandwidth15. With fewer signals, the connections can be spaced widely enough to mount the stack on a standard resin substrate instead of the silicon interposer15.

    Capacity

    TSMC does not publish its CoWoS capacity1. Industry estimates from SemiWiki and TrendForce, compiled by Epoch AI, put it at about 65,000 to 75,000 at the end of 2025, up from 35,000 to 40,000 a year earlier1.

    At its 2024 symposium TSMC said CoWoS capacity would grow at a 60 percent compound annual rate over the next few years24. But when asked about that rate on the July 2024 earnings call, TSMC's chief executive, C.C. Wei, did not repeat it24. He said he could not yet balance supply and demand24. He also said TSMC was more than doubling CoWoS capacity in 2024 and would more than double it again in 202524.

    In October 2025 Wei would say only that TSMC was working to increase capacity in 2026 and would probably give the real number in 202625. He said capacity (making the chips) and capacity (packaging them) were both, in his words, very tight25.

    Epoch AI compared each chip designer's use of components with world supply1. It puts Nvidia at 60.3 percent of all CoWoS capacity in 2025, with a 90 percent confidence interval of 56.5 to 64.31. Google took 13.5 percent, AMD 8.4 and Amazon 7.41. Together those four used around 90 percent of global CoWoS capacity and HBM supply, with HBM measured by value, but only 12 percent of advanced logic die production1.

    Estimated share of CoWoS capacity used, 2025

    Nvidia60.3%Google13.5%AMD8.4%Amazon7.4%Everyone else10.4%

    Source: Epoch AI, advanced packaging and HBM were the bottlenecks on AI chip production in 2025

    In March 2026 the research firm SemiAnalysis judged that front-end capacity had become the dominant bottleneck and that CoWoS constraints were easing11. It said TSMC was planning CoWoS capacity around how many wafers N3, its 3 nm process, could produce, because added packaging capacity is of no use without front-end wafers to fill it11. It also noted that CoWoS packaging can be, and has been, outsourced to assembly firms such as ASE and Amkor11.

    TSMC gave a different account four months later. On the July 2026 earnings call, Wei said TSMC's packaging capacity was so tight that it limited customers' growth2. Asked about Intel's EMIB-T, he said he welcomed the extra flexibility and hoped it would take some of the load off TSMC2. Later in the call he said back-end capacity was still in shortage26.

    Who makes it

    CoWoS interposer size on TSMC's roadmap

    CoWoS interposer size on TSMC's roadmap
    2024, CoWoS-L3.5 reticles
    2026, in production5.5 reticles
    In development, no date9.5 reticles
    202814 reticles

    Source: TSMC 2025 annual report and 2026 technology symposium

    Three kinds of firm package chips. TSMC, which makes chips for others, and Intel, which makes its own, do it in their own back-end fabs. firms do the rest. Intel opened 9 in Rio Rancho, New Mexico, in January 2024 to make its Foveros 3D packages in volume6. It called the plant the only US factory producing the most advanced packaging at scale6.

    ASE Technology Holding, the leading provider of assembly and test services, had revenue of NT$645.4 billion in 2025, about 40 percent of it from electronics manufacturing services7. Its assembly, test and materials business brought in NT$389.2 billion, up from NT$325.9 billion in 20247. Amkor, the largest US-headquartered assembly and test firm, had net sales of $6.71 billion in 20258.

    The packaging tools are a narrower than the assembly firms.

    • . Pressing dies together under heat and force. ASMPT's advanced packaging revenue reached $532.1 million in 2025, with thermocompression bonder revenue up about 146 percent10. ASMPT targets 35 to 40 percent of a market it puts at $1.6 billion in 202810.
    • Hybrid bonding. Copper pads and the insulator around them bond directly, with no solder. Applied Materials co-developed its Kinex hybrid bonding system with Besi, which Applied calls the industry leader in hybrid bonding27.
    • and dicing. Disco held 87 percent of the $1.9 billion world market for dicing tools in 2025, by CSET's count from TechInsights data28. The category covers the grinders that thin wafers and the saws that cut them into chips28. See Test and assembly.

    TSMC's Arizona commitment reached $265 billion in July 2026 and covers two advanced packaging plants alongside 10 fabs29. Amkor started building a $7 billion campus in Peoria in October 2025 and expects production from early 202813. The Commerce Department awarded Amkor up to $407 million in funding for the site in December 202430. In October 2025 Wei said a large outsourced packaging partner, already breaking ground in Arizona, was on an earlier schedule than TSMC's own two packaging fabs there31.

    The chokepoint

    China-based suppliers' share of selected tool segments, 2024

    China-based suppliers' share of selected tool segments, 2024
    Test, linear and discrete69%
    Burn-in test9%
    Advanced packaging fabrication tools7%
    SoC test5%

    Source: CSET, Inside Beijing’s Chipmaking Offensive

    Four of the top ten outsourced assembly and test firms by 2024 revenue are headquartered in China, by a TrendForce ranking that CSET cites3. JCET, a leading Chinese assembly and test firm, had record revenue of RMB 38.87 billion in 2025, up 8.1 percent9. JCET says its XDFOI platform has entered high-volume manufacturing with redistribution-layer interposer, silicon interposer and silicon bridge options32.

    Between 2019 and 2024, Chinese firms gained 5 percentage points of share in test tools and 4 points in fabrication tools built for advanced packaging, by CSET's analysis of TechInsights data3. But they lost share in bonding and other conventional assembly and packaging tools, the category where CSET counts hybrid and thermocompression bonders3. Within the advanced packaging fabrication tools, Chinese firms gained 10 points in and clean tools and 3 points in tools3. They lost 2 points each in and polishing () tools3. In 2024 Chinese firms had 7 percent of the market for advanced packaging fabrication tools3. In 2025 they had 5.3 percent of the $6.2 billion world market for these tools, against 65.8 percent for US firms and 15.3 percent for Japanese firms, by CSET's analysis of TechInsights data4.

    TSMC said in April 2026 that it was producing CoWoS at 5.5 times the size of a reticle field and planning larger versions12. Each generation on TSMC's roadmap needs a larger interposer.

    • 2028. A 14-reticle interposer, about the area of a compact disc, carrying about ten large compute dies and 20 HBM stacks12.
    • 2029. More than 14 reticles, plus a 40-reticle System-on-Wafer12.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    Why is an AI accelerator built from several chips in one package?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    Many leading accelerators, Nvidia's Blackwell among them, need more logic than a lithography machine can print in one shot.

    Packaging sets the chips and their memory side by side on an interposer, a shared wiring layer, and wires them together through it. Even the H100, built as one chip, uses an interposer to connect its memory. Reread: How it works

    Sources (32)
    1. AAdvanced packaging and HBM, not logic dies, were the bottlenecks on AI chip production in 2025Epoch AI · 12 March 2026
    2. AQ2 2026 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptLSEG StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 July 2026 · p. 10
    3. AInside Beijing’s Chipmaking OffensiveCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 14 July 2025
    4. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 20 October 2026
    5. ANVIDIA's B200 costs around $6,400 to produceEpoch AI · 10 December 2025
    6. AIntel Opens Fab 9 in New MexicoIntel · 24 January 2024
    7. AASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd. Reports Its Unaudited Consolidated Financial Results for the Fourth Quarter and the Full Year of 2025PR Newswire · 5 February 2026
    8. AAMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-02-09 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by AMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC.) · 9 February 2026
    9. AJCET Releases 2025 Annual Report, Posts Record-High Full-Year Revenue and Higher Profit Before TaxJCET Group · 9 April 2026
    10. AASMPT Announces 2025 Annual Results AI-Driven Structural Growth Underpins Group PerformanceASMPT · 4 March 2026
    11. BThe Great AI Silicon ShortageSemiAnalysis · 12 March 2026
    12. ATSMC Debuts A13 Technology at 2026 North America Technology SymposiumTSMC · 23 April 2026
    13. AAmkor Technology Breaks Ground on New Semiconductor Advanced Packaging and Test Campus in Arizona; Expands Investment to $7 BillionAmkor Technology · 6 October 2025
    14. ATWINSCAN NXE:3400CASML · Accessed 9 September 2026
    15. ANew JEDEC® SPHBM4 Standard Enables HBM4-Class Bandwidth on Organic SubstratesJEDEC Solid State Technology Association · 13 July 2026
    16. ANVIDIA Hopper Architecture In-DepthNvidia · 22 March 2022
    17. AFoveros Direct 3D Technology BriefIntel · 6 February 2026
    18. ATSMC, CoWoS technology pageTSMC · Accessed 9 September 2026
    19. ATSMC 2025 Annual Report, chapter 5TSMC · 16 April 2026 · p. 3
    20. BNvidia's Blackwell Reworked - Shipment Delays & GB200A Reworked PlatformsSemiAnalysis · 4 August 2024
    21. A[Tech Note] Hybrid Bonding: Evolving into a Foundational Technology for Improving Semiconductor PerformanceSK hynix · 25 August 2026
    22. BHybrid Bonding Process Flow - Advanced Packaging Part 5SemiAnalysis · 9 February 2024
    23. ATSMC 2022 Annual Report, page 97TSMC · Accessed 18 October 2026
    24. AQ2 2024 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptRefinitiv StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 18 July 2024 · p. 6
    25. AQ3 2025 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptRefinitiv StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 October 2025 · p. 7
    26. AQ2 2026 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptLSEG StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 July 2026 · p. 17
    27. AApplied Materials, Kinex integrated die-to-wafer hybrid bonding system product pageApplied Materials · Accessed 9 September 2026
    28. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    29. ATSMC Announces Additional $100 Billion Investment in ArizonaArizona Commerce Authority · 16 July 2026
    30. AAMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC., Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-31 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by AMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC.) · 20 February 2026
    31. AQ3 2025 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptRefinitiv StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 October 2025 · p. 13
    32. AJCET Accelerates Strategic Shift Toward High-End Advanced Packaging, 2025 Advanced Packaging Revenue Hits Record HighJCET Group · 21 April 2026

    Chapter 12: Substrates and PCBs

    Ajinomoto, a Japanese food company, told investors in June 2026 that it holds over 95 percent of the market for the insulating film inside high-end chip packages.

    1,912 words / 8 minSpecimen: substrate layersUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    A is the adapter between a and the under it. The chip's connections are finer than a human hair, but the board is wired in millimeters. The substrate is built in layers, like plywood, around a stiff core of and resin. Thin sheets of epoxy film are pressed onto both faces of the core. A laser burns holes through each sheet, and copper plated into the holes carries signals from one layer to the next. Every added layer is another set of holes that can fail. A handful of firms build these substrates. Japan's Ajinomoto dominates the film, and Japan's Nitto Boseki dominates the low-expansion glass cloth in the core.

    In short

    Ajinomoto's third site for making its , in Gifu Prefecture, is scheduled to start operating in 2032 to meet demand after 20301. Nitto Boseki says market demand seems to have risen about two to three times since it set its plan for fiscal 2024 to 20272. In January 2026 Nikkei Asia reported that Apple and Qualcomm were among the customers worried about Japanese supply3. In August 2026 Ibiden said it had prospects of a third and fourth glass cloth supplier and expected its material procurement risks to decrease4.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationThree or fewer firms could supply this stage today, or one firm holds more than half of it.
    SubstitutabilityRated on the insulating film inside the , because chipmakers and device makers would have to approve any rival film before using it5.
    Price or market size$7.5 billionmarket for FC-BGA substrates in 2025, up 18 percent, in a Prismark estimate cited by AT&S6
    Who leads
    • JPAjinomoto Told investors in June 2026 that its build-up film has held over 95% of its market since launch7
    • JPNitto Boseki Claimed an overwhelming advantage in low thermal expansion glass in its 2025 integrated report2
    • JPIbiden Said in May 2026 that it typically takes close to 100% of each new generation of interposer-type substrates at launch8
    • TWUnimicron Build-up substrates were 52% of sales in Q2 20269
    • KRSamsung Electro-Mechanics Package solution sales KRW 771.6bn in Q2 2026, up 37%10
    Where it is made
    • JPJapan Build-up film, low-expansion glass cloth, Ibiden and Shinko substrate plants in Gifu and Nagano
    • TWTaiwan Unimicron and Nan Ya PCB, substrate makers that sell to outside customers
    • KRSouth Korea Samsung Electro-Mechanics and a planned glass-core joint venture with Sumitomo Chemical's Dongwoo Fine-Chem
    • CNChina Most of TTM's circuit board competitors are based in China and Taiwan
    • ATAustria AT&S
    Why substitution is slow
    Ajinomoto makes the thin insulating film between the substrate's wiring layers11. Chipmakers and device makers approve substrate materials such as , so a rival film would need their approval too5.
    Where China stands

    TTM, an American maker, said in its annual report for 2025 that its circuit board competitors are mostly based in China and Taiwan12. Nitto Boseki, a Japanese glass fiber maker, said in its 2025 integrated report that Chinese and Taiwanese companies are aggressively catching up with it in the special glass sector2.

    Where the US stands

    The White House's 2021 supply chain review listed no American firm among the key substrate makers13. In December 2024 the Commerce Department finalized an award of up to $75 million to Absolics, an affiliate of Korea's SKC, for a glass substrate plant in Covington, Georgia14.

    The wires together inside a package. Beyond the interposer, the wiring runs through a made of epoxy and glass, then a of thirty layers, then a server .

    How it works

    How a substrate fans out

    1. The package. An AI chip is more than the chip itself. It sits in a package: the chips on a silicon base, and under them the substrate, which connects everything to the circuit board.
    2. Tight to wide. The connections on top are packed tight. The circuit board below is wired in millimeters. The substrate has to join the two.
    3. Layer by layer. The substrate does it in layers, built outward from a stiff core. Each layer carries the copper a little further out.
    4. Connected. Stacked together, the layers fan the tight grid out to the board’s wide one. Ajinomoto counts 11 layers of its film on each side of the core in a 2026 AI package substrate, against three on each side for a PC in 1999. Every layer is another chance for a flaw, which is what makes these substrates hard to build.

    Simplified. Three layers of film are drawn on each side of the core, and every thickness is exaggerated.

    The substrate maker drills the core and plates it with copper before the build-up starts. In each cycle the maker then presses on a film of epoxy, burns holes through it with a laser to connect the layers, and adds copper wiring on top15. Each film is about 10 thick, and a human hair is about 80 micrometers across16.

    Ajinomoto counts 11 layers of its film on each side of the core in a 2026 AI package substrate about 100 mm square17. A substrate about 70 mm square had nine on each side around 202317. PC substrates had three layers of the film on each side when PCs first adopted it in 199917. Silicon and epoxy expand at different rates when heated, so the larger the package, the more it warps. Nitto Boseki says its low-expansion cloth is highly rated as an effective fix for that warping, and that its use in substrates has increased significantly18.

    Variants and trade-offs

    BT substrates

    Substrates built on bismaleimide-triazine , or BT, are the other main family. Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, which makes BT materials, says they go mostly into thin packages for smartphone processors, radio modules and memory19. The company says BT also goes into flip-chip substrates for computer CPUs and 19. In these the chip is mounted face down, and BT laminate forms the core between layers of 20. In an October 2024 investor presentation, the company estimated that its BT resins held about 40 percent of the substrate materials market21.

    ABF build-up substrates

    Ajinomoto Build-up Film, or ABF, is the insulating film between the layers of package substrates for , used in PCs, network equipment, servers and AI equipment11. Ajinomoto first developed it in 1999 and says major chipmakers have used it as the de facto standard ever since22. On Ajinomoto's own site, its electronic materials division said practically all high-performance computers and servers rely on the film16. In June 2026 Ajinomoto told investors that the film has held a share of over 95 percent since its launch7.

    Layers of build-up film on each side of a package substrate's core

    Layers of build-up film on each side of a package substrate's core
    PC, 19993 layers
    HPC, about 20239 layers
    AI package, 202611 layers

    Source: Ajinomoto, Growth Strategy for the Electronic Materials Business, June 2026

    Glass core substrates

    A glass core expands less with heat than a resin core and stays flatter, so chipmakers and substrate makers are both trying it23.

    • Absolics, a subsidiary of Korea's SKC, has a final Commerce Department award of up to $75 million for a 120,000-square-foot glass substrate plant in Covington, Georgia24. The department finalized the award in December 202414. As of October 2026, the award's project page at NIST, a Commerce Department agency, expected first deliveries to customers in 2025 and production capacity to come online in 202724.
    • Intel announced glass substrates in September 2023 for the latter part of this decade25.
    • Samsung Electro-Mechanics signed a joint venture agreement with Sumitomo Chemical's subsidiary Dongwoo Fine-Chem in July 2026 to make glass core substrates26. The partners plan to have a supply system in place by the second half of fiscal 202726.

    The materials underneath

    Ajinomoto's Healthcare and Others segment, which includes electronic materials such as the film, lifted business profit 45.1 percent to JPY 66.2 billion in the year to March 202627. Ajinomoto attributes the rise mainly to higher electronic materials revenue and higher profit in Bio-Pharma Services & Ingredients27. It has set an investment budget of JPY 25 billion between 2023 and 2030 to expand film production28. It says there are no concerns about its current supply chain overall7. In May 2026 it announced the acquisition of land in Gifu Prefecture for a third production site, scheduled to start operating in 2032 to meet demand after 20301.

    The glass cloth in the core also has a dominant supplier. Nitto Boseki's T-glass is stiff and expands little when heated, and the company calls it essential for making high-density package substrates29. Laminate makers such as Mitsubishi Gas Chemical coat the glass cloth with resin and press it with copper foil into the core laminate that substrate makers build on30.

    Nitto Boseki claims an overwhelming advantage in quality and capacity for low-expansion glass2. It planned about JPY 80 billion of for fiscal 2024 to 202731. It says market demand seems to have risen about two to three times since that plan was set2. In August 2025 it decided to expand glass fiber cloth production at its Fukushima Enterprise Center, with production scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of its fiscal 202632. In May 2026 it forecast capital investment of JPY 45,000 million for the year to March 2027, up from JPY 21,702 million in the year to March 202633.

    In January 2026 Nikkei Asia reported that Apple and Qualcomm were among the customers worried about Japanese glass cloth supply3. In August 2026 Ibiden, a Japanese substrate maker, said it had used only two glass cloth suppliers, in Japan and Taiwan, but now had prospects of a third and fourth for 4. Because a Japanese supplier also plans to add capacity, Ibiden said it expected its material procurement risks to decrease4.

    Nitto Boseki says Chinese and Taiwanese companies are aggressively catching up with it in the special glass sector2. In July 2026 Nikkei Asia reported that Chinese chip materials makers were competing with Japanese rivals for a market that the industry association SEMI put at $73.2 billion in 202534.

    Who makes it

    Most of the firms that build substrates for others are Asian. The White House's 2021 hundred-day supply chain review listed build-up substrate among the materials that commenters called vulnerable35. It named key substrate makers including Ibiden, Nanya, Shinko, Samsung, Unimicron, Shennan Circuits, Zhuhai Yueya and AKM, none of them American13.

    A May 2024 report by the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group counted the major package substrate vendors by headquarters36. It found two in Japan, two in Taiwan, one in mainland China and none in the United States36. TTM Technologies, an American circuit board maker, says it also offers package substrates12.

    • Ibiden will invest about JPY 500 billion in high-performance package substrates from fiscal 2026 to fiscal 2028, starting with about JPY 220 billion, mainly at its Gama plant in Gifu Prefecture37. In August 2026 it said the Gama plant was scheduled to start operating in stages from the end of fiscal 2027 and to add to its results from fiscal 20284. In May 2026 management said Ibiden typically takes close to 100 percent of a new generation of interposer-type substrates at launch8. It added that this share may decline by 20 to 30 percent after about three to six months8. On substrates, it said wiring the underside is hard enough that Ibiden expects to keep its technical lead at least through fiscal 20308.
    • Unimicron reported NT$42.9 billion of sales in the second quarter of 2026, 52 percent of it build-up substrates and 61 percent of it AI data center work9.
    • Samsung Electro-Mechanics grew package solution sales 37 percent year on year to KRW 771.6 billion in the second quarter of 2026, on substrates for AI , server processors and cars10.
    • AT&S, an Austrian firm, calls itself a globally leading maker of high-end package substrates38. It makes them in China and Malaysia, and since its 2025/26 financial year also in Austria39. Citing the research firm Prismark, its annual report for 2025/26 valued the market for flip-chip (FC-BGA) substrates at $7.5 billion in 2025, up 18 percent from 20246.

    In February 2025 a company owned mainly by funds of JIC Capital, a subsidiary of Japan Investment Corporation, launched a tender offer to take Shinko, a Japanese substrate maker, private40. The offer covered the shares Fujitsu did not own, and Fujitsu agreed to sell its 50.02 percent stake back to Shinko41. The tender offer succeeded in March 202542.

    In September 2026 Shinko agreed to buy a plant in Mobara, Chiba Prefecture, from Japan Display, a display maker43. Shinko said it would make the site a new core plant for its flip-chip package substrates and would also expand capacity at its plants in Nagano43. Production at the Mobara plant is scheduled to start in fiscal 202843.

    Unimicron sales by technology, second quarter 2026

    ABF substrate52%HDI27%BT substrate9%PCB9%FPC2%Other1%

    Source: Unimicron 2026 Q2 earnings conference

    The boards under the GPU

    TTM Technologies says it regularly builds printed circuit boards of more than 30 layers and can go past 7012. Those layers carry power to the GPUs and route fast signals between them, so how much signal the laminate absorbs is a main design constraint. Nitto Boseki also makes NE-glass, a low- glass cloth that absorbs less signal, used in switches and routers in data centers44.

    Data center computing was 24 percent of TTM's fiscal 2025 revenue of about $2.9 billion, against 14 percent two years earlier12. TTM says its circuit board competitors are mostly based in China and Taiwan12. In its annual report for 2025, TTM said it was building a plant in Syracuse, New York, to make ultra-high-density circuit boards for national security needs12. It expected volume production there in the second half of 202612. Thailand aims to be the biggest circuit board hub outside China as board makers diversify production45.

    The chokepoint

    The few firms that build substrates are spending to add capacity, but it takes years. In August 2026 Ibiden said that, with supply short across the industry, the average price of package substrates had risen more than it expected4. The materials inside the substrate are harder to replace. Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, a laminate maker, says chipmakers and electronic device makers further down the chain approve the materials it sells to substrate makers5. Ajinomoto dominates the film, and Nitto Boseki dominates the low-expansion glass cloth in the core. Both are adding capacity on plans that run for years.

    Packages are also getting bigger. TSMC told investors in July 2026 that its packaging roadmap goes beyond 14 times the area a can print in one shot46. A bigger package warps more and needs more layers, so it has more holes that can break the circuit. That lowers , the share of substrates that come out working, and each substrate is already expensive before a chip is mounted on it.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What does a package substrate do?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    It connects a chip's hair-fine contacts to a circuit board wired in millimeters.

    It is built in layers of epoxy film and copper around a stiff glass-cloth core. Reread: How it works

    Sources (46)
    1. AAjinomoto, Growth Strategy for the Electronic Materials Business, 30 June 2026Ajinomoto · 30 June 2026 · p. 20
    2. ANittobo Group Integrated Report 2025Nitto Boseki (Nittobo) · 16 September 2025 · p. 4
    3. BApple and Qualcomm fret over strained supplies of Japan's glass clothNikkei Asia · 14 January 2026
    4. AIbiden, questions and answers from the financial presentation for the first quarter of the year ending 31 March 2027Ibiden · 5 August 2026
    5. AElectronics Materials Business (Mitsubishi Gas Chemical business briefing)Mitsubishi Gas Chemical · 2 October 2024 · p. 12
    6. AAT&S Annual Report 2025/26AT&S · 10 June 2026 · p. 33
    7. AAjinomoto, Growth Strategy for the Electronic Materials Business, 30 June 2026Ajinomoto · 30 June 2026 · p. 3
    8. AIbiden, questions and answers from the financial presentation for the year ended 31 March 2026Ibiden · 12 May 2026
    9. AUnimicron 2026 Q2 Earnings ConferenceUnimicron Technology · July 2026
    10. ASamsung Electro-Mechanics, Q2 2026 business resultsSamsung Electro-Mechanics · 30 July 2026
    11. AAjinomoto, Growth Strategy for the Electronic Materials Business, 30 June 2026Ajinomoto · 30 June 2026 · p. 9
    12. ATTM TECHNOLOGIES INC, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-29 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by TTM TECHNOLOGIES INC) · 17 February 2026
    13. ABuilding Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth: 100-Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017The White House (Biden administration archive) · June 2021 · p. 43
    14. ABiden-Harris Administration Announces CHIPS Incentives Awards with Absolics and Entegris to Support Development of Advanced Packaging Technology and Onshore Material for Leading-Edge Chip ProductionNIST · 5 December 2024
    15. AAjinomoto, Growth Strategy for the Electronic Materials Business, 30 June 2026Ajinomoto · 30 June 2026 · p. 18
    16. AThe Ajinomoto Group’s Unexpected Role in Semiconductor Manufacturing: The Insulating Film “ABF” Born from “AminoScience”Ajinomoto · 5 March 2026
    17. AAjinomoto, Growth Strategy for the Electronic Materials Business, 30 June 2026Ajinomoto · 30 June 2026 · p. 11
    18. ANittobo Group Integrated Report 2025Nitto Boseki (Nittobo) · 16 September 2025 · p. 17
    19. AElectronics Materials Business (Mitsubishi Gas Chemical business briefing)Mitsubishi Gas Chemical · 2 October 2024 · p. 16
    20. AElectronics Materials Business (Mitsubishi Gas Chemical business briefing)Mitsubishi Gas Chemical · 2 October 2024 · p. 18
    21. AElectronics Materials Business (Mitsubishi Gas Chemical business briefing)Mitsubishi Gas Chemical · 2 October 2024 · p. 11
    22. AAjinomoto, Business Briefing: ABF-Based Growth Strategy in ICT, 12 June 2023Ajinomoto · 12 June 2023 · p. 4
    23. ASamsung Electro-Mechanics Signs MOU with Sumitomo Chemical Group to Establish a Joint Venture for Glass Core Used in Package SubstratesSamsung Electro-Mechanics · 5 November 2025
    24. AAbsolics (Georgia)NIST · 5 July 2024
    25. AIntel Unveils Industry-Leading Glass Substrates to Meet Demand for More Powerful ComputeIntel · 18 September 2023
    26. ASumitomo Chemical Subsidiary to Establish of a Joint Venture with Samsung Electro-Mechanics for the Glass Core Substrate BusinessSumitomo Chemical · 2 July 2026
    27. AConsolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2026 (Under IFRS)Ajinomoto · 7 May 2026 · p. 8
    28. AAjinomoto, Growth Strategy for the Electronic Materials Business, 30 June 2026Ajinomoto · 30 June 2026 · p. 21
    29. ANittobo Group Integrated Report 2025Nitto Boseki (Nittobo) · 16 September 2025 · p. 3
    30. AElectronics Materials Business (Mitsubishi Gas Chemical business briefing)Mitsubishi Gas Chemical · 2 October 2024 · p. 28
    31. ANittobo Group Integrated Report 2025Nitto Boseki (Nittobo) · 16 September 2025 · p. 5
    32. ANittobo Group Integrated Report 2025Nitto Boseki (Nittobo) · 16 September 2025 · p. 12
    33. AConsolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2026Nitto Boseki (Nittobo) · 12 May 2026 · p. 5
    34. BChina chip material makers battle Japan rivals for $73bn marketNikkei Asia · 1 July 2026
    35. ABuilding Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth: 100-Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017The White House (Biden administration archive) · June 2021 · p. 45
    36. AEmerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainBoston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association · May 2024 · p. 19
    37. AIbiden, Notice Regarding Capital Investment Plan for High-Performance IC Package SubstratesIbiden · 3 February 2026
    38. AAT&S Annual Report 2025/26AT&S · 10 June 2026 · p. 67
    39. AAT&S Annual Report 2025/26AT&S · 10 June 2026 · p. 53
    40. AAnnouncement Regarding Commencement of the Tender Offer for the Shares of Shinko Electric Industries Co., Ltd. (Securities Code: 6967) by JICC-04, Ltd.Japan Investment Corporation · 17 February 2025 · p. 1
    41. AAnnouncement Regarding Commencement of the Tender Offer for the Shares of Shinko Electric Industries Co., Ltd. (Securities Code: 6967) by JICC-04, Ltd.Japan Investment Corporation · 17 February 2025 · p. 3
    42. A(Progress Report on Disclosed Matters) Notice Regarding Completion of JICC-04’s Tender Offer for Shares of a Consolidated Subsidiary of Fujitsu Limited (SHINKO ELECTRIC INDUSTRIES CO., LTD.)Fujitsu · 19 March 2025
    43. ANotice Concerning the Acquisition of Japan Display Inc.’s Mobara FabShinko Electric Industries · 30 September 2026
    44. ANittobo Group Integrated Report 2025Nitto Boseki (Nittobo) · 16 September 2025 · p. 7
    45. BThailand carves out a less-glamorous AI niche: printed circuit boardsNikkei Asia · 3 September 2025
    46. AQ2 2026 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptLSEG StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 July 2026 · p. 16

    Chapter 13: Test and Assembly

    Testing finds bad chips before they go into an expensive package. Japan's Advantest took about 65 percent of 2025 spending on chip testers, by its own estimate.

    1,629 words / 7 minSpecimen: probe cardUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    Before a can be sold, a machine called a has to check that it works. While the chips are still on the , thousands of needles press onto small metal pads on each one. The tester sends signals through the needles and reads what comes back, and any chip that fails goes no further. A modern is a dozen expensive pieces bonded into one package, and if one piece is bad, all of them are thrown away. So the industry now tests chips earlier, at higher temperatures and for longer, to make weak ones fail during testing before they reach a finished product. Two firms, Advantest in Japan and Teradyne in the United States, sell most of the testers.

    In short

    In a TrendForce ranking cited by CSET, four of the ten largest assembly and test contractors by 2024 revenue are headquartered in China1. Georgetown's CSET, analyzing TechInsights data, finds that between 2019 and 2024 Chinese toolmakers gained 5 percentage points of share in test tools1. Across assembly, test and packaging tools, they still lag significantly behind foreign suppliers1. Advantest says that switching to another maker means rebuilding a customer's whole test setup, at significant extra cost2.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationFour to six firms could supply this stage today, and the top two take most of the revenue.
    SubstitutabilityRated on test tools, where Advantest held 62.7 percent of the market in 2025 and Teradyne 21.8 percent, by CSET's analysis of TechInsights data3.
    Price or market sizeAbout $9.0 billionmarket for chip testers in 2025, by Advantest's estimate4
    Who leads
    • JPAdvantest About 65% of the tester market in 2025, by its own estimate4
    • USTeradyne $2.52bn of semiconductor test revenue in 2025, service included5
    • TWASE Ran 8,348 testers in Q2 2026, up from 6,797 a year earlier6
    • USAmkor $6.71bn of 2025 revenue7
    • JPDisco 87% of the $1.9bn market for dicing saws and grinders in 2025, on CSET's analysis of TechInsights data8
    Where it is made
    • TWTaiwan Taiwanese firms such as ASE and Powertech lead outsourced assembly and test
    • JPJapan Advantest testers, Accretech and Tokyo Electron probers, Disco and Accretech dicing and grinding
    • USUnited States Test equipment from Teradyne, FormFactor, Cohu and Aehr, and Amkor's planned Arizona packaging plant
    • CNChina Four of the top ten assembly and test firms by 2024 revenue, in a TrendForce ranking cited by CSET
    • MYMalaysia Malaysia said in July 2026 that it ships 13% of the world's packaged chips
    Why substitution is possible
    Customers such as ASE already buy testers from both firms9. The barrier is the cost of switching, which Advantest says means rebuilding a customer's whole test setup2.
    Where China stands

    Georgetown's CSET, analyzing TechInsights data, finds that between 2019 and 2024 Chinese toolmakers gained 5 percentage points of share in test tools and 4 points in fabrication tools built for 1. But they lost share in bonding and other conventional assembly and packaging tools1.

    Where the US stands

    American firms held 23.5 percent of the market for test tools in 2025 and Japanese firms 63.0 percent, by CSET's analysis of TechInsights data3. Amkor raised its planned investment in an Arizona packaging and test campus to $7 billion in October 202510. In June 2026 it announced a long-term partnership with TSMC, which will buy packaging and test services from it in Arizona11.

    Turning silicon into a finished, packaged takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps, depending on how complex the chip is, the Semiconductor Industry Association estimated in 202512. Advantest's investor guide of July 2026 says test is the only step that puts electrical signals through the chip13. The earlier stages of chipmaking make , the individual chips on a . The of the industry, assembly and test, checks which of them work and puts the good ones into packages.

    How it works

    How a chip is tested

    1. The wafer. Earlier stages make the chips. Before any of them can be sold, a machine tests each one, starting while the chips are still on the wafer.
    2. Needles. Thousands of needles on a probe card press onto one chip. They touch small metal pads on its surface.
    3. Questions and answers. Through the needles, the tester sends signals into the chip and reads what comes back. It checks every answer.
    4. Chip by chip. The wafer moves under the needles, chip by chip. The tester marks any chip that answers wrong, and that chip goes no further.
    5. Into the package. Only chips that pass go on to be packaged. A modern accelerator bonds together a dozen expensive pieces, and one bad piece throws away all of them, so each piece is tested before it goes in.

    Simplified. Nine needles stand for thousands. In a real prober the card stays still and the wafer is raised to meet the needles. The failed chips are placed for illustration and do not reflect a real yield. The package follows chapter 11: two logic chips and eight memory stacks on an interposer and a package base.

    Each round of test catches failures the round before it cannot see.

    • . Thousands of needles land on each die while it is still on the wafer. A sends in test patterns and checks the answers, and dies that fail go no further.
    • . The part runs hot and at raised voltage for minutes to days, on the wafer or in the package, so that early-life failures happen in the factory, before the part ships14.
    • Final test. The tester checks the packaged part again, because packaging adds failures of its own.
    • System-level test. The finished part sits in a socket and runs something close to a real workload, because some failures appear only when everything runs at once.

    As the parts in a package grow more valuable, finding a bad die before packaging matters more15. Aehr's wafer-level burn-in systems look for early-life and hidden failures before dies are cut from the wafer15. Catching those failures early lowers the risk of packaging and an expensive with a processor that may later fail15. Aehr says its lead AI customer is moving all burn-in for its AI from the system level to the wafer16. The FOX-XP systems that customer ordered from Aehr in August 2026 each burn in nine 300 mm wafers at a time15.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Wafer sort and known-good die

    The hard part of wafer sort is the , the that holds the needles. FormFactor says the high-frequency capability of its probe cards lets it compete favorably in testing high-bandwidth memory, a stack of eight, twelve or sixteen memory dies17. For a large every needle must sit in the same plane, survive repeated touchdowns without drifting, and do it hot. Each card is built for one chip design, so every new design needs a new card and a new .

    Final test, burn-in and system-level test

    The bigger the package, the more one bad die can cost. TSMC has told investors that its packaging roadmap runs beyond 14 times the area a can print in one shot18. A die that fails after assembly wastes the memory and substrate joined to it15. ASE, a Taiwanese , ran 6,797 testers in the second quarter of 2025 and 8,348 a year later6.

    Automated test equipment: share of the ~$9.0bn tester market, 2025

    Advantest65%Teradyne and all others35%

    Source: Advantest FY2025 results briefing, April 2026

    Who makes it

    Advantest puts its own share at about 65 percent of an estimated $9.0 billion tester market in 20254. Its share of (SoC) testers, the machines that test processors and other non-memory chips, rose about ten points in a year to 66 percent4. It held about 60 percent of memory test4.

    Teradyne, Advantest's main rival, took $2.52 billion of semiconductor test revenue in 2025, service included5. Of that, $1.89 billion came from SoC testers and $505 million from memory testers5. Teradyne's total revenue grew 13 percent to $3.19 billion in 2025, with fourth-quarter revenue up 44 percent on AI demand19.

    Georgetown University's CSET, analyzing TechInsights data, gives Advantest 62.7 percent of the $9.1 billion market for test tools in 2025 and Teradyne 21.8 percent3. Japanese firms held 63.0 percent of that market and American firms 23.5 percent3.

    Where the tester money went in calendar 2025

    SoC testers$6.9bnMemory testers$2.1bn

    Source: Advantest FY2025 results briefing, April 2026

    The rest of the test and assembly equipment market splits into niches, each with its own suppliers.

    • Probe cards. FormFactor took $785.0 million of revenue in fiscal 2025, most of it from probe cards17. Technoprobe's revenue grew 15.7 percent to EUR 628.4 million in 2025, about 38 percent of it from AI20. It aims to double its manufacturing capacity by the end of 202720.
    • Probers, the machines that move each wafer under the probe card and keep it at a set temperature. Tokyo Seimitsu, which sells under the Accretech name, says its own research gives it the largest global share in probers21. Tokyo Electron makes probers too22. CSET's analysis of TechInsights data gives Tokyo Electron 19.9 percent and Accretech 17.1 percent of the $2.9 billion market for handlers and probers in 202523.
    • Handlers and burn-in, the machines that feed packaged parts into a tester and hold them at a set temperature, and the systems that run burn-in. Cohu took $453.0 million of revenue in fiscal 202524. Aehr's revenue was $50.0 million in fiscal 2026, but it booked a record $60.7 million of orders in the fourth quarter alone16. It expects revenue of $130 million to $150 million in fiscal 202716.
    • and grinding. Dicing saws cut wafers into dies, and grinders thin them. CSET's analysis of TechInsights data found that in 2025 Disco held 87 percent and Accretech 8.1 percent of the $1.9 billion market for these machines8. In December 2025 Disco announced a saw that cuts panels as large as 400 by 400 mm into individual packages25.
    • Bonding. Kulicke and Soffa took $654.1 million of revenue in fiscal 202526. Besi's second-quarter 2026 revenue rose 68.7 percent to EUR 249.9 million on and data center demand27.

    use heat and force to press memory dies into a stack and to attach to substrates. ASMPT says it remained the leader in that market in 2025 and aims for a 35 to 40 percent share28. In its 2025 results it said it expects the market to reach $1.6 billion by 202828. In July 2026 ASMPT announced new bulk orders for more than 50 of its chip-to-substrate bonders for AI chips, from outsourced assembly and test firms29. Hanmi Semiconductor in Korea also sells thermocompression bonders, including dual bonders for high-bandwidth memory30. See Memory and HBM.

    The back end's geography

    Taiwanese firms lead outsourced assembly and test, the OSAT business, and Chinese firms are large challengers. ASE billed $20,573.4 million in 20259. Packaging made up about 48 percent of that, testing about 11 percent and its electronics manufacturing arm about 40 percent31. In a TrendForce ranking that CSET cites, four of the top ten OSATs by 2024 revenue are headquartered in China1.

    Malaysia's investment agency said in July 2026 that the country ships 13 percent of the world's packaged chips32. It said a consortium of five Malaysian firms aims to help the country capture 7 percent of world shipments by 203532. A 2024 study by the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group gave Malaysia 7 percent of global assembly, test and packaging capacity in 2022, the largest share in Southeast Asia33. The study measured capacity by factory floor space at contractors and chipmakers' own plants34.

    ASE spent $2.7 billion on machinery and $1.4 billion on buildings, facilities and automation in the first half of 202635. It says revenue from advanced packaging is running ahead of its $3.5 billion forecast for the year35. Powertech, another Taiwanese assembly and test firm, aims to run the first line for AI chips in 202736.

    Amkor, an American assembly and test contractor, took $6.71 billion of revenue in 20257. Its revenue in the second quarter of 2026 alone was $1.90 billion, up 26 percent year on year37. It has raised the planned investment in its Arizona campus to $7 billion10.

    In October 2024 TSMC and Amkor signed a memorandum of understanding for TSMC to buy packaging and test services from Amkor's planned plant in Peoria, Arizona38. TSMC would use those services for its customers, especially those using its Phoenix 38. The two announced a long-term partnership in June 202611.

    Testers installed at ASE, a Taiwanese assembly and test contractor

    Testers installed at ASE, a Taiwanese assembly and test contractor
    Q2 20256,797 testers
    Q1 20267,585 testers
    Q2 20268,348 testers

    Source: ASE Technology Holding, second quarter 2026 earnings release (SEC Form 6-K)

    The chokepoint

    Advantest says that switching to another tester maker means rebuilding the whole test setup used for development, evaluation and , at significant extra cost to the customer2. Still, ASE says it buys testers with similar functions from different makers, including Teradyne and Advantest9.

    CSET, analyzing TechInsights data, finds that between 2019 and 2024 Chinese toolmakers gained 5 percentage points of share in test tools and 4 points in fabrication tools built for advanced packaging1. But they lost share in bonding and other conventional assembly and packaging tools1. They still lag significantly behind foreign suppliers1.

    ASE's packaging business took $9,829.2 million from outside customers in 2025, and its testing business $2,292.0 million9. Amkor took $6.71 billion7. Global semiconductor sales that year were $791.7 billion39.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 3Question

    Why do chipmakers test chips early and often?

    Card 1 of 3Answer

    One bad chip can ruin a package that holds a dozen expensive ones.

    Testing makes a weak chip fail before it is built into a finished product. Reread: How it works

    Sources (39)
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    2. AInvestors Guide July 29, 2026Advantest · 30 July 2026 · p. 12
    3. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 20 October 2026
    4. AAdvantest, presentation notes for the FY2025 (year ended 31 March 2026) results briefing, 27 April 2026Advantest · 27 April 2026 · p. 13
    5. ATERADYNE, INC, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-31 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by TERADYNE, INC) · 19 February 2026
    6. AASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd., Form 6-K report of foreign private issuer for the period ended 2026-07-30U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd.) · 30 July 2026
    7. AAMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-02-09 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by AMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC.) · 9 February 2026
    8. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    9. AASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd., Form 20-F annual report for the period ended 2025-12-31U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd.) · 1 April 2026
    10. AAmkor Technology Breaks Ground on New Semiconductor Advanced Packaging and Test Campus in Arizona; Expands Investment to $7 BillionAmkor Technology · 6 October 2025
    11. ATSMC and Amkor Technology Announce Long Term Partnership to Accelerate Advanced Packaging in the United StatesAmkor Technology · 16 June 2026
    12. ATestimony of David Isaacs, Semiconductor Industry Association, hearing on “Trade in Critical Supply Chains”U.S. Senate Committee on Finance · 14 May 2025 · p. 2
    13. AInvestors Guide July 29, 2026Advantest · 30 July 2026 · p. 10
    14. AAEHR TEST SYSTEMS, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2026-05-29U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by AEHR TEST SYSTEMS) · 27 July 2026
    15. AAehr Receives $22 Million Follow-On Order for AI Processor Wafer-Level Burn-In SystemsAehr Test Systems · 12 August 2026
    16. AAehr Test Systems Reports Fiscal 2026 Fourth Quarter and Full Year Financial Results with Record Quarterly Bookings and $100 Million Effective BacklogAehr Test Systems · 14 July 2026
    17. AFORMFACTOR INC, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-27 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by FORMFACTOR INC) · 20 February 2026
    18. AQ2 2026 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptLSEG StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 July 2026 · p. 16
    19. ATeradyne Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2025 ResultsTeradyne · 2 February 2026
    20. ATechnoprobe, press release: the Board of Directors approves the draft statutory and consolidated annual report as at 31 December 2025Technoprobe · 18 March 2026 · p. 1
    21. ATokyo Seimitsu Integrated Report 2025Accretech · 3 December 2025 · p. 6
    22. APrecio™ SeriesTokyo Electron · Accessed 9 September 2026
    23. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 20 October 2026
    24. ACOHU, INC., Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-27 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by COHU, INC.) · 17 February 2026
    25. ADISCO develops the DFD6080 fully automatic dicing saw for work sizes up to 400 mm square (最大400mm角のパッケージ切断に対応したダイシングソー「DFD6080」を開発)DISCO Corporation · 15 December 2025
    26. AKULICKE AND SOFFA INDUSTRIES, INC., Form 8-K, exhibit 99.1: results for the fourth quarter and fiscal 2025 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by KULICKE AND SOFFA INDUSTRIES, INC.) · 19 November 2025
    27. ABE Semiconductor Industries N.V. Announces Q2-26 and H1-26 ResultsBE Semiconductor Industries (Besi) · 23 July 2026
    28. AASMPT Announces 2025 Annual Results AI-Driven Structural Growth Underpins Group PerformanceASMPT · 4 March 2026
    29. AASMPT Secures Significant Wins for More than 50 Chip-to-Substrate Thermo-Compression Bonding ToolsASMPT · 29 July 2026
    30. AHanmi Semiconductor, products pageHanmi Semiconductor · Accessed 9 September 2026
    31. AASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd., Form 6-K report of foreign private issuer for the period ended 2026-02-05U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd.) · 5 February 2026
    32. AAdvanced Packaging: How Malaysia is Packaging the Future of AIMalaysian Investment Development Authority · 1 July 2026
    33. AEmerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainBoston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association · May 2024 · p. 21
    34. AEmerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainBoston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association · May 2024 · p. 35
    35. AASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd., Form 6-K report of foreign private issuer for the period ended 2026-07-30U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd.) · 30 July 2026
    36. BPowertech eyes world's first panel-level packaging for AI chips in 2027Nikkei Asia · 27 August 2026
    37. AAMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-07-27 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by AMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC.) · 27 July 2026
    38. AAmkor and TSMC to Expand Partnership and Collaborate on Advanced Packaging in ArizonaTSMC · 4 October 2024
    39. AGlobal Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025Semiconductor Industry Association · 6 February 2026

    Chapter 14: Systems and Networking

    AI chips are wired together 72 to a rack and run as one computer. Many firms can assemble the racks, but lasers for the optical links between them were scarce in 2026.

    1,845 words / 8 minSpecimen: GPU baseboardUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    One AI is not enough to train a model. So seventy-two of them are wired together in a , a cabinet the size of a wardrobe, and run as one computer. Each chip sits on its own board and draws more than a thousand amps, several times the current a whole house is wired to carry. The chips have to swap results with each other all the time. A copper wire can carry those signals only a few meters before they fade, so the longer links send them as light down glass fiber. Many companies can build the rack, but in 2026 the lasers that send the light were scarce.

    In short

    In March 2026 Nvidia agreed to invest $2 billion in the laser maker Lumentum, alongside a multibillion-dollar purchase commitment and rights to future capacity for advanced laser components1. is used in high-speed lasers for optical communications, and China produced 70 percent of the world's indium in 20252.

    On 4 February 2025 China added indium phosphide , the the lasers are grown on, to its list3. AXT, a US-listed maker of those wafers, does all its manufacturing in China3. In its filing for the quarter to June 2026, AXT said it could not estimate when it would resume shipping the wafers to the United States3.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationFour to six firms could supply this stage today, and the top two take most of the revenue.
    SubstitutabilityRated on and its NVSwitch , which Nvidia controls and which join the in a 4. Lasers for the optical links were also scarce in 20265. Nvidia secured future capacity rights for them from Lumentum in March 20261.
    Price or market size$3.1 millionfor one GB200 NVL72 rack bought by a typical hyperscaler, or about $3.9 million with networking, storage and other items, by SemiAnalysis's August 2025 estimate6
    Who leads
    • USNvidia NVLink, InfiniBand and Spectrum-X Ethernet, which it credited for data center growth in the quarter to April 20267
    • USBroadcom $16.7B of AI semiconductor revenue in the quarter to August 2026, up 221%8
    • TWFoxconn World's largest AI server provider, its chairman said in March 20269
    • CNInnoLight High-speed optical modules made in Suzhou and, since 2019, Thailand10
    • USCoherent Lasers and optical networking products, with a $2B Nvidia investment agreed in March 202611
    Where it is made
    • USUnited States Switch and accelerator silicon, system design, indium phosphide lasers
    • TWTaiwan Contract design, rack assembly and high-layer-count circuit boards
    • JPJapan Low-loss board laminate
    • CNChina Optical module assembly and test, and most of the world's indium
    • THThailand Chinese module makers' offshore transceiver plants
    Why substitution is possible
    UALink is an open specification for the same job as NVLink12. AMD's Helios rack, launched in July 2026, runs it over 13. Since May 2025 Nvidia's NVLink Fusion program has let other firms' custom chips use NVLink, so the dependence on Nvidia stays14.
    Where China stands

    Chinese firms such as InnoLight assemble high-speed , at sites including Suzhou and, since 2019, Thailand10. In February 2025 China put under new export restrictions2. The same month it began requiring export permits for indium phosphide , the the lasers are grown on3.

    Where the US stands

    Coherent broke ground in Sherman, Texas, in June 2026 on an expansion of its indium phosphide factory15. In August 2026 Nvidia said that Wistron's new plant in Fort Worth, Texas, was producing its GB300 superchips and that Foxconn was building a factory in Houston16.

    Before a package can compute, it has to be built into a machine. Building that machine is a separate industry from making the package.

    How it works

    How AI chips are wired together

    1. One rack. One AI chip is not enough to train a model. So 72 of them are wired together in one rack, a cabinet the size of a wardrobe, and run as one computer.
    2. Copper inside. Inside the rack, copper wires link each tray of chips to the switch trays, which pass data between any two chips. Copper carries a signal only a few meters.
    3. Light between. Training a large model takes many racks, most of them too far apart for copper. The links between them carry the signal as flashes of light in glass fiber.
    4. Lasers. At each end of a fiber, a laser turns the electrical signal into flashes of light, and a detector turns them back. That lets thousands of chips in many racks work on one model.

    Simplified. The trays follow the layout of an Nvidia NVL72 rack. Racks and fibers are not drawn to scale.

    An (the AI chip) ships as a module, the chip package on a small board with the circuits that feed it power. Nvidia calls its version , and the open-standards equivalent is the Open Compute Project's accelerator module. Eight modules bolt onto a baseboard that carries their power and the links between them. On Nvidia's baseboard, switch chips pass data between any two modules at full speed.

    systems drop the baseboard and put the chips on trays stacked in the rack. An Nvidia holds 18 compute trays plus nine switch trays, 72 in all, and draws up to 142 17. The newer Vera Rubin NVL72 uses the same rack footprint18. SemiAnalysis estimated in August 2025 that a GB200 NVL72 rack cost a typical $3.1 million, or about $3.9 million with networking, storage and other items6.

    Inside the rack the trays reach each other over copper17. Between neighboring racks, the signal can travel up to 7 meters over active electrical cables, a type of copper cable sold by firms such as Credo19. Longer links run on glass fiber, with an at each end. A laser in the sending transceiver turns the electrical signal into pulses of light, and a detector in the receiving one turns the pulses back into current.

    The accelerators in an AI cluster exchange data over two networks that are not interchangeable. connects anywhere from a few dozen accelerators to thousands closely enough that they can read each other's memory. It runs at . joins those groups to one another at hundreds of gigabits per second. A byte is eight bits, so each GPU in a GB300 NVL72 has nine times as much bandwidth for scale-up as for scale-out, SemiAnalysis calculated in January 202620.

    A model too big for one accelerator is split across many. The parts that exchange data constantly stay inside the scale-up group, while whole blocks of layers can sit on different groups across the slower scale-out network21. So scale-up bandwidth limits how efficiently a large model trains.

    Variants and trade-offs

    The designs differ in how many accelerators can share one pool of memory.

    • and NVSwitch. Nvidia's per-GPU bandwidth went from 900 GB/s in NVLink 4 to 1,800 in NVLink 5, and the rack's own network moves 130 TB/s on Blackwell22. Nvidia's Rubin launch release of January 2026 gives NVLink 6 as 3,600 GB/s per GPU and 260 TB/s for a Vera Rubin NVL72 rack23. As of October 2026, Nvidia's NVLink product page still lists preliminary figures of 3,000 GB/s and 216 TB/s22.
    • UALink. The open specification runs 200 Gb/s per lane, four lanes to a station for 800 Gb/s, and can address up to 1,024 endpoints in one group12. AMD's Helios rack, launched in July 2026, joins 72 GPUs and runs UALink over for its scale-up network13.
    • Google's 3D torus. Google wires 64 of its Ironwood accelerators into each rack, called a cube24. Inside the cube each chip links directly to six others, in a three-dimensional grid that Google calls a 3D torus24. Optical circuit switches join cubes into superpods of 9,216 chips that can bypass a failed cube or link24.

    Scale-out: InfiniBand versus Ethernet

    , a specialized network long used in supercomputers, was the main scale-out network when AI clusters were small and uniform, but Ethernet switch capacity grew quickly. Broadcom's Tomahawk 4 switched 25.6 Tbps on one chip in December 201925. Tomahawk 5 reached 51.2 Tbps in August 2022, and Broadcom said it had doubled the bandwidth about every two years since 201426. Tomahawk 6 doubled it again to 102.4 Tbps in June 202527. In June 2025 the Ultra Ethernet Consortium published its 1.0 specification, a set of Ethernet-based communication protocols for AI and supercomputing that covers transport, congestion control and direct memory access28.

    Broadcom Tomahawk switching capacity on one chip

    Broadcom Tomahawk switching capacity on one chip
    Tomahawk 425.6 Tbps
    Tomahawk 551.2 Tbps
    Tomahawk 6102.4 Tbps

    Source: Broadcom product releases for Tomahawk 4, 5 and 6

    Nvidia sells switches and network cards for both InfiniBand and Ethernet. Its data center revenue reached $89.0 billion in the quarter to July 2026, up 117 percent from a year earlier29. In the quarter before, it credited its data center growth to Blackwell 300 products and to demand for its "InfiniBand, Spectrum-X Ethernet, and NVLink" solutions7.

    Optics: pluggable, then co-packaged

    A cluster needs several transceivers, the modules that turn electricity into light and back, for each accelerator. Their power cost is one reason Broadcom and Nvidia are moving the optics out of pluggable modules and into the switch chip's own package, a design called . Broadcom's Tomahawk 6 Davisson cuts optical interconnect power by 70 percent compared with traditional pluggable modules30. It keeps its lasers in field-replaceable modules30. Nvidia's Spectrum-X Photonics switches, announced in March 2025, reach 512 ports of 800 gigabits and use four times fewer lasers than traditional designs31. Nvidia builds them on its Spectrum-6 switch design23. In August 2026 Nvidia said its Spectrum-6 switch systems, with pluggable or co-packaged optics, were arriving at AI data centers around the world32.

    Who makes it

    Chinese makers of optical modules have built plants outside China. InnoLight has run a plant in Thailand since 2019, alongside its sites in Suzhou and Taiwan10. The Thai subsidiary of Eoptolink, another Chinese module maker, lists sites in Chonburi and Rayong33.

    The Federal Communications Commission publishes a Covered List of equipment and services judged to pose an unacceptable risk to US national security or to the security and safety of 34. Its July 2026 order bars new authorizations for devices that contain logic-bearing hardware components produced by firms on that list35. Commenters in the record named optical transceivers as one such component36. As of 16 October 2026, the Covered List did not include InnoLight or Coherent37.

    AI data centers were straining supplies of the lasers inside those modules and pushing up their prices, Nikkei Asia reported in May 20265. Nvidia had agreed in March 2026 to invest $2 billion in one laser maker, Lumentum, alongside a multibillion-dollar purchase commitment and future capacity access rights for advanced laser components1. Coherent, another laser maker, broke ground in Sherman, Texas, in June 2026 on an expansion of its factory15.

    Indium phosphide is used in the high-speed laser diodes and photodetectors for optical communications2. China accounted for 70 percent of world indium production in 20252. In February 2025 placed indium under new export restrictions2.

    Broadcom's AI chips include and Ethernet switch chips38. In its annual report for fiscal 2025, Broadcom said that distributors and equipment makers account for most of its chip sales, and that it builds custom accelerators to each customer's specifications38. Its AI semiconductor revenue reached $16.7 billion in the third quarter of fiscal 2026, up 221 percent from a year earlier8. Marvell, another US firm, also builds custom AI chips to each customer's specifications and sells Ethernet switch chips, its annual report for fiscal 2026 says39. Marvell's five-year agreement with Amazon Web Services, announced in December 2024, covers custom AI chips alongside the optical and networking parts that go with them40.

    Taiwanese firms do much of the physical assembly. Foxconn booked NT$8.1 trillion of revenue in 2025, up 18 percent, and cloud and networking was its largest product category in the fourth quarter9. In the same results release, its chairman called Foxconn the world's largest AI server provider9.

    Some assembly is moving to the United States. In April 2025 Nvidia said it was building supercomputer manufacturing plants in Texas, with Foxconn in Houston and Wistron in Dallas41. It expected to up in the following 12 to 15 months41. In August 2026 Nvidia said Wistron's new plant in Fort Worth, Texas, near Dallas, was producing its GB300 superchips and Foxconn was building its factory in Houston16.

    The chokepoint

    In October 2025 Nvidia said more than 50 makers of systems and components were gearing up for the Vera Rubin NVL72, whose design follows its MGX rack architecture18. In its filing for the quarter to July 2026, Nvidia said the complexity of producing its data center systems had caused production delays29.

    Four components that go into the rack take longer to replace.

    • Indium phosphide laser capacity. In March 2026 Nvidia agreed to invest $2 billion in Coherent, alongside a multibillion-dollar purchase commitment and future access and capacity rights for Coherent's advanced laser and optical networking products11.
    • Indium phosphide . China added indium phosphide substrates, the the lasers are grown on, to its list on 4 February 20253. AXT, a US-listed maker of these wafers, does all its manufacturing in China3. In its filing for the quarter to June 2026, AXT called the export permits the most significant challenge it faces3. It said it could not estimate when it would resume shipping the wafers to the United States3. The same filing names Sumitomo and JX as AXT's competitors in indium phosphide3.
    • NVSwitch. Nvidia's annual report for fiscal 2026 lists NVLink interconnects and switches among its own networking products4. UALink is an open standard designed for accelerator communications within one scale-up group12. Since May 2025 Nvidia's NVLink Fusion program has let other firms' custom chips use NVLink, including CPUs that Fujitsu and Qualcomm plan to connect to Nvidia GPUs14.
    • High-layer-count . TTM Technologies, an American circuit board maker, says its circuit board competitors are mostly based in China and Taiwan42. Nitto Boseki, a Japanese glass fiber maker, makes NE-glass, a that absorbs less signal, for the boards in data center switches and routers43. See Substrates and PCBs.

    Optical module assembly can move, as InnoLight's high-volume plant in Thailand, opened in 2019, shows10.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    What is an AI rack?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    A cabinet of 72 AI chips wired together to run as one computer.

    The chips swap results with each other constantly. Reread: How it works

    Sources (43)
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    2. AMineral Commodity Summaries 2026: IndiumU.S. Geological Survey · 5 February 2026
    3. AAXT INC, Form 10-Q quarterly report for the period ended 2026-06-30U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by AXT INC) · 13 August 2026
    4. ANVIDIA CORP, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2026-01-25 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by NVIDIA CORP) · 25 February 2026
    5. BAI demand strains supplies of lasers, fiber and other optical techNikkei Asia · 27 May 2026
    6. BH100 vs GB200 NVL72 Training Benchmarks - Power, TCO, and Reliability Analysis, Software Improvement Over TimeSemiAnalysis · 20 August 2025
    7. ANVIDIA CORP, Form 10-Q quarterly report for the period ended 2026-04-26 (10-Q)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by NVIDIA CORP) · 20 May 2026
    8. ABroadcom Inc., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-09-02 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Broadcom Inc.) · 2 September 2026
    9. AHon Hai Technology Group (Foxconn) Announces FY2025 & 4Q25 Financial ResultsHon Hai Precision Industry (Foxconn) · 16 March 2026
    10. AInnoLight Technology, company overview pageInnoLight Technology · Accessed 9 September 2026
    11. ANVIDIA and Coherent Announce Strategic Partnership to Develop Optics Technology to Scale Next-Generation Data Center ArchitectureNvidia · 2 March 2026
    12. AUALink™ 200G 1.0 Specification OverviewUALink Consortium · 15 May 2025
    13. AAAI 2026: AMD Launches AMD Helios Rackscale Solution for Frontier AIAMD Newsroom · 23 July 2026
    14. ANVIDIA Unveils NVLink Fusion for Industry to Build Semi-Custom AI Infrastructure With NVIDIA Partner EcosystemNvidia · 18 May 2025
    15. ACoherent Announces a CHIPS Letter of Intent for $50 Million to Expand World-Leading Manufacturing Facility for AI InfrastructureCoherent · 16 June 2026
    16. ANVIDIA and Partners Build in America, for AmericaNvidia · 5 August 2026
    17. ASystem Hardware & ComponentsNvidia · Accessed 9 September 2026
    18. ANVIDIA, Partners Drive Next-Gen Efficient Gigawatt AI Factories in Buildup for Vera RubinNvidia · 13 October 2025
    19. ACredo Technology Group Holding Ltd, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2026-05-02 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Credo Technology Group Holding Ltd) · 15 June 2026
    20. BCo-Packaged Optics (CPO) Book – Scaling with Light for the Next Wave of InterconnectSemiAnalysis · 1 January 2026
    21. AParallelisms Guide — Megatron BridgeNvidia · Accessed 9 September 2026
    22. ANVLink & NVLink Switch for Advanced Multi-GPU CommunicationNvidia · 20 April 2026
    23. ANVIDIA Kicks Off the Next Generation of AI With RubinNvidia · 5 January 2026
    24. AInside the Ironwood TPU codesigned AI stackGoogle Cloud · 6 November 2025
    25. ABroadcom Ships Tomahawk 4, Industry’s Highest Bandwidth Ethernet Switch Chip at 25.6 Terabits per SecondBroadcom · 9 December 2019
    26. ABroadcom Ships Tomahawk 5, Industry's Highest Bandwidth Switch Chip to Accelerate AI/ML WorkloadsBroadcom · 16 August 2022
    27. ABroadcom Ships Tomahawk 6: World’s First 102.4 Tbps SwitchBroadcom · 3 June 2025
    28. AUltra Ethernet Consortium (UEC) Launches Specification 1.0 Transforming Ethernet for AI and HPC at ScaleUltra Ethernet Consortium · 11 June 2025
    29. ANVIDIA CORP, Form 10-Q quarterly report for the period ended 2026-07-26 (10-Q)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by NVIDIA CORP) · 26 August 2026
    30. ABroadcom Announces Tomahawk 6 – Davisson, the Industry's First 102.4-Tbps Ethernet Switch with Co-Packaged OpticsBroadcom · 8 October 2025
    31. ANVIDIA Announces Spectrum-X Photonics, Co-Packaged Optics Networking Switches to Scale AI Factories to Millions of GPUsNvidia · 18 March 2025
    32. ANVIDIA Announces Financial Results for Second Quarter Fiscal 2027Nvidia · 26 August 2026
    33. AEoptolink Technology, contacts pageEoptolink Technology · Accessed 9 September 2026
    34. AProtecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program: Third Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC-26-50)U.S. Federal Communications Commission · 23 July 2026 · p. 3
    35. AProtecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program: Third Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC-26-50)U.S. Federal Communications Commission · 23 July 2026 · p. 6
    36. AProtecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program: Third Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC-26-50)U.S. Federal Communications Commission · 23 July 2026 · p. 10
    37. AList of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks ActU.S. Federal Communications Commission · 16 October 2026
    38. ABroadcom Inc., Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-11-02 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Broadcom Inc.) · 18 December 2025
    39. AMarvell Technology, Inc., Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2026-01-31 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Marvell Technology, Inc.) · 11 March 2026
    40. AMarvell Technology, Inc., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2024-12-02 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Marvell Technology, Inc.) · 2 December 2024
    41. ANVIDIA to Manufacture American-Made AI Supercomputers in US for First TimeNvidia · 14 April 2025
    42. ATTM TECHNOLOGIES INC, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-29 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by TTM TECHNOLOGIES INC) · 17 February 2026
    43. ANittobo Group Integrated Report 2025Nitto Boseki (Nittobo) · 16 September 2025 · p. 7

    Chapter 15: Data Centers and Power

    By mid-2026, companies had asked to connect about 474 GW of new demand to the Texas grid, mostly for data centers. Only about 205 GW of those requests had the engineering checks done in time to enter the grid operator's first review. The large transformers that connect such sites to the grid commonly took three years to arrive in 2024.

    1,978 words / 9 minSpecimen: server rackUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    A data center feeds electricity to the machines inside it and carries away the heat they give off. One of AI , a cabinet taller than a door, can draw 142 1. Every watt of it comes back out as heat, and liquid piped through the rack carries the heat away1. A large training site already holds more than a hundred thousand chips2. The newest sites are planned in gigawatts3. One gigawatt is the whole output of a large power station, and OpenAI's seven Stargate sites in the United States add up to more than nine of them by 20293. Getting that much electricity to the site is harder than putting up the building. and heavy switches connect a site to the grid, and turbines make the power. All of them come from a few suppliers and take years to arrive.

    In short

    Measured by capacity, US factories supplied 29.2 percent of the bought in the US in 2023, and imports the rest4. GE Vernova's gas equipment backlog and reserved factory slots stood at 116 in mid-2026, against planned output of 20 GW a year from the third quarter5.

    ERCOT, the grid operator for most of Texas, counted 9,456 MW of big power users approved to energize in its overview for September 20266. Judging by peak monthly use in September, it believed 4,132 MW of that was operating6. On 3 August 2026 Governor Greg Abbott ordered an audit of every data center seeking a connection before any data center project moves forward7. In September 2026 ERCOT said it had paused approvals to energize data centers of 75 MW or more until the audit and a review of their impact on local communities are complete8.

    Chokepoint card
    ConcentrationFour to six firms could supply this stage today, and the top two take most of the revenue.
    SubstitutabilityNvidia named nine data center power system providers for its 800-volt designs in October 20259.
    Price or market size$580 billionof data center investment expected worldwide in 2025, in the International Energy Agency's November 2025 outlook10
    Who leads
    • USGE Vernova Gas equipment, transformers and switchgear, including through Prolec GE11
    • CHHitachi Energy Power transformers and switchgear11
    • DESiemens Energy Grid technologies, transformers, turbines11
    • JPMitsubishi Power Power generation equipment, including gas turbines11
    • USVertiv Data center power systems9
    • FRSchneider Electric Cooling, through its Motivair division12
    Where it is made
    • USUnited States The largest data center operators, and GE Vernova turbines and grid equipment
    • CHSwitzerland Hitachi Energy transformers and switchgear, and ABB switchgear
    • DEGermany Siemens Energy grid technologies and turbines
    • JPJapan Mitsubishi Power equipment, including gas turbines
    Why substitution is possible
    Buyers of grid equipment can choose among suppliers, and GE Vernova's 2025 annual report names Hitachi Energy, Siemens Energy, Schneider Electric and ABB among its key competitors11. But in 2024 the longest reached 60 months13. An International Energy Agency survey published in 2025 found waits of up to four years worldwide14.
    Where China stands

    China used 25 percent of the world's data center electricity in 2024, second to the United States, by the International Energy Agency's estimate15. Data centers made up around 3 percent of the growth in China's electricity demand from 2022 to 202416.

    Where the US stands

    US factories supplied 29.2 percent of the large power transformers bought in the United States in 2023, measured by capacity4. Constellation said in August 2026 that it expects to restart the Crane nuclear plant in 202717. Microsoft has agreed to buy its power18.

    A passes through a in months, but in 2024 a commonly took three years to arrive13. Before the pandemic, the same order took under a year19.

    How it works

    Power in, heat out

    1. The site. Data centers are where AI chips go to work. A large training site holds a hundred thousand of them, in rows of racks.
    2. Power in. Power comes in from the grid, stepped down by a substation, and runs through the data center to every rack. One rack of AI chips can draw 142 kilowatts.
    3. Heat. Every watt of it comes back out as heat, more than air can carry away.
    4. Water out. So water runs through plates on the chips, carries the heat to coolers outdoors and comes back. Nvidia plans for racks of a megawatt each from 2027, so the power coming in and the heat going out keep growing.

    Simplified diagram, with illustrative sizes. An Nvidia GB300 NVL72 rack draws at most 142 kW. Nvidia gives 45 °C as the supply-water temperature for its Vera Rubin racks. The megawatt racks from 2027 are Nvidia's plan.

    The is the basic unit of AI compute. Nvidia's rack draws up to 142 through eight 33 kW , the rack's own power supplies1. Colossus 1, an AI data center in Memphis, Tennessee, held an estimated 230,000 Nvidia by July 20252.

    Between the grid and the rack, a substation steps the high voltage down with transformers. Switchgear, the building's heavy circuit breakers, can cut any part of the site off in a fault. Battery-backed supplies keep the racks running for the seconds it takes backup generators to start. Distribution boards split the feed among the rows of racks.

    At the back of each rack, a carries the current down to the server trays. It is a solid copper bar, because an ordinary cable would overheat at that current. Every piece of equipment from the substation to the busbar is heavy and has its own , the wait between order and delivery.

    Heat leaves in water. , metal blocks with coolant running through them, sit on the GPU packages and pass the heat to the building's water loop, which releases it outdoors12. Nvidia's Rubin racks run coolant at up to 45 °C, warm enough that in many climates the loop can release its heat without turning on chillers, the refrigeration machines that cool water12.

    Nvidia is also moving the power that feeds its racks to 800 volts of direct current. Raising the voltage cuts the current needed for the same power, and the heat in copper comes from current. Nvidia said in October 2025 that at 800 volts the same wire can carry 157 percent more power than at 415 volts of alternating current20. Inside racks such as the GB300 NVL72, power runs at 54 volts, and at that voltage a one-megawatt rack would need up to 200 kg of copper busbar21.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Cooling

    • Air. Heat exchangers in the rack door work when density, the power each rack draws, is moderate, but Nvidia's GB300 NVL72 rack is liquid cooled1.
    • Direct-to-chip liquid. Nvidia's Rubin platform is 100 percent liquid cooled, and every cloud provider and data center operator building for it is moving to liquid12.
    • Immersion. The servers sit in a bath of fluid, which makes them hard to service.

    Nvidia says the cooling supply chain is keeping pace with the move to liquid12. Motivair, Schneider Electric's cooling division, has worked alongside Nvidia's product roadmap for nearly a decade12.

    Rack power

    Nvidia's 800-volt DC architecture is designed for racks from 100 kW to more than a megawatt, with megawatt racks from 202721. Nvidia is making the change because the 54-volt distribution in existing racks begins to hit physical limits once racks exceed 200 kW21.

    Nvidia names nine data center power system providers for its 800-volt gigawatt designs, among them ABB, Eaton, Hitachi Energy, Mitsubishi Electric, Schneider Electric, Siemens and Vertiv9.

    A megawatt rack changes the busbar, the floor loading, the coolant flow, the leak detection and the energy stored in the rack. Nvidia's Vera Rubin NVL72 rack design holds 20 times more energy storage to keep power steady9.

    Where the electrons come from

    • Grid interconnection. The slow path in the United States, where the queues to connect are long3.
    • Behind-the-meter gas, generation on the site itself. The fast path, which at least three of OpenAI's seven US Stargate sites will use to avoid grid queues3.
    • Nuclear. Existing plants already sell power to data centers22. Talen Energy supplies Amazon's data center campus next to the Susquehanna nuclear plant in Pennsylvania under a June 2025 contract expected to reach 1,920 MW no later than 203222. Restarts and new reactors are still to come. Constellation signed a power purchase agreement with Microsoft to restart Three Mile Island Unit 1 as the 835 MW Crane Clean Energy Center18. The plant shut in 201923. A $1 billion federal loan that closed in November 2025 partly finances its restart, which is subject to licensing approvals from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission23. No restarted reactor is serving data centers yet.

    Who makes it

    The largest data center operators pay for the buildout. by Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle came to $448.2 billion in 2025, the sum of quarterly figures compiled by Epoch AI, a research group24. If the trend continues, it will reach $770 billion in 202624. The International Energy Agency expected worldwide investment in data centers to reach $580 billion in 202510.

    Capital spending by five large US data center operators, 2025

    Capital spending by five large US data center operators, 2025
    Amazon$134.7B
    Microsoft$108.3B
    Alphabet$93.1B
    Meta$72.5B
    Oracle$39.6B

    Source: Epoch AI, hyperscaler capex trend, February 2026, quarterly figures from company filings summed for 2025

    Epoch AI also projects that OpenAI's seven US Stargate sites will exceed 9 GW by 20293. It expects the site in Abilene, Texas, to grow from an estimated 0.3 GW in April to 1.2 GW in the fourth quarter of 20263.

    Equipment makers limit how fast the buildout can go. GE Vernova builds large gas turbines, and its 2025 annual report names Siemens Energy and Mitsubishi Power among the key competitors of its power generation business11. Its electrification business makes power transformers and switchgear, and the report names Hitachi Energy, Siemens Energy, Schneider Electric and ABB among that business's key competitors11.

    GE Vernova bought the remaining half of Prolec GE, a transformer maker, in the first half of 20265. GE Vernova's gas equipment backlog and reserved factory slots grew from 100 GW to 116 GW in the second quarter of 20265. In the first half of the year, data center orders for its electrification business, which makes grid equipment, passed $5 billion, more than double its total for 20255.

    GE Vernova's planned annual gas turbine output

    GE Vernova's planned annual gas turbine output
    Q3 202620 GW/yr
    202824 GW/yr
    203030 GW/yr

    Source: GE Vernova second-quarter 2026 results, July 2026

    Capacity and demand

    US data centers used 192 in 2024, 4.7 percent of national electricity, according to a June 2026 estimate by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory that leaves out cryptocurrency mining25. The lab's reference case, its main scenario, projects 464 TWh in 2028 and 649 TWh in 2030, which would be 11.8 percent of forecast US electricity use25. Its scenarios for 2030 range from 521 to 843 TWh, or 9.5 percent to 15.3 percent26.

    In its October 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook, the US Energy Information Administration expects US electricity sales of 4,152.0 TWh in 2026 and 4,216.6 TWh in 202727. It expects electricity demand from the commercial sector, which includes data centers, to grow 2.8 percent in 2027 and demand from industry to grow 2.7 percent28. Its September outlook had lowered the 2027 electricity sales forecast for the region that includes Texas by 4.7 percent from August29. That outlook noted that Texas had paused connecting new data centers to the grid while it audits proposed projects30.

    US data center electricity use, 2024 and 2030 projection range

    US data center electricity use, 2024 and 2030 projection range
    2024192 TWh
    2030 low case521 TWh
    2030 reference case649 TWh
    2030 high case843 TWh

    Source: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, June 2026

    By the International Energy Agency's estimate, China accounted for 25 percent of the world's data center electricity use in 2024, second to the United States at 45 percent15. Data centers made up around 3 percent of the growth in China's electricity demand from 2022 to 2024, the agency found16.

    efficiency is still improving. Google's Ironwood , an AI chip, delivers twice the performance per watt of Trillium, the TPU before it31. A token is the chunk of text a model reads or writes. Energy per token can fall while total energy use still rises, if the number of tokens rises faster.

    The chokepoint

    On the Texas grid, far more capacity has been requested than is connected and running. ERCOT, the grid operator for most of Texas, was tracking about 474 GW of large loads (big power users) seeking a connection in June 2026, roughly 90 percent of it data centers32. In its operational overview for September 2026, ERCOT counted 9,456 MW approved to energize, but judging by peak monthly use in September, it believed only 4,132 MW of it was operating6.

    Before a big user can connect, engineers must study whether the nearby grid can carry its load. In a preliminary review in July 2026, ERCOT found that about 205 GW of the requests already had such a study, which made them eligible for Batch Zero, the first batch of requests it studies together33. On 3 August 2026 Texas Governor Greg Abbott ordered the state's Public Utility Commission and ERCOT to audit every data center in the interconnection process before any data center project moves forward7. ERCOT then paused approvals to energize data centers and crypto mining sites of 75 MW or more until the audit and a review of their impact on local communities are complete8. In September 2026 ERCOT conditionally classed 66.4 GW of Batch Zero projects as base load and 127.9 GW as studied load, pending final decisions in December8. It will report on the audit and the community review to the Public Utility Commission by 10 December 20268.

    Projects in that queue also wait on equipment.

    • Large power transformers. In 2024, lead times of 36 months were commonly quoted and the longest reached 60 months, against under a year before the pandemic13. By a US Commerce Department estimate, 82 percent of the units put into US service in 2019 were imported34. In an industry survey published in 2025, the International Energy Agency found that large power transformers took up to four years to secure worldwide14. It also found that their average lead times had almost doubled since 202114. Measured by capacity, US factories supplied 29.2 percent of the transformers of 60 MVA and above bought in the US in 2023, and imports supplied the rest4.
    • Gas turbines. In July 2026 GE Vernova expected its annual gas turbine output to reach 20 GW in the third quarter of 2026, 24 GW in 2028 and 30 GW in 20305.
    • Firm new generation, the kind that runs whatever the weather. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved a fuel license amendment for the Crane plant, and Constellation expects to restart it in 202717.

    Memory chips are also in short supply. Micron's quarterly report for the period ended 28 May 2026 says AI-driven growth in demand for memory and storage is outpacing industry supply35. The memory shortage and the wait for power equipment both limit how much of the 2026 capital spending turns into working compute.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 4Question

    Why are AI racks cooled with liquid?

    Card 1 of 4Answer

    One rack can draw 142 kilowatts, and that much heat is more than air can carry away.

    Every watt a rack draws comes back out as heat. Reread: Cooling

    Sources (35)
    1. ASystem Hardware & ComponentsNvidia · Accessed 9 September 2026
    2. AColossus 1, AI data centers directoryEpoch AI · Accessed 9 September 2026
    3. AOpenAI Stargate: where the US sites standEpoch AI · 17 April 2026
    4. ALarge Power Transformers from South Korea, Investigation No. 731-TA-1189 (Second Review), Publication 5531U.S. International Trade Commission · August 2024 · p. 90
    5. AGE Vernova Inc., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-07-22 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by GE Vernova Inc.) · 22 July 2026
    6. AElectric Reliability Council of Texas, ERCOT Monthly Operational Overview (September 2026)Electric Reliability Council of Texas · 16 October 2026 · p. 9
    7. AGovernor Abbott Directs Comprehensive Data Center AuditOffice of the Texas Governor · 3 August 2026
    8. AElectric Reliability Council of Texas, Item 14: Batch Zero Update, Board of Directors meeting, 14-15 September 2026Electric Reliability Council of Texas · 11 September 2026
    9. ANVIDIA, Partners Drive Next-Gen Efficient Gigawatt AI Factories in Buildup for Vera RubinNvidia · 13 October 2025
    10. AExecutive summary – World Energy Outlook 2025International Energy Agency · 12 November 2025
    11. AGE Vernova Inc., Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2025-12-31 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by GE Vernova Inc.) · 29 January 2026
    12. AHotter Than a Hot Tub: The 45°C Breakthrough to Cool AI’s Biggest MachinesNvidia · 22 June 2026
    13. AU.S. Department of Energy Large Power Transformer Resilience Report to Congress, July 2024U.S. Department of Energy · 10 July 2024 · p. 8
    14. AExecutive summary – Building the Future Transmission GridInternational Energy Agency · 2025
    15. AExecutive summary – Energy and AIInternational Energy Agency · 10 April 2025
    16. AExecutive summary – Electricity 2025International Energy Agency · 14 February 2025
    17. AConstellation Reports Second Quarter 2026 ResultsConstellation Energy · 6 August 2026
    18. AConstellation Ahead of Schedule for Launch of Crane Clean Energy CenterConstellation Energy · 19 February 2025
    19. AU.S. Department of Energy Large Power Transformer Resilience Report to Congress, July 2024U.S. Department of Energy · 10 July 2024 · p. 18
    20. ABuilding the 800 VDC Ecosystem for Efficient, Scalable AI FactoriesNvidia · 13 October 2025
    21. ANVIDIA 800 VDC Architecture Will Power the Next Generation of AI FactoriesNvidia · 20 May 2025
    22. ATalen Energy Corp, Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2025-06-11 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by Talen Energy Corp) · 11 June 2025
    23. AEnergy Department Closes Loan to Restart Nuclear Power Plant in PennsylvaniaU.S. Department of Energy · 17 November 2025
    24. AHyperscaler capex has quadrupled since GPT-4's releaseEpoch AI · 26 February 2026
    25. AUnited States Data Center Energy Usage Report: 2025 UpdateLawrence Berkeley National Laboratory · 18 June 2026 · p. 10
    26. AUnited States Data Center Energy Usage Report: 2025 UpdateLawrence Berkeley National Laboratory · 18 June 2026 · p. 11
    27. AShort-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026U.S. Energy Information Administration · 6 October 2026 · p. 46
    28. AShort-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026U.S. Energy Information Administration · 6 October 2026 · p. 12
    29. AShort-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026U.S. Energy Information Administration · 8 September 2026 · p. 4
    30. AShort-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026U.S. Energy Information Administration · 8 September 2026 · p. 10
    31. AInside the Ironwood TPU codesigned AI stackGoogle Cloud · 6 November 2025
    32. AElectric Reliability Council of Texas, ERCOT update to the Senate Committee on Business and Commerce, 29 July 2026Electric Reliability Council of Texas · 29 July 2026 · p. 6
    33. AElectric Reliability Council of Texas, ERCOT update to the Senate Committee on Business and Commerce, 29 July 2026Electric Reliability Council of Texas · 29 July 2026 · p. 10
    34. AU.S. Department of Energy Large Power Transformer Resilience Report to Congress, July 2024U.S. Department of Energy · 10 July 2024 · p. 20
    35. AMICRON TECHNOLOGY INC, Form 10-Q quarterly report for the period ended 2026-05-28 (10-Q)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC) · 25 June 2026

    Chapter 16: The Economics of AI Chips

    Epoch AI estimated in December 2025 that Nvidia's B200 AI chip cost about $6,400 to build, mostly for memory and packaging. Its processor silicon cost about $900.

    1,879 words / 8 minSpecimen: wafer costUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    A is the list of parts inside a product and what each one costs. Epoch AI estimated in December 2025 that Nvidia's B200, an AI from its Blackwell line, cost about $6,400 to build1. The two , the pieces of silicon that do the calculating, cost about $900 of that1. The beside them accounted for about half, and the packaging that wires the and memory together cost more than the dies1. Three firms, SK hynix, Samsung and Micron, dominate the world market for that memory2. One Taiwanese firm, TSMC, does that packaging1.

    In short

    Reports in March 2024 put the B200's selling price at $30,000 to $40,000 per 1. Epoch AI notes that most Blackwell revenue comes from servers and systems, which may carry lower margins1. It says Nvidia's Blackwell margin may therefore be lower than the gap between cost and price suggests1.

    The estimate's memory price of $14 to $17 per gigabyte predates the 2026 rise in memory makers' sales and margins3. Micron's , the share of sales left after production costs, rose from 39.8 percent for the year to August 2025 to 86.8 percent in the quarter to September 20264. Nvidia's was 75.0 percent in the quarter to July 20265.

    In December 2025 Epoch AI estimated that building one of Nvidia's Blackwell B200 cost about $6,4001. Reports in March 2024 put its selling price at $30,000 to $40,000 per chip1. Epoch AI's chip sales model, with data through October 2025, puts Nvidia's compute revenue per in its GB200 systems at $33,000 to $42,0006. That figure leaves out the networking gear in those racks6. Some stages behind that $6,400 are expensive because they are hard to make, some because capacity is short, and some because one firm sets the price.

    How it works

    Three numbers set the cost of a , the finished rectangle of circuitry cut out of a .

    • Wafer price. TSMC does not publish it. TSMC makes Nvidia's Blackwell chips on a custom-built process called 4NP7. Epoch AI estimates $17,000 for a 12-inch () wafer on that process1.
    • Dies per wafer. A wafer is a circle and dies are rectangles, so the edge of the wafer goes to waste. The bigger the die, the fewer fit. Each of the two in a B200 is about 800 1. Nvidia calls them , meaning they are near the largest size a can print in one shot7.
    • . Yield is the share of dies that work. Defects land at random, so a bigger die is more likely to catch one. Epoch AI models Blackwell die yield at 40 to 70 percent, centered on 601.

    Together, those three numbers put the two dies inside a B200 at about $9001. The estimate counts only variable costs and leaves out fixed costs such as research and development1.

    Variants and trade-offs

    Memory is the largest line

    The largest line on the bill is the 192 GB of beside those dies, a generation called HBM3E1. At $14 to $17 per gigabyte it comes to about $2,900, which Epoch AI counts as half of the build cost1. Epoch AI says HBM prices are negotiated deal by deal and can vary significantly with volume and contract length1. The $14 to $17 range dates from December 2025, before the 2026 rise in memory makers' sales and margins described below3.

    Three firms, SK hynix, Samsung and Micron, dominate the world market for that memory2. SK hynix said in July 2026 that demand for its products had exceeded its available supply in recent quarters8.

    Packaging, substrate and test

    -L, the TSMC process that mounts dies and memory on one carrier and wires them together, adds about $1,100, more than the logic dies it carries1. Epoch AI models packaging yield at 65 to 95 percent1. A package that fails testing loses its logic dies and memory stacks1. Spreading that loss over the good units adds about $1,000 to each B2001. Power delivery hardware, the , and final assembly and testing add $4801. See Advanced packaging for why packaging capacity runs out first.

    The B200 bill of materials

    LineEstimateRange
    HBM3E, 192 GB$2,900$2,800–3,100
    CoWoS-L packaging$1,100$1,000–1,200
    Packaging yield loss$1,000$430–1,700
    Logic die, two on TSMC 4NP$900$720–1,200
    Power delivery, board, assembly and test$480$370–600
    Manufacturing cost~$6,400$5,700–7,300
    Reported selling price per chip, March 2024$30,000–40,000
    Nvidia compute revenue per GPU in GB200 racks, data to October 2025$33,000–42,000

    Epoch AI models each line as a range, deriving the packaging line from TSMC's revenue and Nvidia's share of CoWoS capacity1. The estimate covers the module only and leaves out servers and rack-scale systems1. Epoch AI notes that most Blackwell revenue comes from those systems, which may carry lower margins1. So, Epoch AI says, Nvidia's actual margin on Blackwell may be lower than the gap between this cost and the reported chip price suggests1.

    The B200 is used here because Epoch AI's line-by-line estimate covers it. In its results for the quarter to July 2026, Nvidia said its Vera Rubin platform was into full production5. Each Rubin GPU carries up to 288 GB of HBM4, a newer generation of the stacked memory9.

    Where the ~$6,400 of B200 manufacturing cost goes, Epoch AI estimate, December 2025

    HBM3E, 192 GB$2,900CoWoS-L packaging$1,100Packaging yield loss$1,000Logic die, two on 4NP$900Power delivery, board, test$480

    Source: Epoch AI B200 cost model, from a $17,000 4NP wafer, 40-70% die yield, $14-17 per GB of memory, and a packaging line derived from TSMC's advanced packaging revenue

    From package to rack to cluster

    At rack scale, cost is measured per GPU-hour, one GPU running for one hour. For an operator that owns the machine, SemiAnalysis put a at $3.57 per GPU-hour in July 2026, against $1.84 for a GB200 and $2.36 for a GB30010. Each generation costs its owner more per hour than the last10.

    But SemiAnalysis found Rubin cheaper per token than GB200 and GB300 at every interactivity level it compared10. A token is a short chunk of text, and interactivity is how many tokens per second each user receives. That finding rests on early results from the cloud provider CoreWeave running the DeepSeek R1 model, and SemiAnalysis said it had not verified them10.

    One level up, SemiAnalysis estimated in June 2024 that a cluster of 100,000 of Nvidia's earlier H100 GPUs cost over $4 billion in servers11. It needs more than 150 of data center capacity and uses 1.59 a year, which costs $123.9 million at $0.078 per kWh11. In the network design Nvidia recommended, 98,304 link its GPUs to the first layer of switches, called leaf switches11.

    Who captures the value

    FirmStageQuarter ended
    MicronHBM and September 202686.8%4
    NvidiaAccelerator designJuly 202675.0%5
    TSMCWafers and CoWoSSeptember 202666.4%12
    KLA (non‑GAAP)InspectionJune 202662.4%13
    ASMLSeptember 202657.5%14
    Lam ResearchJune 202651.7%15
    Applied MaterialsJuly 202650.3%16
    ASE TechnologyPackaging and test segmentJune 202627.3%17
    AmkorJune 202616.8%18

    Each figure except KLA's comes from the firm's own earnings release. KLA's shareholder letter gives only a non-GAAP gross margin for the quarter, 62.4 percent13. KLA says its non-GAAP figures exclude certain costs and expenses that it believes do not reflect its core operating results19. For ASE the table shows its packaging and test segment17. The company as a whole had a gross margin of 21.0 percent, because about a third of its revenue came from electronics manufacturing services, which earned 8.9 percent17.

    SK hynix's earnings release gives no gross margin. Its was 76 percent in the quarter to June 2026, and its revenue was up 257 percent from a year earlier3. The maker Ibiden gives no gross margin either, but its operating profit was 21.8 percent of net sales in the quarter to June 202620.

    Gross margin, quarters ended June to September 2026

    Gross margin, quarters ended June to September 2026
    Micron86.8%
    Nvidia75%
    TSMC66.4%
    KLA (non‑GAAP)62.4%
    ASML57.5%
    Lam Research51.7%
    Applied Materials50.3%
    ASE packaging and test27.3%
    Amkor16.8%

    Source: Each firm's own quarterly earnings release; quarters end between June and September 2026; ASE's bar is its packaging and test segment; KLA's bar is the non-GAAP figure from its shareholder letter (TSMC shown)

    In the table, the firms in design, equipment and wafers earn gross margins of 50.3 to 75.0 percent, and those in assembly and test 16.8 to 27.3 percent. In 2026 Micron passed all of them. Its gross margin rose from 39.8 percent for the year to August 2025 to 86.8 percent in the quarter to September 20264.

    The Semiconductor Industry Association, using monthly data compiled by World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, counted $791.7 billion of global chip sales in 202521. In its June 2026 forecast, World Semiconductor Trade Statistics put 2025 at $795.6 billion and 2026 at $1.51 trillion, with memory growing about 250 percent and logic 37 percent22.

    The industry group SEMI counted $135.1 billion of billings in 202523. at Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle came to $448.2 billion in 2025, the sum of Epoch AI's quarterly figures24. Epoch AI says that spending would reach $770 billion in 2026 if the trend continues24. These totals overlap, so they cannot be added together.

    Selected market totals, 2025

    Selected market totals, 2025
    Semiconductor sales$791.7B
    Hyperscaler capex$448.2B
    Nvidia data center revenue$193.7B
    Semiconductor equipment$135.1B

    Source: Semiconductor Industry Association on chip sales; Epoch AI quarterly capital spending at Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle, summed for 2025; Nvidia data center revenue for its fiscal year to January 2026; SEMI on equipment billings

    Where the money goes

    In Epoch AI's estimate for the B200, packaging cost $1,100 and packaging yield loss another $1,000, against $900 for the logic dies1.

    The table below sorts each stage by whether its cost falls as volume grows. The classes are a judgment drawn from the sources in this chapter and the stage chapters.

    StageClassWhy
    lithographyStructurally expensiveOne supplier, ASML. See Lithography.
    and Structurally expensiveEvery design needs its own mask set, and every EUV layer a flawless mask. See Photomasks and pellicles.
    Structurally expensiveKLA held 56.8 percent of the market for these tools in 2025, by CSET's analysis of TechInsights data25. See Metrology and inspection.
    HBMStructurally expensiveSK hynix says HBM needs more wafer input than ordinary DRAM8. See Memory and HBM.
    Advanced packaging, CoWoS-LStructurally expensiveModeled packaging yield is 65 to 95 percent, and a failed package loses its dies and memory.
    Structurally expensiveInvestment can add substrate lines, but Ajinomoto said in June 2026 that the insulating film it makes for these substrates has held over 95 percent of its market since launch26. See Substrates and PCBs.
    Power and cooling plantStructurally expensiveIn the United States, grid connections face long queues27. GE Vernova's gas equipment backlog and slot reservations reached 116 GW in mid-202628. See Data centers and power.
    Leading-edge logic wafersCompressible with scaleA very large die yields well only once a process matures. See Transistors and the front end.
    Design and Compressible with scaleA design is paid for once, and its cost is spread across every chip sold. See Chip design, EDA and IP.
    Deposition and etch toolsCompressible with scaleMost deposition and etch steps have three or four established tool makers. See Deposition and etch.
    Optical transceiversCompressible with scaleNvidia agreed in March 2026 to invest $2 billion in the laser maker Lumentum, with rights to future capacity29. It agreed a similar $2 billion deal with Coherent30. See Systems and networking.
    Test and assembly (OSAT)Already commoditizedGross margins of 16.8 to 27.3 percent at Amkor and ASE's packaging and test segment, in the table above.
    Wafers and Already commoditizedSeveral firms make approved 300 mm wafers. By Siltronic's estimate, the five largest wafer makers served around 75 percent of the market in the first three quarters of 202531. See Silicon and wafers.
    Rack integration ()Already commoditizedIn October 2025 Nvidia said more than 50 makers of systems and components were gearing up for the Vera Rubin NVL7232. See Systems and networking.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 3Question

    What does an Nvidia B200 cost to build, and what does it sell for?

    Card 1 of 3Answer

    About $6,400 to build, in Epoch AI's December 2025 estimate. Reports in March 2024 put its selling price at $30,000 to $40,000 per chip.

    Nvidia's gross margin was 75.0 percent in the quarter to July 2026. Epoch AI notes that most revenue from Blackwell, the chip line that includes the B200, comes from servers and racks, which may carry lower margins. Reread: The B200 bill of materials

    Sources (32)
    1. ANVIDIA's B200 costs around $6,400 to produceEpoch AI · 10 December 2025
    2. AUnderstanding the Biden Administration’s Updated Export ControlsCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 11 December 2024
    3. ASK hynix Announces 2Q26 Financial ResultsSK hynix · 29 July 2026
    4. AMicron Technology, Inc. Reports Record Fiscal Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2026 ResultsMicron Technology · 30 September 2026
    5. ANVIDIA Announces Financial Results for Second Quarter Fiscal 2027Nvidia · 26 August 2026
    6. AAI chip sales documentationEpoch AI · 8 January 2026
    7. ANVIDIA Blackwell ArchitectureNvidia · 18 December 2025
    8. ASK hynix Inc., Form 424B4 prospectus for the period ended 2026-07-10 (424(B)(4))U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by SK hynix Inc.) · 10 July 2026
    9. AInside NVIDIA Rubin GPU Architecture: Powering the Era of Agentic AINvidia · 21 July 2026
    10. BVera Rubin NVL72 vs GB200 NVL72? Inference TCO & Architecture AnalysisSemiAnalysis · 23 July 2026
    11. B100,000 H100 Clusters: Power, Network Topology, Ethernet vs InfiniBand, Reliability, Failures, CheckpointingSemiAnalysis · 17 June 2024
    12. ATSMC Reports Third Quarter EPS of NT$29.43U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CO LTD) · 15 October 2026
    13. ALetter to Shareholders Q4 Fiscal 2026KLA Corporation · 28 July 2026 · p. 3
    14. AASML reports €11.7 billion total net sales and €5.0 billion net income in Q3 2026U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASML HOLDING NV) · 14 October 2026
    15. ALam Research Corporation Reports Financial Results for the Quarter Ended June 28, 2026Lam Research · 29 July 2026
    16. AApplied Materials Announces Third Quarter 2026 ResultsApplied Materials · 13 August 2026
    17. AASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd. Reports Its Unaudited Consolidated Financial Results for the Second Quarter of 2026PR Newswire · 30 July 2026
    18. AAMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-07-27 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by AMKOR TECHNOLOGY, INC.) · 27 July 2026
    19. AKLA Corporation Reports Fiscal 2026 Fourth Quarter and Full Year ResultsKLA Corporation · 28 July 2026
    20. AOutline of Consolidated Financial Results For the First Quarter Ended June 30, 2026Ibiden · 4 August 2026
    21. AGlobal Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025Semiconductor Industry Association · 6 February 2026
    22. AGlobal Semiconductor Market Surges Beyond USD 1.5 Trillion in 2026 Driven by Extraordinary Memory ExpansionWorld Semiconductor Trade Statistics · 2 June 2026
    23. ASEMI Reports Global Semiconductor Equipment Billings Reached $135 Billion in 2025, Up 15% Year-on-YearSEMI · 7 April 2026
    24. AHyperscaler capex has quadrupled since GPT-4's releaseEpoch AI · 26 February 2026
    25. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    26. AAjinomoto, Growth Strategy for the Electronic Materials Business, 30 June 2026Ajinomoto · 30 June 2026 · p. 3
    27. AOpenAI Stargate: where the US sites standEpoch AI · 17 April 2026
    28. AGE Vernova Inc., Form 8-K current report for the period ended 2026-07-22 (8-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by GE Vernova Inc.) · 22 July 2026
    29. ANVIDIA Announces Strategic Partnership With Lumentum to Develop State-of-the-Art Optics TechnologyNvidia · 2 March 2026
    30. ANVIDIA and Coherent Announce Strategic Partnership to Develop Optics Technology to Scale Next-Generation Data Center ArchitectureNvidia · 2 March 2026
    31. AInvestor Presentation: Foundation of Digital LifeSiltronic · April 2026 · p. 6
    32. ANVIDIA, Partners Drive Next-Gen Efficient Gigawatt AI Factories in Buildup for Vera RubinNvidia · 13 October 2025

    Chapter 17: Who Controls the Chain

    Since 2018 the United States has used export controls to limit China's access to advanced chips and chipmaking tools, and China has been building its own.

    2,909 words / 13 minUpdated 21 October 2026

    Link to chapterChapter PDF

    In plain terms

    An is a rule that requires the government's permission for a sale. The government names an item and a country or a buyer. From then on its own companies must hold a license before they ship that item to that country or buyer. The American government extends some of these rules to goods made abroad with American technology. Few governments can use such a rule to much effect, because it works only when their own firms sell something the buyer cannot get elsewhere. The machines, software and chemicals used to make an advanced come from a short list of firms in the United States, the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea. China can copy the simpler machines within a few years. It cannot yet copy the machine that prints the finest circuits, or the chemicals that machine needs. It has also yet to show it can make , the stacked memory beside an AI chip, .

    In short

    Japan and the Netherlands have aligned their own with the American rules on 1. Chinese toolmakers supplied 35 percent of China's own chipmaking equipment market in 2025, up from 10 to 15 percent before 20222. When the United States licensed sales of Nvidia's H200 in February 2026, China restricted them3.

    The most advanced chips come mainly from Taiwan. It held 69 percent of the world's capacity for below 10 in 2022, by the count of the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group4.

    The United States is still changing its , and China is still building its response to them.

    The shape of the contest

    In September 2022 National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said the United States must keep "as large of a lead as possible" in foundational technologies such as advanced logic and memory 5. The October rules that followed were the first to apply his doctrine of a , meaning strict controls on a narrow set of technologies1. Those rules went beyond the old aim of staying two technology ahead of China and tried to push China's capability back below the level it had already reached6.

    Many license requirements depend on who is buying and why. In October 2018, for example, the Commerce Department put the Chinese chip company Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit on its , so that any US-regulated item needed a license to reach it7. The 2022 rules went further and required a license for any advanced AI chip, and any tool for an advanced , bound for China8. Most applications were presumed denied, but equipment for the China fabs of firms headquartered in the United States or allied and partner countries was 8.

    Chokepoints and who holds them

    SegmentLeaderShareBasis
    Netherlands100.0%revenue, 2025
    lithographyNetherlands99.3%revenue, 2025
    United States71.7%revenue, 2025
    United States60.3%revenue, 2025
    and cleanUnited States52.6%revenue, 2025
    Japan78%revenue, 2023
    Japan53%revenue, 2023
    logic, below 10 Taiwan69%capacity, 2022
    , all nodesTaiwan81.9%market share, 2025
    South Korea82.5%revenue, 2025: SK hynix 63.2, Samsung 19.3, Micron 17.4
    designUnited States65%sales, 2022
    , 28 nm and aboveChina33%capacity, 2022

    No country is self-sufficient, so the United States and China can each use export controls to hurt the other.

    is missing from the table because no public source publishes a split of its capacity by country and the Taiwanese chipmaker TSMC will not give one.

    • Equipment. TechInsights 2025 revenue by parent-company headquarters, from CSET's ETO Supply Chain Explorer9.
    • Materials. Fuji Keizai's survey by parent-company headquarters, as , Trade and Industry published it in December 202510.
    • Memory. Figures from the market research firm IDC, as SK hynix's US listing prospectus relays them11.
    • Logic capacity. The Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group's 2022 measurement of logic capacity, below 10 nm for Taiwan and at 28 nm and above for China4.

    The US export-control campaign, 2018 to today

    In August 2020 the Commerce Department widened its to require a license for any foreign-made item produced with US technology and bound for Huawei12. In 2022 its (BIS) blocked China's access to the most advanced AI chips and to the tools to make them, and it tightened those rules in 2023 and 20241. In August 2025 the government began licensing some sales of Nvidia's H20 chip to China, and in February 2026 small amounts of its H20013.

    The Export Controls page has the full timeline, with the legal citation for each rule.

    Eight US actions that shaped chip export controls

    1. Huawei and 68 affiliates added to the Entity List
    2. China-wide controls on AI chips and advanced-fab tools
    3. Performance density added; A800 and H800 captured
    4. 24 tool types, HBM controls, 140 entity listings
    5. AI Diffusion rule announced, three country tiers
    6. BIS stops enforcing the AI Diffusion rule
    7. US officials seek 15% of licensed H20 sales
    8. H200 and MI325X move to case-by-case review

    Source: Federal Register rules, BIS press releases and Nvidia filings, cited for each entry on the Export Controls timeline

    Ways around the controls

    Renting out time on a chip does not count as exporting it, so a Singapore data center selling time on an H200 already installed there moves nothing across a border14. The of January 2025 required a license for advanced AI chips bound anywhere in the world15. For the data centers it approved, it said that API access to a model, and rented capacity for , "are not prohibited"15.

    The American rules reach that trade through the firms holding the chips. A license under the 15 January 2026 rule for H200-class chips bound for requires the applicant to obtain the recipient's know-your-customer procedures16. It must also obtain the recipient's list of customers renting computing power in China and seven other places, among them Russia and Iran16. The license also depends on a promise that no algorithm trained on the chips is served to blacklisted or military 16.

    The United States has approved large AI chip sales in the Gulf. In November 2025 Commerce authorized G42 of the United Arab Emirates and HUMAIN of Saudi Arabia to buy the equivalent of up to 35,000 Nvidia GB300 chips each under security and reporting conditions17. On 10 July 2026 Commerce moved the Emirates into the export-control group that holds close US allies18. It named the Emirati government, G42 and eight US-headquartered AI companies as recipients that need no license for controlled AI chips and systems18.

    Smugglers route chips past the controls through Southeast Asia. Since 14 July 2025 Malaysia has required a permit to export, transship or transit any high-performance US-origin AI chip19. On 25 March 2026 the Justice Department announced charges against three people accused of using Thai companies' names to order servers with export-controlled chips for China20. The orders included one for $170 million that was never completed20.

    The House select committee on China cites a median estimate of 140,000 chips smuggled to China in 202421. A bill in Congress, the Chip Security Act, would require location verification on controlled chips within 180 days of enactment22. The House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the House version 42-0 on 26 March 202623. It has not become law.

    Allies: the Netherlands, Japan, Korea and Europe

    US tool controls alone would only shift the sales to Dutch and Japanese suppliers, so the campaign depends on those two governments. Both have aligned their own controls on with the American rules1.

    • The Netherlands. The Dutch government began licensing advanced tools on 1 September 2023 and widened the controls in September 202424. On 1 April 2025 it extended them to measurement and inspection tools25.
    • Japan. Japan's controls on advanced manufacturing equipment took effect on 23 July 2023, apply to all destinations and name no country26.
    • South Korean fabs in China. BIS revoked the that let Samsung's and SK hynix's China subsidiaries and Intel Semiconductor (Dalian) receive US equipment without individual licenses, effective 31 December 202527. BIS said it would license those fabs to keep running, but not to expand capacity or upgrade technology28. SK hynix, which bought the Dalian fab from Intel, received an annual BIS license in December 2025 to ship approved US equipment to its China fabs during 202629.

    A BIS rule effective 29 September 2025 extended Entity List restrictions to any company at least 50 percent owned by one or more listed firms30. On 30 September the Dutch economy minister invoked the Goods Availability Act against Nexperia, a Nijmegen chipmaker that supplies Europe's car industry31. He cited governance failures that risked moving technology out of Europe31.

    Both were suspended in November. On 10 November BIS suspended its rule until 9 November 202632. The minister suspended his order on 19 November33. Europe holds a in leading-edge lithography, but none in the mature-node chips its car industry uses.

    The MATCH Act, a bill introduced on 8 April 2026, would ban sales of immersion deep-ultraviolet to China34. It would also name five Chinese companies, CXMT, Hua Hong, Huawei, SMIC and YMTC, in statute34. It would give allies 150 days to match those limits before the United States extends the Foreign Direct Product Rule on its own34.

    China's response

    In 2024 China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology reportedly told Chinese telecom operators to strip foreign chips out of their networks by 20272.

    China has also taken measures against American suppliers. Micron, the American memory maker, failed a review by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) on 21 May 2023 and lost its critical-infrastructure buyers in China35. In September 2025 the CAC reportedly told firms including ByteDance and Alibaba to cancel Nvidia orders36. When the United States licensed H200 sales in February 2026, China restricted them, as it had restricted licensed H20 sales3.

    (MOFCOM) has also restricted exports of minerals.

    • 3 December 2024. MOFCOM banned exports of , germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the United States, one day after the American chip rules37.
    • 4 April 2025. It required export licenses for seven 38.
    • 9 October 2025. It announced licensing, from 1 December 2025, for foreign-made goods containing Chinese rare earths worth 0.1 percent or more of their value39. MOFCOM suspended that rule on 7 November 2025 until 10 November 202640.
    • 9 November 2025. MOFCOM suspended its ban on exports of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the United States until 27 November 202641. It acted after Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met at the Asia-Pacific summit in October 202542.

    China repealed none of these controls, and the April licensing rules still apply.

    Chinese toolmakers held 10 to 15 percent of their home market before 2022, 25 percent in 2024 and 35 percent in 20252. They hold about 40 percent of the Chinese market for etch and deposition tools2. But in September 2025 the (CSIS) judged that making its own extreme-ultraviolet machines remained firmly out of China's reach despite massive state investment43.

    Chinese chipmakers remain behind at the leading edge. SMIC's most advanced process, N+3, reaches the of TSMC's 6 process without extreme-ultraviolet scanners44. It prints its tightest layers in on deep-ultraviolet tools44.

    In September 2025 the research firm SemiAnalysis conservatively put SMIC's capacity at 7 nm and below at 45,000 by the end of 202545. It expected 60,000 in 2026 and 80,000 in 202745. Those figures count wafers, and how many working chips they give depends on , the share of chips on a wafer that work.

    SemiAnalysis also expected Huawei to ship about 805,000 of its Ascend AI chips in 2025, with made by both TSMC and SMIC45. It judged that memory would limit China's output of AI chips before logic wafers did45. By its count, a stockpile of roughly 13 million memory stacks was enough for about 1.6 million Ascend 910C packages45. It expected CXMT, China's own memory maker, to make only about 2 million stacks in 2026, enough for 250,000 to 300,000 more45.

    Huawei said in September 2025 that its Ascend 950 chips, due in 2026, would carry high-bandwidth memory of its own design46. It gave no figure for how much of that memory it would make46.

    China's share of revenue at the four largest chip-tool makers, peak fiscal year and latest

    China's share of revenue at the four largest chip-tool makers, peak fiscal year and latest
    ASML, FY202436.1%
    ASML, FY202529.1%
    Applied Materials, FY202437.2%
    Applied Materials, FY202530.1%
    Lam Research, FY202442.2%
    Lam Research, FY202633.8%
    Tokyo Electron, FY202444.4%
    Tokyo Electron, FY202634.1%

    Source: ASML 2025 Form 20-F (total net sales), Applied Materials and Lam Research 10-K filings and Tokyo Electron FY2024 and FY2026 consolidated financial statements, each China share computed from the filing's sales by region

    Industrial policy: CHIPS, Rapidus, Big Fund and the rest

    The authorized about $52.7 billion2. By July 2025 Commerce had awarded $30.9 billion of direct funding to 19 companies for 40 projects, covering a median 14.2 percent of each project's capital cost48. Commerce counted a federal tax credit, the Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit, when it sized those grants48. Since the One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025, the credit covers 35 percent of investment in an advanced chip plant placed in service after 2025, up from 25 percent48.

    On 22 August 2025 the government agreed to convert $5.7 billion of unpaid Intel grants and $3.2 billion of Secure Enclave defense money into $8.9 billion of Intel stock, a 9.9 percent stake49.

    The United States has also used tariffs to draw chip investment. Under a memorandum signed in January 2026, Taiwanese chip and technology firms are to invest $250 billion in US semiconductor, energy and AI production50. In the same memorandum the United States agreed to cap some of its national-security tariffs on Taiwanese goods at 15 percent50. On 16 July 2026 TSMC announced another $100 billion for four more Arizona fabs, bringing its total Arizona investment to $265 billion51.

    The European Commission says the EU still depends on other countries for advanced chip manufacturing52. On 3 June 2026 it proposed a Chips Act 2.0, which would add measures to support advanced chip production in the EU52.

    Japan instead backs a homegrown chipmaker, Rapidus. It began prototyping 2 nm at its IIM-1 plant in July 202553. In February 2026 it raised another 267.6 billion yen, about $1.7 billion, from a government agency and 32 companies, aiming for 2 nm by 202754. By June 2026 it had raised 424.95 billion yen in equity, the latest 150 billion yen from a state agency55.

    China spends more than the United States. The latest round of its , the Big Fund, reached $47 billion56. CSIS puts cumulative state funding since 2014 at an estimated $150 billion and calls the CHIPS Act substantially smaller in scale2.

    CHIPS Act direct funding awarded, by firm, as of July 2025

    CHIPS Act direct funding awarded, by firm, as of July 2025
    Intel$7.9B
    TSMC$6.6B
    Micron$6.4B
    Samsung$4.7B
    Texas Instruments$1.6B
    GlobalFoundries$1.6B
    SK hynix$0.5B
    Amkor$0.4B
    GlobalWafers$0.4B
    Hemlock Semiconductor$0.3B

    Source: GAO-26-107882, Semiconductors: Information on Projects Funded to Strengthen U.S. Supply Chain

    Taiwan

    No policy has reduced the world's reliance on Taiwan. Taiwan's foundries held 81.9 percent of the world's contract chipmaking market in 2025, according to the Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association's August 2026 report57. TSMC makes its 2 nm chips only in Taiwan58. Taiwan held 69 percent of the world's logic capacity below 10 nm in 20224.

    Advanced packaging is in Taiwan too. Asked in October 2025 how much packaging capacity he would add, TSMC's chairman said only that the company was "working very hard to narrow the gap between the demand and supply"59. He called wafer and packaging capacity both "very tight"59.

    The argument holds that this deters an attack on Taiwan, because so many countries rely on its chips58. The Stimson Center calls that open to debate, though many Taiwanese believe it58.

    With an eye to that shield, Taiwan's rules keep TSMC's newest process at home first, so TSMC's Arizona fabs have run a generation behind its fabs in Taiwan58. The Stimson Center expected 2 nm production in Arizona in 2028 at the earliest58. TSMC said in October 2025 that it was "preparing to upgrade our technologies faster to N2 and more advanced process technologies in Arizona"60. The four Arizona fabs it announced in July 2026 are to run at 2 nm or more advanced51.

    The Arizona fabs narrow the gap in wafer production, and TSMC has two advanced packaging fabs planned there61. But TSMC's work in Taiwan rests on a local supply chain of more than 300 firms, which the Stimson Center judged extremely difficult to copy in the United States58. The US push has raised fears in Taiwan that the shield could weaken58.

    Who gains and who pays

    • Taiwan and Korea. None of these policies will move leading-edge logic, memory stacking or advanced packaging out of Taiwan and Korea before 2030. Reshoring adds capacity elsewhere without taking any away from them.
    • The Netherlands and Japan. Their toolmakers build the controlled machines, so the two governments gain a say in who gets them. China accounts for a falling share of the firms' sales. At ASML, China's share of net system sales, which leave out service and field options, fell from 41 percent in 2024 to 33 percent in 202562. Against total net sales, the measure in the chart, it fell from 36.1 percent to 29.1 percent47. At Tokyo Electron, China's share of sales fell from 44.4 percent in the year to March 2024 to 34.1 percent in the year to March 202663. The company said China's share of its sales dropped to 26.8 percent in the quarter to March 2026 because spending on leading-edge chips grew faster than spending on older ones64.
    • The United States. Its firms took 65 percent of the world's logic chip sales in 202265. The Semiconductor Industry Association, using data from World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Gartner and Omdia, put US firms' share of all chip sales in 2025 at 53.4 percent, the highest since 198466. Commerce expects the CHIPS-funded projects to lift the US share of global leading-edge logic chip manufacturing from 0 percent in 2022 to 20 percent by 203048.
    • China. Mature-node chips, tools below the leading edge, and are moving to Chinese suppliers. In September 2025 SemiAnalysis expected China, without smuggled memory, to make fewer Ascend chips in 2026 than in 202545.

    Flashcards

    Recall each answer, then turn the card.

    Card 1 of 5Question

    When does an export control work?

    Card 1 of 5Answer

    When a country's own firms sell something the buyer cannot get elsewhere.

    The machines, software and chemicals for advanced chips come from a few firms in the United States, the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea. Reread: Chokepoints and who holds them

    Sources (66)
    1. AWhere the Chips Fall: U.S. Export Controls Under the Biden Administration from 2022 to 2024Center for Strategic and International Studies · 12 December 2024
    2. AChina’s Localization Drive in Semiconductors Gains Impetus from Allied Chip Export ControlsCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 24 March 2026
    3. ANVIDIA CORP, Form 10-Q quarterly report for the period ended 2026-07-26 (10-Q)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by NVIDIA CORP) · 26 August 2026
    4. AEmerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainBoston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association · May 2024 · p. 14
    5. ARemarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies SummitThe White House · 16 September 2022
    6. AChoking off China’s Access to the Future of AICenter for Strategic and International Studies · 11 October 2022
    7. AAddition of an Entity to the Entity ListFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 30 October 2018
    8. AImplementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List ModificationFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 13 October 2022
    9. ADocumentation: Semiconductor Supply Chain DatasetEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    10. AMETI, Semiconductor and digital industry strategy: future direction (半導体・デジタル産業戦略の今後の方向性), 23 December 2025Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan) · 23 December 2025 · p. 8
    11. ASK hynix Inc., Form 424B4 prospectus for the period ended 2026-07-10 (424(B)(4))U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by SK hynix Inc.) · 10 July 2026
    12. AAddition of Huawei Non-U.S. Affiliates to the Entity List, the Removal of Temporary General License, and Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule)Federal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 20 August 2020
    13. ANVIDIA CORP, Form 10-K annual report for the period ended 2026-01-25 (10-K)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by NVIDIA CORP) · 25 February 2026
    14. A15 CFR 734.13 -- Export.Electronic Code of Federal Regulations · 3 June 2016
    15. AFramework for Artificial Intelligence DiffusionFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 15 January 2025
    16. ARevision to License Review Policy for Advanced Computing CommoditiesU.S. Government Publishing Office (Federal Register) · 15 January 2026
    17. AStatement on UAE and Saudi Chip ExportsU.S. Department of Commerce · November 2025
    18. AEnhanced Favorable Treatment for the United Arab Emirates Under the Export Administration RegulationsFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 14 July 2026
    19. AExport, transshipment and transit of high-performance AI chips of US origin now subject to a Strategic Trade PermitMinistry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI), Malaysia · 14 July 2025
    20. AChinese National and Two U.S. Citizens Charged with Conspiring to Smuggle Artificial Intelligence Technology to ChinaU.S. Department of Justice · 25 March 2026
    21. AProtecting U.S. Tech: China Committee and Bipartisan, Bicameral Leaders Unite to Stop CCP AI Chip SmugglingU.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party · 7 July 2025
    22. AS.1705 – Chip Security Act, 119th Congress (2025-2026), bill textU.S. Congress (Congress.gov, Library of Congress) · 8 May 2025
    23. AUNANIMOUS: Bipartisan Huizenga Legislation to Curb AI Chip Smuggling Passes CommitteeU.S. House of Representatives (Office of Rep. Bill Huizenga) · 26 March 2026
    24. AThe Netherlands expands export control measure for advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipmentGovernment of the Netherlands · 6 September 2024
    25. AKlever: export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to be tightenedGovernment of the Netherlands · 15 January 2025
    26. ACSIS Translation: Updated Japanese Export Controls on High-Performance Semiconductor Manufacturing EquipmentCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 18 July 2023
    27. ARevocation of Validated End-User Authorizations in the People's Republic of ChinaFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 2 September 2025
    28. ADepartment of Commerce Closes Export Controls Loophole for Foreign-Owned Semiconductor Fabs in ChinaU.S. Bureau of Industry and Security · 29 August 2025
    29. ASK hynix Inc., Form 424B4 prospectus for the period ended 2026-07-10 (424(B)(4))U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by SK hynix Inc.) · 10 July 2026
    30. AExpansion of End-User Controls To Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed EntitiesFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 30 September 2025
    31. AMinister of Economic Affairs invokes Goods Availability ActGovernment of the Netherlands · 12 October 2025
    32. AOne Year Suspension of Expansion of End-User Controls for Affiliates of Certain Listed EntitiesFederal Register (Commerce Department; Industry and Security Bureau) · 12 November 2025
    33. AUpdate on invoking Goods Availability ActGovernment of the Netherlands · 19 November 2025
    34. ARisch, Ricketts, Kim Introduce MATCH Act; Level the Global Playing Field for U.S. TechU.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations · 8 April 2026
    35. AMicron Aggression: The Right Response to Beijing’s Ban on the U.S. ChipmakerCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 22 June 2023
    36. ABeijing blocks Nvidia sales in vote of confidence for Chinese chipmakers, the White House strikes a deal for 10 percent of Intel, and Commerce voids a $7.4B CHIPS Act grantCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 18 September 2025
    37. AMinistry of Commerce Notice 2024 No. 46: Notice Concerning Strengthening Controls on Exports of Relevant Dual-Use Items to the United StatesCenter for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 3 December 2024
    38. AAnnouncement No.18 of 2025 of The Ministry of Commerce and The General Administration of Customs of The People’s Republic of China Announcing the decision to implement export control on some medium and heavy rare earth related itemsMinistry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China · 4 April 2025
    39. AMinistry of Commerce Notice 2025 No. 61: Announcement of the Decision to Implement Controls on Exports of Rare Earth-Related Items to Foreign Countries (translation)Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) · 9 October 2025
    40. AMOFCOM and GAC Announcement 2025 No. 70, suspending the October 2025 export-control measures, Announcements Nos. 55 to 58, 61 and 62 (商务部、海关总署公告2025年第70号)Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China · 7 November 2025
    41. A商务部公告2025年第72号 公布调整实施商务部公告2024年第46号的决定Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China · 9 November 2025
    42. AThe U.S.-China Trade Truce Has Not Solved the Gallium ProblemCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 11 May 2026
    43. ABreakthroughs or Boasts? Assessing Recent Chinese Lithography AdvancementsCenter for Strategic and International Studies · 24 September 2025
    44. BIs SMIC N+3’s Metal Pitch Smaller than Intel 18A’s?SemiAnalysis · 14 June 2026
    45. BHuawei Ascend Production Ramp: Die Banks, TSMC Continued Production, HBM is The BottleneckSemiAnalysis · 8 September 2025
    46. AGroundbreaking SuperPoD Interconnect: Leading a New Paradigm for AI InfrastructureHuawei · 18 September 2025
    47. AASML HOLDING NV, Form 20-F annual report for the period ended 2025-12-31 (financial statement R71)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (filing by ASML HOLDING NV) · 25 February 2026
    48. AGAO-26-107882, SEMICONDUCTORS: Information on Projects Funded to Strengthen U.S. Supply ChainU.S. Government Accountability Office · 11 December 2025
    49. AIntel and Trump Administration Reach Historic Agreement to Accelerate American Technology and Manufacturing LeadershipIntel · 22 August 2025
    50. AImplementing Certain Tariff-Related Elements of a Trade and Security Agreement Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United StatesFederal Register (Commerce Department; International Trade Administration; Trade Representative, Office of United States) · 28 May 2026
    51. ATSMC Announces Additional $100 Billion Investment In ArizonaCity of Phoenix · 16 July 2026
    52. AProposal for the Chips Act 2.0European Commission · 3 June 2026
    53. ARapidus Achieves Significant Milestone at its State-of-the-Art Foundry with Prototyping of Leading-Edge 2nm GAA TransistorsRapidus · 18 July 2025
    54. ARapidus Secures 267.6 Billion Yen in Funding from Japan Government and Private Sector CompaniesRapidus · 27 February 2026
    55. ARapidus Completes 150 Billion Yen Funding Round from Japan GovernmentRapidus · 5 June 2026
    56. AChina's Evolving Industrial Policy for AIRAND Corporation · 26 June 2025
    57. AOverview on Taiwan Semiconductor Industry (2026 Edition)Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association · 7 August 2026 · p. 9
    58. AWhy Taiwan Fears ‘America First’ Risks Eroding Its ‘Silicon Shield’Stimson Center · 10 October 2025
    59. AQ3 2025 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptRefinitiv StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 October 2025 · p. 7
    60. AQ3 2025 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptRefinitiv StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 October 2025 · p. 5
    61. AQ3 2025 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd Earnings Call (Chinese, English) — edited transcriptRefinitiv StreetEvents (transcript of a TSMC earnings call), via TSMC · 16 October 2025 · p. 13
    62. AASML 2025 fourth-quarter and full-year results (investor presentation)ASML · 28 January 2026 · p. 9
    63. AFY2026 (April 2025-March 2026) Financial Announcement, transcriptTokyo Electron · 30 April 2026 · p. 27
    64. AFY2026 (April 2025-March 2026) Financial Announcement, transcriptTokyo Electron · 30 April 2026 · p. 5
    65. ASupply Chain Explorer: Advanced ChipsEmerging Technology Observatory (ETO) · Accessed 9 September 2026
    66. A2026 State of the U.S. Semiconductor IndustrySemiconductor Industry Association · 2 July 2026 · p. 7

    Made by Yashvardhan Sharma with Claude. Corrections and questions: contact@chipsupplychain.org.Updated 25 October 2026

    A company filings, governments, standards bodies, universities and research institutions; B SemiAnalysis, Reuters, the Financial Times and Nikkei Asia.

    Glossary

    Every term, firm, chip and country, with the passages that mention them.

    Try

    15 CFRCFR, Code of Federal Regulations, 15 CFR 742.6, part 742, part 740, part 734, supplement no. 5 to part 740, supplement no. 5

    The Code of Federal Regulations is the standing text of US rules, sorted into titles and parts. Title 15 holds the Export Administration Regulations. Part 734 says what is subject to them. Part 740 lists the license exceptions, and its supplement no. 5 lists the nineteen destinations eligible for License Exception AIA. Part 742 sets the licensing policy for each control.

    A rule announced in the Federal Register stays in the CFR until it is removed, so the unenforced AI Diffusion rule still stands in the regulations.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    300 mm300-millimeter, 12-inch wafer, 12-inch wafers, 12-inch equivalent, 200 mm, 8-inch, 8-inch-equivalent, 450 mm, 150 mm

    300 mm is the diameter of the standard wafer, about twelve inches. Older fabs run 200 mm, or 8-inch, wafers. The last increase in wafer size, to 300 mm, came in 2002.

    Advanced chips start on 300 mm wafers. In SEMI's November 2020 World Fab Forecast, which CSET cited in January 2021, they carried 99.7 percent of world fab capacity at 45 nm and below.

    Read it in Silicon and Wafers →
    3A0903A090.a, 3A090.b, 3A090.c, 4A090, 4A090.a, ECCN 3A090, ECCN 4A090

    3A090 is the entry in the US export control list that covers advanced AI chips, defined by their total processing performance and performance density. Its part c, added in December 2024, covers high bandwidth memory. 4A090 covers the computers built from the chips. A chip that falls under 3A090.a needs a license for China. The AI Diffusion rule of January 2025 extended that requirement to every destination. But BIS says it enforces the requirement only for Country Groups D:1, D:4 and D:5 and for firms headquartered in D:5 or Macau.

    It decides which AI chips need a license for China, so designers now build chips around its thresholds.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    3B0013B090, 3B001.c.1, 3B001.d.9, 3B001.d.10, 3B001.d.5, 3D991, 3E991

    3B001 is the main entry in the US export control list for chipmaking equipment. It is written as process specifications, such as an etch tool that cuts sideways or a deposition tool that coats holes more than 200 times deeper than they are wide. BIS created 3B090 in October 2022 and folded it into 3B001 and 3B002 in October 2023 (88 FR 73424). The related 3D and 3E entries cover the software and know-how that go with the tools.

    It decides which chipmaking tools need an export license. It defines a tool by the process it can run, because the same chamber can add or remove material depending on its recipe.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    ABFAjinomoto Build-up Film, build-up film, ABF build-up film, ABF substrate, ABF substrates

    The insulating film inside the substrate, the small layered board that the chips in a high-end package sit on. The board is built up in layers, and a sheet of this epoxy film, about 10 micrometers thick, separates each layer of copper wiring from the next. The Japanese food company Ajinomoto first developed it in 1999.

    Ajinomoto told investors in June 2026 that its film has held over 95 percent of its market since its launch. The company says practically all high-performance computers and servers rely on it.

    Read it in Substrates and PCBs →
    acceleratorAI accelerator, XPU, accelerators

    A chip built to do the one kind of arithmetic machine learning needs, multiplying large grids of numbers, far faster than a general-purpose processor can. Nvidia's graphics processors, Google's Tensor Processing Units and Amazon's Trainium are all accelerators.

    The whole supply chain exists to make accelerators, and export licenses are granted or refused for them.

    advanced packaging2.5D packaging, 3D packaging, 2.5D, 2.5D work, advanced packaging plants

    The steps that assemble several finished chips into one component, sitting side by side or stacked, wired together closely enough to behave like a single larger chip. Ordinary packaging only puts one chip into a protective case with contacts on the bottom.

    A modern AI accelerator needs more circuitry than a lithography machine can print in one exposure, and its memory must sit beside the logic, so it is assembled this way. Epoch AI found that TSMC's CoWoS packaging and the memory itself were the main limits on AI chip production in 2025.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    Affiliates Ruleaffiliates rule, 50 percent rule, affiliates of listed entities

    The Affiliates Rule extended the Entity List to any company anywhere in the world that is at least half owned by a listed firm. The aim was to stop a listed company from buying through a subsidiary. It took effect on 29 September 2025 and was suspended for a year six weeks later.

    It is suspended until 9 November 2026. If it returns, subsidiaries at least half owned by listed firms will again need licenses.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    AI Diffusion ruleAI Diffusion, diffusion rule, Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, AI Diffusion framework

    The AI Diffusion rule, published on 15 January 2025, required a license to ship the most capable AI chips anywhere in the world. Its exceptions allowed unlimited shipments to nineteen destinations, capped volumes elsewhere and none to China. It also controlled the weights of frontier AI models.

    Four months later BIS said it would not enforce the rule. But it withdrew none of the text, so the license requirement and exceptions still stand in the regulations. BIS says it enforces the requirement only for Country Groups D:1, D:4 and D:5 and for firms headquartered in D:5 or Macau.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    ALDatomic layer deposition

    A way of coating a chip a fraction of an atomic layer at a time. Each pulse of gas sticks to the surface and stops once the surface is covered. So the film comes out the same thickness on the floor and on the walls of a hole more than 50 times deeper than it is wide.

    US regulators call atomic layer deposition an enabler of stacked memory and of FinFET and gate-all-around logic, and export rules name some of its tools directly. Chinese toolmakers held 2.6 percent of the market in 2025 on CSET's count, most of it from Piotech.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    ArFargon fluoride, argon fluoride laser, 193 nm, 193-nanometer

    ArF stands for argon fluoride, the gas mixture inside the laser that gives deep ultraviolet lithography its 193-nanometer light. Scanners, the machines that print each layer, use this light in two ways. A dry scanner shines it through air, and an immersion scanner through a thin film of water between lens and wafer, which prints finer lines. ArF scanners print most of the fine layers on any chip made without extreme ultraviolet.

    ArF immersion scanners made up 42 percent of ASML's system sales in 2025. They are also the kind that a Chinese state-owned firm was reported in July 2026 to be producing at home.

    Read it in Lithography →
    ASICapplication-specific integrated circuit, custom silicon, ASICs, custom accelerator, custom accelerators, custom chip, custom AI silicon, custom AI ASICs

    A chip designed for one company's own workload and not sold on the open market. Google's Tensor Processing Unit and Amazon's Trainium are chips of this kind. An Nvidia part sold to any customer is not.

    A custom chip is tuned to one company's workload, but a chip sold to everyone comes with mature software and a resale market. Design houses such as Broadcom and Marvell turn the buyer's design into silicon and sell the finished chips to the buyer.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    ATEautomated test equipment, automatic test equipment, tester

    Automated test equipment, or ATE, is the machine that connects to a chip, on the wafer or in its package, feeds it test patterns and checks whether the answers coming back are right. Advantest's July 2026 investor guide counts test as the only manufacturing step that puts electrical signals through the chip.

    An AI accelerator joins a dozen expensive pieces, and one bad piece scraps them all. So each die is tested before assembly. Advantest's April 2025 investor guide put Advantest and Teradyne at about 80 percent of the tester market.

    Read it in Test and Assembly →
    back endback end of line, BEOL, back-end, back-end fabs, back-end tools

    Inside a fab, the back end of line is the second half of making a chip, the dozen or more layers of copper wiring stacked above the transistors. In the industry at large, the back end means everything after the wafer leaves the fab: grinding, dicing, packaging and test.

    Wiring is now as hard to make as the transistor. Among the firms that package and test chips after they leave the fab, four of the ten largest by 2024 revenue are headquartered in China, in a TrendForce ranking cited by CSET.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    backside power deliverybackside power, backside vias, PowerVia, Super Power Rail, backside power network

    Backside power delivery moves a chip's power wiring to the underside of the wafer, so the wiring above the transistors carries only signals. After the transistors and signal wiring are built, the wafer is bonded face down to a second wafer and ground thin, and the power wires are built on its back. Power arrives through tiny holes etched up from below, clear of the crowded top.

    It is one of the few remaining ways to make a chip faster without shrinking the transistor. Intel ships it on its 18A process. TSMC says A16, its first process with it, will be production-ready in the second half of 2026.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    base diebase chip, base logic die, logic base die, HBM base die

    The base die is the bottom chip of an HBM stack, the one that manages the memory dies above it and talks to the processor on their behalf. For HBM4, SK hynix moved it to TSMC's advanced logic process so it can hold more functions. Samsung's HBM4, shipped from February 2026, uses a 4 nm logic base die.

    SK hynix made its own base dies up to HBM3E, so the move gives TSMC a role inside a product it does not make.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    baseboardbaseboards, SXM, OAM, HGX, HGX baseboard

    A baseboard is the large circuit board that eight accelerator modules bolt onto inside a server. It carries their power and the links between them. On Nvidia's baseboard, switch chips let any two modules reach each other at full speed. Nvidia's module is called SXM and its baseboard HGX. The open-standard equivalents are OAM and UBB.

    With an eight-module baseboard, the eight accelerators in one server work as one unit. Rack-scale systems such as the NVL72 drop the baseboard and join 72 GPUs through switch trays in the rack.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    BGAball grid array, FC-BGA, flip-chip BGA

    A way of joining a packaged chip to a circuit board using a grid of small solder balls across the underside in place of a row of pins around the edge. Heating the assembly melts every ball at once into a permanent joint.

    The number and spacing of those balls limit how much current and how many signals can reach a package.

    Read it in Substrates and PCBs →
    Big FundNational Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, National Integrated Circuit Fund, third chip fund, China's third chip fund

    The Big Fund is the nickname for China's National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, the state vehicle that puts government money into Chinese chip firms. Its third round, raised in May 2024, came to 344 billion yuan, about $47 billion.

    CSIS puts China's cumulative state funding for chips since 2014 at an estimated $150 billion. The money has built a domestic tool industry but no leading-edge node.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    bill of materialsBOM

    The itemized list of every purchased part in a finished product and what each part cost, the way a builder's invoice prices lumber, wiring and fixtures separately.

    A bill of materials shows which suppliers get the money a buyer spends. Epoch AI estimated in December 2025 that memory made up about half of the roughly $6,400 manufacturing cost of an Nvidia B200.

    Read it in The Economics of AI Chips →
    BISBureau of Industry and Security, part of the US Department of Commerce

    The US government office that decides which technologies may be exported, to whom, and on what conditions. It writes the rules, issues the licenses and brings the enforcement cases.

    BIS wrote the US restrictions on selling AI chips and chipmaking tools to China in a series of rules. It can change a threshold by publishing a notice in the Federal Register, with no act of Congress needed.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    burn-inburn in, wafer-level burn-in, burn-in test

    Burn-in runs a chip hot and at raised voltage for minutes to days, so that any part that would fail early fails in the factory before it is shipped. It can run on the wafer or in the package. Aehr, a maker of burn-in systems, says its lead AI customer is moving all burn-in for its accelerators from the system level to the wafer.

    One weak die in a package of a dozen expensive parts scraps all of them, so burn-in on the wafer protects everything else in the package.

    Read it in Test and Assembly →
    busbarbusbars, copper busbar, copper busbars

    A busbar is a thick bar of solid copper that carries large currents down the back of a rack to the boards that need them. An ordinary cable carrying the same current would overheat. At the 54 volts used inside racks such as the GB300 NVL72, a one-megawatt rack would need up to 200 kilograms of busbar, by Nvidia's estimate.

    Nvidia is moving its racks to 800 volts, which cuts the current, so a megawatt rack will not need bars that heavy.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    capexcapital expenditure, capital spending

    Money a company spends on long-lived physical assets such as buildings, machines and servers, as distinct from salaries and other running costs.

    The largest cloud companies' capex pays for the chips, racks and buildings of the AI buildout. Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle spent $448.2 billion of capital in 2025, the sum of Epoch AI's quarterly figures. Epoch AI says they will spend $770 billion in 2026 if the trend continues.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    case-by-case reviewcase by case, case-by-case, reviewed case by case

    Case-by-case review means a license is required and each application is judged on its own, with no presumption either way. Since January 2026 Nvidia's H200 and AMD's MI325X have been reviewed this way for China, with conditions attached to each approval.

    It is the middle ground between an open market and a presumption of denial. In early 2026 the United States settled on it for chips such as the H200 bound for China.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    chipchips, microchip, microchips, semiconductor chip

    A chip is a small rectangle of silicon, usually smaller than a fingernail, that carries a complete electronic circuit, often made of billions of transistors. It is cut from a wafer after the circuit has been built up on it layer by layer.

    The supply chain is every firm and country that takes part in making chips, and some of them can stop production.

    Read it in Silicon and Wafers →
    chipletchiplets

    One of several smaller pieces that a chip has been deliberately split into, each manufactured separately and then wired back together inside a single package. A chip built this way is like a house assembled from prefabricated rooms.

    Many large accelerators need more circuitry than a lithography machine can print in one exposure, so they are built from chiplets. That makes packaging, the step that joins the chiplets, the hard part. Epoch AI found that TSMC's CoWoS packaging and memory were the main limits on AI chip production in 2025.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    CHIPS ActCHIPS and Science Act, CHIPS incentives, CHIPS money, CHIPS Act grants, CHIPS authorization, CHIPS Act support, CHIPS award

    The CHIPS and Science Act authorized about $52.7 billion of US federal money for the chip industry. By July 2025 the Commerce Department had awarded $30.9 billion of direct funding to 19 companies for 40 projects.

    Its grants paid a median 14.2 percent of each funded project's capital cost. In August 2025, $5.7 billion of grants awarded to Intel but not yet paid went into the government's $8.9 billion purchase of a 9.9 percent stake in Intel.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    chokepointchokepoints

    A step in the supply chain where so few firms or countries can do the work that losing one of them stops everybody.

    One sanction or one factory fire at a chokepoint reaches the whole industry, and so does a government policy aimed at one.

    CMOScomplementary metal-oxide-semiconductor, complementary MOS

    CMOS, short for complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor, is the standard way of building digital circuits from pairs of transistors. Each n-type transistor, which switches on when the voltage on its gate is high, is matched with a p-type transistor, which switches on when that voltage is low. In either logic state one side of the circuit is off, so little current flows except while it switches.

    CMOS became the dominant technology for making chips because its circuits drew close to zero power while idle, which kept heat in check as chips packed in more transistors. FinFET and gate-all-around transistors are newer shapes for the same n-type and p-type pairs.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    CMPchemical mechanical polishing, chemical mechanical planarization, polishing slurry, polishing slurries, slurry, slurries, CMP slurry, CMP pads, planarization

    Chemical mechanical polishing, or CMP, rubs a wafer's surface flat again after each new layer goes on, using a pad and a liquid full of fine grit called slurry. Without it the next layer would be printed on a surface too bumpy to focus on.

    Japanese companies held 51 percent of polishing-slurry sales in 2023, counted by company nationality. CSET's January 2021 brief, drawing on 2019 market reports, put DuPont and Cabot Microelectronics at about 56 percent of a $790 million slurry market. Cabot was renamed CMC Materials in October 2020, and Entegris bought it in July 2022. DuPont's electronics business became Qnity Electronics in November 2025.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    co-packaged opticsco-packaged, co-packaging, CPO, plug-in modules, plug-in optics

    Co-packaged optics puts the parts that turn electrical signals into light and back onto the switch chip's own package instead of into plug-in modules at the front of the box. Broadcom keeps the lasers that supply the light in separate modules that can be replaced in the field.

    Broadcom and Nvidia are moving the optics onto the switch package partly to cut the power the optics use. Broadcom says its Tomahawk 6 Davisson cuts optical interconnect power by 70 percent.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    coater/developercoater-developer, coater and developer, coater/developer track, track tool, track tools

    A coater/developer, or track, is the machine that spins a thin coat of photoresist onto the wafer before it enters the scanner. After the wafer comes out, the same machine washes away the exposed parts, so every printed layer passes through it twice.

    No pattern can be printed without it. Tokyo Electron's own results put its share of the market at 91 percent in 2025.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    coefficient of thermal expansionCTE, thermal expansion, expansion mismatch, low-CTE

    The coefficient of thermal expansion is how much a material expands for each degree it warms. Silicon barely expands and epoxy expands more, so when the two are bonded and heated, the package bends.

    Warpage control, keeping a package from bending, means matching expansion across die, bridge, interposer and substrate. It gets harder as packages grow.

    Read it in Substrates and PCBs →
    compute thresholdtraining compute threshold

    A limit set on the amount of arithmetic used to train an AI model. It counts operations, whichever chips run them. The AI Diffusion rule of January 2025 made one an export control. ECCN 4E091 covers "'Parameters' for an artificial intelligence model trained utilizing 10^26 or more 'operations'". The rules require a license to send such parameters to every destination worldwide (15 CFR 742.6(a)(13)). Article 51(2) of the EU AI Act sets Europe's line ten times lower. It presumes a model has high-impact capabilities when the cumulative computation used for training is "greater than 10^25" floating point operations.

    Every other control threshold measures a chip, but this one measures the model the chips train. Article 51(3) of the AI Act lets the European Commission change the EU figure by delegated act. Such an act takes effect unless the European Parliament or the Council objects within three months (Article 97(6)). BIS said in May 2025 that it would not enforce the AI Diffusion rule, but 4E091 still stands in the regulations.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    Concentrationconcentration band

    A four-band judgment of how many firms could credibly supply a stage today, taken at the narrowest step inside it. Extreme means three or fewer, or one firm holding more than half the stage. High means four to six, with the top two taking most of the revenue. Moderate means seven or more, none of them dominant. Low means many, with the scarce input something another industry sells at volume. Where a figure exists for the top country's share of the segment, it is a second check. When the two disagree, the supplier count wins.

    The fewer the firms that can do a stage, the more one accident or one license decision affects the whole chain.

    consigneeconsignees, named consignee, named consignees, ultimate consignee

    The consignee is the party a shipment is sent to, the name on the export license. A named consignee, such as G42 in the United Arab Emirates, can receive controlled chips on the terms attached to its own name.

    The July 2026 UAE rule names the Emirati government, G42 and eight US-headquartered AI companies as consignees who can take controlled AI chips without a license. The license-free treatment is tied to those named buyers.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    Country GroupsCountry Group, Country Group D:5, D:5, A:5, D:1, D:3, D:4, arms-embargoed countries

    The groups that US export rules sort the world's countries into, published as supplement no. 1 to 15 CFR part 740. A:5 and A:6 list close partners. D:1, D:4 and D:5 are the national security, missile technology and arms-embargoed groups. E:1 and E:2 are the most restricted. A country can be in several groups at once, and the license requirement usually depends on which.

    US license rules for AI chips are written in terms of these groups. Chips in the 3A090.b band, the band below the top one, need a license for D:1, D:4 and D:5 destinations not also in A:5 or A:6 (15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(B)). The UAE moved from D:3 and D:4 into A:5 in July 2026. But the rule names the UAE, so these chips still need a license there, except for approved Emirati consignees (15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(B)).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    CoWoSchip on wafer on substrate

    TSMC's method for mounting logic chips and memory stacks side by side on a shared interposer, a layer of fine wiring, then mounting that interposer on a rigid base board. In CoWoS-S the interposer is one piece of silicon. In CoWoS-L, used for Nvidia's Blackwell and Rubin, it is layers of fine copper wiring with small embedded silicon bridges. Nearly every high-end AI accelerator is built this way.

    Epoch AI found that TSMC's CoWoS packaging and memory were the main limits on AI chip production in 2025. It estimates that Nvidia used 60.3 percent of all CoWoS that year. SemiAnalysis judged in March 2026 that CoWoS supply was easing, but in July 2026 TSMC said its packaging capacity was so tight that it limited customers' growth.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    critical dimensioncritical dimensions, CD, CD-SEM, critical-dimension, line width, line-width, line widths

    The critical dimension is the width of the finest printed feature on a layer. A CD-SEM is an electron microscope built to measure it across a wafer without cutting anything.

    Fabs measure it to tell whether each lithography and etch step came out the right width. In 2025 Hitachi held 71.9 percent of the market for the tools that measure it, by CSET's count. They are the one kind of inspection or measurement tool that Japan leads.

    Read it in Metrology and Inspection →
    CSISCenter for Strategic and International Studies

    CSIS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization in Washington, D.C., founded in 1962. Its technology researchers publish assessments of China's chipmaking and of US export controls.

    Its reports judge how far Chinese chipmakers are from replacing foreign tools. In September 2025 CSIS judged that extreme ultraviolet machines remained firmly out of China's reach despite massive state investment, including $43 billion that China announced for developing its own.

    Read it in Lithography →
    CVDchemical vapor deposition, PECVD, plasma-enhanced chemical vapor deposition, MOCVD, CVD precursor, precursor, precursors

    Chemical vapor deposition, or CVD, grows a film by flowing gases over a hot wafer so they react on its surface and leave a solid layer behind. The plasma-enhanced version, PECVD, runs cooler. The gases used are called precursors.

    CVD made up $11.2 billion of a $26.2 billion deposition tool market in 2025, most of it the plasma-enhanced kind. Chinese toolmakers' share of the deposition tool market rose from 2 to 7 percent between 2019 and 2024.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    de minimis

    The share of controlled American content a foreign-made item may contain before US export rules, the EAR, apply to it. Under 15 CFR 734.4 the general threshold is 25 percent of the item's value, and 10 percent for the most restricted destinations. Above the threshold the item falls under the EAR, and below it the item does not.

    It decides whether foreign-made goods with some US content fall under American rules. The foreign direct product rules work differently and catch an item whatever its share of US content. Under 15 CFR 734.4(a)(3), equipment in ECCN 3B993.f.1 has no de minimis level when it is bound for advanced-node chip production. The exception is equipment first exported from a country that also controls it.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    defect densityD0, defects per square centimeter

    The average number of chip-killing flaws per square centimeter of processed wafer. It is a fab's quality score, inferred from how many chips come out working.

    AI accelerators have some of the largest dies in production, and yield, the share of dies that work, falls steeply as die area times defect density grows. In a textbook example at 0.8 defects per square centimeter, 49.2 percent of dies 1 centimeter on a side come out flawless, against 11.3 percent of dies 2 centimeters on a side. The share that can be sold is higher on chips that carry spare blocks.

    Read it in Metrology and Inspection →
    denial order

    An order from BIS that shuts a named party out of trade in US-controlled items, as a sanction or a protective measure, with no license policy involved. Under 15 CFR 764.3 it restricts the party's exports, reexports and in-country transfers of items subject to the EAR, and its access to them. It can also suspend or revoke the party's outstanding licenses. There is no application to file. Orders can be issued outright or suspended and later activated.

    It can cut a named party off from every item subject to the EAR. The order activated against ZTE in April 2018 stayed in force until BIS terminated it 89 days later as part of a settlement (83 FR 17644; 83 FR 34825).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    deposition

    Adding a layer of material to a wafer. Machines knock atoms off a solid target so they land on the surface, react gases at the surface so a film grows there, or plate metal out of a liquid. It is how the insulators, the wires and the parts of each transistor are built up.

    Making one chip takes 1,000 to 1,500 steps by a 2025 industry estimate, and many of them are deposition and etch. AI hardware needs films that reach the bottom of deeper holes. Four firms make most of the tools, but deposition is among the tool types where Chinese makers gained the most share between 2019 and 2024.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    dicingwafer dicing, dicing saw, dicing saws, grinding, wafer grinding, grinders, wafer grinders, thinning, wafer thinning

    Dicing cuts a finished wafer into its individual dies with a diamond saw or a laser. Grinding, done first, thins the wafer from the back, and for stacked memory it goes on until the copper columns inside the dies come through.

    Stacked high bandwidth memory (HBM) depends on that grinding. Disco of Japan held 87 percent of the world market for dicing saws and wafer grinders in 2025, by CSET's count.

    Read it in Test and Assembly →
    diesingular of dice, dies

    One rectangular chip cut out of a wafer. Hundreds are printed side by side on the same disc and then sliced apart, and each separated rectangle is a die.

    Cost and yield are counted per die. A GPU die that fills the largest area one exposure can print loses far more silicon to one fatal defect than a small chip does.

    Read it in Silicon and Wafers →
    dielectricdielectrics, dielectric etch, dielectric properties, insulator, insulating layer

    A dielectric is an insulator: a material that does not conduct, such as the glassy oxides and nitrides between a chip's wires or the epoxy in a package substrate. Dielectric etch cuts holes and trenches through those insulating layers so the wires can be laid in.

    How much signal a dielectric absorbs sets how fast a substrate or circuit board can run. So the suppliers of laminates, the insulating sheets these boards are made from, matter to AI systems.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    DRAMdynamic random-access memory

    A computer's main working memory. Each bit is a charge held in a microscopic capacitor that leaks, so the chip has to refresh its contents constantly. It forgets everything when the power goes off.

    HBM is a stack of DRAM chips, and the three leading DRAM makers, SK hynix, Samsung and Micron, make nearly all of it. SK hynix says the shift of production capacity to HBM left ordinary DRAM, the kind in PCs and phones, undersupplied. The company says the shortage helped drive a significant price recovery from the third quarter of 2025.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    DUVdeep ultraviolet, deep-ultraviolet, DUV scanner, DUV scanners, DUV tools

    Chipmaking light from gas lasers, at 248 or 193 nanometers, and the machines that print with it, which still make up most lithography tools. Filling the gap between lens and wafer with water sharpens the image, a method called immersion.

    A fab without extreme ultraviolet machines can reach leading-edge logic only with immersion deep ultraviolet and several passes per layer, as SMIC does. So Dutch export licensing covers the most advanced immersion tools.

    Read it in Lithography →
    EARExport Administration Regulations

    The body of US rules that governs the export of commercial goods, software and technology, including items with both civilian and military uses. The Bureau of Industry and Security writes and enforces them. They run from 15 CFR part 730 to part 774. Part 734 sets what they cover, part 742 the license requirements, part 744 the end-use and end-user controls, part 740 the exceptions and part 764 the penalties.

    American export rules on chips and chipmaking tools are amendments to these regulations, made by notice in the Federal Register with no act of Congress.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    EAR99

    The label for an item that falls under US export rules but is not named on the Commerce Control List, the catalog of controlled items. The label is defined at 15 CFR 734.3(c). It is a catch-all category, but an EAR99 item still needs a license if it is going to a listed party or a controlled end use.

    An EAR99 item can usually ship without a license, but a listed buyer, a controlled end use or an embargoed destination can still require one. So exporters of unlisted items have to follow the end-user controls in part 744 of the EAR too.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    ECCNExport Control Classification Number

    The catalog number that US export rules assign to a controlled item, similar to a customs tariff code but for security-sensitive technology. Number 3A090 covers advanced computing chips and 3B001 covers chipmaking equipment.

    An item's classification number determines whether it needs a license. So the technical thresholds written into each number set which products are controlled.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    EDAelectronic design automation, chip design software

    The software that turns a description of what a chip should do into the exact pattern of shapes to be printed on silicon. It also proves the design will work before anyone commits money to masks and wafers.

    Three vendors sell the only software that covers every step of designing a leading-edge chip. Since October 2022 software made for designing chips with gate-all-around transistors has needed a US export license. In May 2025 the US government sent letters to the three vendors requiring a license for all their sales to China, and it lifted the requirement on 2 July.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    electron beamelectron-beam, e-beam, electron beams, multi-beam, multibeam, e-beam inspection, electron-beam metrology

    An electron beam is a stream of electrons focused to a spot far smaller than any spot of light. Mask shops use it to write the pattern onto a photomask, and fabs use it to inspect wafers for defects light cannot see and to measure line widths. A multi-beam tool fires many beams at once, because a single beam is slow.

    In 2023 Intel called Austria's IMS Nanofabrication the established leader in the multi-beam writers that advanced EUV masks require. Since December 2024 US rules have controlled wafer inspection tools that use two or more beams to find defects 21 nm across or smaller.

    Read it in Photomasks and Pellicles →
    electronic-gradeelectronic grade, semiconductor-grade, semiconductor grade, solar-grade, solar grade

    Electronic-grade, or semiconductor-grade, silicon is refined until its metal impurities are no more than a few parts per billion, pure enough for chips. Solar-grade silicon is a less pure grade made for solar cells.

    Every chip starts from it. The Commerce Department found in 2026 that semiconductor-grade polysilicon makes up only 2.4 percent of global production. The German wafer maker Siltronic names five major suppliers for 2025: Wacker, Hemlock, OCI, Tokuyama and Mitsubishi. None of them is Chinese.

    Read it in Silicon and Wafers →
    EMEA

    EMEA stands for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, one region in the breakdowns that companies publish of where their sales go.

    ASML is based in the Netherlands, yet tools shipped to EMEA made up 1 percent of its net system sales in 2025, against 33 percent for China.

    Read it in Lithography →
    end-use and end-user controlsend user, end users, end-user, end use, military end user

    Export rules that depend on who the buyer is and what they will do with the item, whatever the item is. The same tool can ship freely to one customer and need a license that will be refused for another.

    A company can lose access to US-controlled items because of who owns it or what its site produces. In September 2025 US rules were extended to firms at least 50 percent owned by listed entities, though the extension is suspended until 9 November 2026.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    Entity Listentity-list, Entity-Listed, Entity List additions, listed entity, listed entities, listed firm, listed firms

    A published list of foreign companies, institutes and individuals. Anyone anywhere, American or foreign, needs a license to send them an item subject to the EAR. Each entry states its own license review policy. Most carry a presumption of denial, meaning the license will normally be refused. SMIC's entry, as amended in December 2024, is a presumption of denial for all items. The exception is tools designed for 200 mm wafer production and bound for a 200 mm plant, which are reviewed case by case. The list is supplement no. 4 to 15 CFR part 744, and the license requirement is in 15 CFR 744.11.

    It names an organization, so it is one of the simplest tools the US government has. In September 2025 the US extended each listing to companies at least 50 percent owned by listed firms, but that extension is suspended until 9 November 2026 (90 FR 50857).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    epitaxyepitaxial, epitaxial wafer, epitaxial wafers, epitaxial layer, epi

    Epitaxy grows a fresh layer of crystal on top of a wafer, atom by atom, so the new layer continues the crystal beneath it with almost no flaws. An epitaxial wafer is a plain wafer with that extra layer, and the transistors are built in it.

    Flaws in that layer can make the transistors leak current. The industry association SEMI credits the 2025 rise in wafer shipments to AI demand for advanced epitaxial wafers for logic chips and polished wafers for high-bandwidth memory.

    Read it in Silicon and Wafers →
    etchetching, etched, etches, etcher, etchers, dry etch

    Removing material from a wafer wherever the printed pattern says it should not be. Most etch tools turn a gas into a plasma whose ions and fragments eat one material and leave the material beside it alone.

    Wrap-around transistors need etch that cuts sideways while sparing the material beside it. Stacked memory needs holes far deeper than they are wide. So US rules control etch tools by selectivity, meaning how well a tool cuts one material while sparing another, and by hole shape.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    EthernetUltra Ethernet, Spectrum-X, Spectrum-X Ethernet, Tomahawk, Ethernet switch

    Ethernet is the ordinary networking standard of offices and the internet, now made fast and reliable enough to link the servers of an AI cluster. Its switch chips, such as Broadcom's Tomahawk, route traffic between thousands of accelerators.

    Broadcom has doubled the bandwidth of its Ethernet switch chips every generation, from 25.6 Tbps on one chip in Tomahawk 4 in 2019 to 102.4 in Tomahawk 6 in 2025.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    EUVextreme ultraviolet, extreme-ultraviolet, EUV scanner, EUV scanners, extreme ultraviolet lithography

    The light that prints the finest layers of every leading-edge chip, and the machines that print with it. Its wavelength is 13.5 nanometers, and shorter light draws finer lines. Air and glass both absorb it, so the machine works in a vacuum and carries the light on mirrors. The light comes from droplets of molten tin, 50,000 a second, each hit twice by a laser.

    The finest layers set how densely transistors and wires pack, so the most advanced AI chips depend on EUV. Only ASML makes the machines, and export controls block it from shipping them to Chinese chipmakers.

    Read it in Lithography →
    export controlexport controls, export licensing, export license, export licenses, export licence, export licences, export-control

    An export control is a rule that requires the government's permission for a sale. The government names an item and a country or a buyer. From then on its own companies must hold a license before they ship that item to that country or buyer. The United States extends some of these rules to goods made abroad with American technology.

    It works only when the controlling country's firms make something the buyer cannot get elsewhere.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    fabfabrication plant, wafer fab, fabs, chip factory, chip factories

    The factory where wafers are processed into chips. It is a cleanroom where each wafer moves from machine to machine in a sealed pod for months. The building costs tens of billions of dollars.

    In 2023 BCG estimated that a new 2 nm-class fab finished in 2026 would cost $35 to $43 billion to own over ten years. SemiAnalysis judged in December 2025 that finding enough workers remained a major challenge for TSMC in Arizona. TSMC has yet to build one of its largest fabs outside Taiwan.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    fabless

    A chip company that designs and sells chips but owns no factory, paying a contract manufacturer, a foundry, to make them. Nvidia, AMD, Apple, Qualcomm and Broadcom all work this way.

    The fabless model concentrates manufacturing in a handful of foundries. So a designer's supply, its costs and where its chips are made all depend on a company it does not control.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    Federal RegisterFR, 89 FR, 91 FR, 88 FR, Federal Register notice

    The Federal Register is the US government's daily journal, where every new rule is published. An export rule can take effect a few days before it is printed there, as the UAE rule did in July 2026. A citation such as 89 FR 96790 means volume 89, page 96790, and is the usual way to cite a rule.

    US export rules change by notices published there, with no act of Congress needed.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    FinFETfin field-effect transistor

    A transistor whose channel, the strip that current flows through, stands on edge like a shark fin. The gate, the electrode that switches the current, wraps around three sides of the fin instead of resting on one. More contact means firmer control and less leakage when the switch is meant to be off.

    TSMC's leading-edge processes used FinFETs until N2, its first process with gate-all-around transistors, entered volume production in late 2025. The October 2022 US rules used FinFET or 16/14 nm logic as one of their thresholds for an advanced fab.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    FLOPSfloating point operations per second, TFLOPS, PFLOPS, FLOP, teraflops

    A count of how many arithmetic operations on floating-point numbers, numbers with a fractional part, a chip can perform each second, the way horsepower counts an engine's output.

    It is the standard unit of AI compute, but two chips' figures can be compared only when the number format behind each, such as 8-bit or 16-bit, is stated. US export rules use their own score, TPP, which weights each operation by its bit length.

    foreign direct product ruleFDPR, FDP rule, foreign-produced direct product rule, direct product rule, foreign-produced item rules, foreign-produced item rule, foreign-produced item

    A US rule that puts a foreign-made item under American control when two tests are both met. The first is about the product: the item was made directly from specified US technology or software, or in a plant that was. The second is about the destination: the item is going somewhere, or to someone, the rule names. The mechanics are in 15 CFR 734.9.

    The rule lets US controls reach goods made outside the United States. Without it, a buyer on the Entity List could escape US controls by ordering chips from a supplier outside the United States. With it, a chip made in Taiwan on American tools for Huawei needs a US license. For listed firms the rule reaches only those whose entry carries a footnote naming it, such as Huawei's (15 CFR 734.9(e)).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    foundrypure-play foundry, contract chipmaker, foundries, pure-play, pure play, pure-play model, contract chipmaking

    A company, or a division of one, that manufactures chips designed by other companies. A pure-play foundry, the model TSMC pioneered after its founding in 1987, makes no products of its own. The model works because no chip company sells enough of one product to fill a modern fab on its own.

    All six of TSMC's largest plants are in Taiwan. Taiwan held 69 percent of the world's logic capacity below 10 nm in 2022, so political events there affect the whole chip supply.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    FP8 and FP48-bit and 4-bit floating point, FP8, FP4, FP16, BF16, INT8, number formats

    Ways of writing a number using only 8 or 4 binary digits, or bits, far fewer than standard formats use. Each number is less precise, but the chip can perform and store far more of them. That trade-off suits machine learning, which can work with less exact numbers.

    Lower precision raises a chip's headline speed, so a performance figure quoted without its number format cannot be compared. US export rules allow for this by weighting each operation by its bit length.

    front endfront end of line, FEOL, front-end, front-end wafers

    The front end of line is the first half of making a chip, the steps that build the transistors in the silicon. In the industry at large, the front end means the whole wafer fab, as against the back end where chips are packaged and tested.

    SemiAnalysis judged in March 2026 that front-end capacity had overtaken packaging as the main bottleneck on AI chip output. But TSMC said in July 2026 that its packaging capacity still limited customers' growth.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    gallium and germaniumgallium, germanium, antimony

    Gallium and germanium are metals used in electronics. Gallium goes into compound chips such as radio parts, LEDs and lasers, and germanium into fiber optics, infrared optics, semiconductors and solar cells. Both are recovered as byproducts, gallium from processing bauxite and germanium from certain zinc ores and coal.

    The US Geological Survey put China's share of world production of primary low-purity gallium at 99 percent in February 2026. China has required licenses to export both metals since August 2023. Its December 2024 ban on exports of both to the United States is suspended until 27 November 2026.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    gate-all-aroundGAA, nanosheet transistor, RibbonFET at Intel, nanosheet, nanosheets, RibbonFET, GAA transistor, gate-all-around transistors

    A transistor in which the gate, the electrode that switches the current, wraps all the way around the channel that current flows through. In a FinFET, the design it replaces, the gate touches three sides. Surrounding the channel gives the gate firmer control than a fin allows, so less current leaks when the switch is off.

    Only TSMC, Intel and Samsung make it in volume. It needs etch that cuts sideways, which US export rules control. Customers building 2 nm gate-all-around capacity lifted ASM International, the leader in atomic layer deposition, to record revenue in 2025.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    GB/sTB/s, Gb/s, Tbps, gigabytes per second, terabytes per second, gigabits per second, terabits per second

    GB/s is gigabytes per second, the measure of how much data a link or a memory can move. TB/s is a thousand times more. A lowercase b, as in Gb/s or Tbps, counts bits, each an eighth of a byte. One HBM4 stack moves over 2 TB/s. NVLink 6 gives each GPU 3,600 GB/s, according to Nvidia's January 2026 Rubin launch.

    The October 2022 US rule caught chips with a processing score of 4,800 or more and an input and output rate of 600 GB/s or more (87 FR 62186). Since January 2026, chips with total DRAM bandwidth below 6,500 GB/s and a processing score, or TPP, below 21,000 can be licensed case by case for China (91 FR 1684).

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    glass clothT-glass, low-expansion glass, glass fiber cloth, low-expansion glass cloth

    Glass cloth is a woven fabric of fine glass fibers that gives a substrate core or circuit board its stiffness. T-glass is a special grade that barely expands when heated, which helps keep a large package flat.

    Nitto Boseki of Japan claims an overwhelming advantage in low-expansion glass cloth. It says demand seems to have risen about two to three times since its fiscal 2024 to 2027 plan was set.

    Read it in Substrates and PCBs →
    GPUgraphics processing unit, GPUs

    A processor originally built to draw video game images by doing thousands of simple calculations at once. Neural networks turned out to need the same kind of arithmetic, so the GPU became the default AI processor.

    Nvidia used 60.3 percent of all CoWoS packaging in 2025, on Epoch AI's estimate. The US required a license for Nvidia's H20 in April 2025. Since January 2026 it has reviewed applications to sell the H200 to buyers in China case by case.

    gross margin

    The share of a sale left over after paying what it cost to make the thing, before research, sales and overheads are counted. A 70 percent gross margin means $70 of every $100 of revenue is left after manufacturing cost.

    Gross margin shows which firms have pricing power. In quarters ending June to September 2026, Micron's was 86.8 percent and Nvidia's 75.0 percent. The assembly and test houses Amkor and ASE were at 16.8 to 27.3 percent, counting ASE's packaging and test segment alone.

    Read it in The Economics of AI Chips →
    HBMhigh bandwidth memory, high-bandwidth memory, HBM3E, HBM4, HBM4E, HBM stack, HBM stacks, memory stacks, stacked memory

    Stacked memory built for AI chips. Up to sixteen memory chips are stacked into a cube and wired together through copper-filled holes made in each chip before stacking. The cube sits a few millimeters from the processor. It holds the model the chip is running, the numbers called weights, and hands them to the processor over 1,024 or more wires at once.

    To write each word of an answer, the chip reads the whole model from this memory, along with the record of the conversation so far. A larger model or a longer conversation needs more memory, so the size and speed of HBM usually set how many people one chip can serve. HBM is the largest line in the bill of materials of an Nvidia B200. SK hynix, Samsung and Micron make nearly all of it.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    High-NA EUVhigh numerical aperture extreme ultraviolet, ASML EXE series, High-NA, High NA, High-NA scanners, High-NA machine, High-NA tools

    The next generation of extreme ultraviolet machine, whose larger mirrors collect light over a wider angle and so print smaller features. The wider optics also halve the area the machine can print in one exposure, so a large chip has to be stitched together from two exposures.

    It cuts the smallest printable feature from 13 nanometers to 8, and TSMC expects more AI chip layers to need it. Each machine sells for an estimated $350 to $400 million. Intel says it uses High-NA in volume production for select layers of some 18A products. TSMC plans to use it in high-volume manufacturing from 2030.

    Read it in Lithography →
    high-performance computingHPC, HPC platform, high-performance computers

    High-performance computing is the industry's name for the heavy end of the market: supercomputers, AI accelerators and the server processors beside them. A foundry's HPC platform is the version of a node tuned for those chips.

    AI accelerators are part of this segment and need package substrates with more layers than earlier HPC chips. Ajinomoto, which makes the insulating film between those layers, counts 11 layers of it on each side of the core in a 2026 AI package substrate, against nine on each side of an HPC substrate around 2023.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    high-volume manufacturingHVM, volume production, mass production, high volume, in volume, production ramp

    High-volume manufacturing is the point where a new process or product stops being a trial and is made in volume for sale. Output then climbs to full rate during the ramp.

    Foundries announce the date a process reaches it, and before then the process runs only in trials such as risk production.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    hybrid bondingdirect bond interconnect, SoIC, Foveros Direct, copper pad to copper pad

    Joining two chips by bonding their copper pads, and the glass-like insulator around them, directly to each other, with no solder in between. Removing the solder lets connections be packed much more tightly and shortens the path heat has to travel out.

    An SK hynix tech note puts microbumps about 20 micrometers apart and hybrid-bonded pads under 1 micrometer apart. It expects full-scale use in HBM at HBM4E or HBM5, where stacks are projected to pass twenty layers.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    hydrogen fluoridehydrofluoric acid, HF, ultra-high-purity hydrofluoric acid, high-purity hydrogen fluoride

    Hydrogen fluoride is a gas that dissolves glass, and hydrofluoric acid is its solution in water. Fabs use both to strip oxide layers and clean wafers between steps. Like other cleaning chemicals, it is purified until metal impurities are down to parts per trillion.

    When Japan put it under individual export licenses for South Korea in 2019, Japan's exports of it to South Korea fell 87.9 percent. South Korea bought more from the United States and Taiwan and made more at home.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    hyperscalerhyperscalers

    One of the handful of companies that run data centers at global scale, such as Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Meta and Oracle.

    They pay for the AI buildout. Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle spent $448.2 billion of capital in 2025, the sum of Epoch AI's quarterly figures.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    i-lineg-line, i-line steppers, i-line scanners

    i-line is the coarsest of the main lithography lights, 365 nanometers from a mercury lamp, named for one line in the lamp's spectrum. It prints the widest features on a chip and much of a package.

    SMEE, the established Chinese scanner maker, is strongest in i-line, and even there it holds about 4 percent of the world market.

    Read it in Lithography →
    IDMintegrated device manufacturer, integrated device maker, integrated device makers

    A chip company that both designs its products and manufactures them in its own factories. Intel, Samsung and Micron are examples.

    An integrated maker that also makes chips for other companies competes with its own customers. Its own products take the best capacity, so fewer customers trust it with a flagship design.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    immersion lithographyimmersion DUV, ArF immersion, immersion scanner, immersion scanners, immersion tools, immersion DUV scanners, immersion deep-ultraviolet

    Immersion lithography prints with a thin layer of ultrapure water between the scanner's lens and the wafer. The water lets the lens focus light at a wider angle than air allows, so the same light prints finer lines. It is the most advanced form of deep ultraviolet lithography, one step below extreme ultraviolet.

    Dutch export licensing covers the most advanced immersion scanners. Reuters reported in July 2026, citing one unnamed source, that a Chinese state-owned firm had started producing its own immersion scanners.

    Read it in Lithography →
    in-country transfertransfer (in-country)

    A change in the end use or the end user of an item inside one foreign country, defined at 15 CFR 734.16. Nothing crosses a border. A server legally imported into a country for one customer is transferred when it is resold, or repurposed, for another.

    Controls on in-country transfers catch hardware diverted after it has arrived. So a license granted for a named Chinese customer does not cover the hardware if it passes to someone else. Reexports and in-country transfers of advanced chips to Macau or Country Group D:5 keep a presumption of denial, meaning a license will normally be refused (91 FR 1684). That holds even where an export from the United States would be reviewed case by case (91 FR 1684).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    indium phosphideInP, indium

    Indium phosphide is a crystal grown from the metal indium and phosphorus. It gives off light when current passes through it, which silicon cannot do efficiently. The lasers inside the fastest optical modules are made of it.

    China produced about 70 percent of the world's indium in 2025. In February 2025 it put indium under new export restrictions and began requiring export permits for indium phosphide substrates. In March 2026 Nvidia agreed to invest $2 billion each in Coherent and Lumentum, alongside purchase commitments for their lasers.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    inferenceinference chip, inference chips, inference accelerator, inference accelerators, training and inference

    Inference is running a finished AI model to answer requests, such as a prompt. Training, a run of weeks on a cluster of accelerators, builds the model first. To write each word of an answer, the chip reads the whole model from memory, does a little arithmetic and waits for the next read. Training reuses each number it fetches, so it fetches little and computes a lot.

    In inference, memory size and speed usually set how many people one chip can serve.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    InfiniBandQuantum-2, Quantum-X800

    InfiniBand is a networking standard long used in supercomputers, with low delay and no dropped packets. AI clusters relied on it to link thousands of servers before Ethernet caught up, and Nvidia still sells both.

    The choice between InfiniBand and Ethernet decides who sells the switch chips. Broadcom has doubled the bandwidth of its Ethernet switch chips with each generation since 2019.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    interposerinterposers, silicon interposer, silicon carrier

    A layer of wiring with no transistors, used as a miniature circuit board underneath several chips so they can be connected at a density no ordinary board could reach. It is either one piece of silicon or layers of fine copper wiring, often with small silicon bridges.

    HBM connects over 1,024 or 2,048 wires, too many for a resin board, so memory and logic sit together on an interposer. Its area caps how much fits in one package. In April 2026 TSMC was producing CoWoS at 5.5 times the reticle, the largest area a lithography machine prints in one exposure.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    ion implantationion implanter, ion implanters, implant, implant layers, implantation

    A way of changing how silicon conducts by firing atoms into it. An ion implanter shoots charged atoms of boron, phosphorus or arsenic into the wafer, where they lodge just under the surface. The patches they land in then conduct the way the design needs.

    Every modern chip process relies on it. Implanters are export-controlled. In February 2026 Applied Materials agreed to pay a penalty of about $252 million over implanters shipped to a Chinese customer on the Entity List.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    IPsilicon IP, IP blocks, licensed blocks, licensed circuit blocks, semiconductor IP, IP catalog, intellectual property

    In chip design, IP, short for intellectual property, means a ready-made block of circuitry, such as a processor core or a memory interface, that a design house licenses. Arm sells processor IP, and other firms sell the blocks that talk to memory, PCIe or another chiplet.

    Each licensed block must be proven on a new process before a chip can use it. The memory interface is a demanding one, because it has to hold its timing across thousands of solder bumps into a stacked memory die.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    is-informed letteris informed letter, is-informed letters, by letter

    A letter from BIS to one named company imposing a license requirement on a specific export, without any rule being published. BIS's power to send one is written into the regulations themselves, for example 15 CFR 744.23(b), which lets BIS inform a person individually, with no amendment to the EAR.

    It imposes a control at once, with no published rule. BIS imposed the April 2025 license requirement for Nvidia's H20 this way, and the public learned of it from Nvidia's own filing.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    JEDECJESD270-4, JEDEC standard

    JEDEC is the industry body that writes the standards for memory chips, so that a memory stack from any maker fits any processor built to the same specification. Its HBM4 standard, published in April 2025, sets the width and speed of the interface.

    Makers now ship HBM4 faster than the standard's 8 Gb/s per pin. Samsung's runs at 11.7, SK hynix's above 10 and Micron's above 11. Each customer runs its own qualification tests, so meeting the standard does not by itself win an order.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    kilowattkW, kilowatts, megawatt, MW, megawatts, gigawatt, GW, gigawatts

    A kilowatt is a thousand watts. A megawatt is a thousand kilowatts, and a gigawatt a thousand megawatts, about the output of one large power station. A GB300 NVL72 rack draws up to 142 kilowatts. The largest data center campuses are planned in gigawatts.

    AI deals are now counted in gigawatts too, as when OpenAI and Broadcom announced 10 gigawatts of accelerators. Power equipment now arrives more slowly than the chips.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    known-good dieKGD, good die, good dies, known good die

    A bare chip tested thoroughly enough, before assembly, to be trusted inside something expensive. In an ordinary product a faulty chip wastes one chip. Inside a package that joins a dozen expensive pieces, one bad die throws away all of them.

    As packages grow toward about ten large compute dies and 20 memory stacks, a bad die found only after assembly scraps more parts. So chipmakers move testing and burn-in, running chips hot to force early failures, back onto the wafer.

    Read it in Test and Assembly →
    KrFkrypton fluoride, krypton fluoride laser, 248 nm, 248-nanometer

    KrF is krypton fluoride, the gas in an older lithography laser that shines at 248 nanometers. KrF scanners print the coarser layers of a chip, where lines are far apart.

    KrF tools print coarser layers such as implant layers. ASML sold 78 of them in 2025, and Canon also makes them.

    Read it in Lithography →
    laminatelaminates, copper-clad laminate, copper-clad laminates, low-loss laminate, core laminate

    A laminate is a stiff sheet made by pressing glass cloth and resin together, usually with copper foil bonded to its faces. It is the material a circuit board or a substrate core is cut from. A low-loss laminate absorbs little of the signal passing through the wires on it.

    How much signal the laminate absorbs has become a main design limit on the boards that link GPUs.

    Read it in Substrates and PCBs →
    large power transformerlarge power transformers, transformer, transformers, switchgear, substation

    A large power transformer is a machine that changes grid electricity from one voltage to another, for example from transmission voltage down to a level a data center can use. Switchgear is the heavy switching and protection equipment around it. Together they make up the substation at the gate of the campus.

    In 2024 lead times of 36 months were commonly quoted, against under a year before the pandemic. Of the units put into US service in 2019, 82 percent were imported.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    lead timelead times, delivery time

    Lead time is the wait between placing an order and receiving it. A wafer clears a leading-edge fab in months, while in 2024 a large power transformer commonly took three years.

    Chip supply and power equipment are both constrained. Micron said in its report for the quarter to May 2026 that AI-driven memory and storage growth was outpacing industry supply. Waits for large power equipment run to years.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    leading edgeleading-edge, at the leading edge, advanced node, advanced nodes, advanced-node

    The leading edge is the newest generation of chipmaking process in volume production. In 2026 that means the 3 nm and 2 nm nodes, made only by TSMC, Samsung and Intel. A leading-edge chip is one built on it.

    Gate-all-around transistors are the design used at 2 nm, and only TSMC, Intel and Samsung make them in volume. In 2024 the United States put a worldwide license requirement on the technology for building them.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    license exceptionlicense exception

    A written carve-out in export rules that lets a shipment go without an individual license, if it meets stated conditions. The ones that matter for AI chips and chipmaking tools are NAC and ACA (15 CFR 740.8), HBM (740.25), AIA and LPP (740.27 and 740.29), IEC (740.24) and RPL (740.10). AIA and LPP let the top band of accelerators ship to allies, and elsewhere in small volumes. IEC covers countries that adopt matching controls, and RPL covers servicing and spare parts.

    Exceptions let the US government adjust its controls without rewriting them and ease the rules for allies. License Exception IEC, added in September 2024, covers exports to and by countries that have put equivalent controls in place (89 FR 72926).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    License Exception ACAACA, Advanced Computing Authorized

    An export rule that lets AI chips other than top-band data center chips ship to most of the world with no license and no advance notice. It covers the same chips as its companion exception NAC, and every destination except Macau, Country Group D:5 and firms headquartered in either. The top-band data center chips in ECCN 3A090.a are excluded. BIS split it from NAC at 15 CFR 740.8 in April 2024. The AI Diffusion rule widened it in January 2025 to the whole world outside Macau and D:5.

    It lets these chips reach most of the world with no license or advance notice. NAC keeps a notice requirement for Macau and D:5. Before April 2024 NAC did both jobs, so an older table that shows one exception describes what is now two.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    License Exception ACMACM, Advanced Compute Manufacturing

    License Exception ACM, for Advanced Compute Manufacturing, lets controlled AI chips and related items go without a license to private-sector firms that develop, make or store them. The items must be bound for customers outside Macau and Country Group D:5. It was created alongside License Exceptions AIA and LPP.

    It keeps the AI Diffusion rule's worldwide license requirement from catching chips that are only passing through factories and warehouses on their way to an eligible customer.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    License Exception AIAAIA, Artificial Intelligence Authorization

    License Exception AIA, for Artificial Intelligence Authorization, lets the top band of AI chips ship without a license to nineteen destinations. They are listed in supplement no. 5 to part 740, and the United States is among them. The AI Diffusion rule created it in January 2025 as the exception inside a worldwide license requirement.

    BIS said in May 2025 that it would not enforce the AI Diffusion rule. But the rule was never repealed, so AIA still stands in the regulations. BIS says it enforces the worldwide requirement only for Country Groups D:1, D:4 and D:5 and for firms headquartered in D:5 or Macau.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    License Exception HBM

    An export rule that lets high bandwidth memory go to a packaging site with no license, to be packaged beside a chip. It applies if the memory's bandwidth density is below 3.3 GB/s per square millimeter, measured over the area of the package or stack. The exporter must be headquartered in the United States or Country Group A:5. If the memory is bound for Macau or Country Group D:5, the chip's designer must buy it. The stacks must go straight to the packaging site. It does not cover packaging at a facility in Macau or D:5 that also makes advanced-node chips. It sits at 15 CFR 740.25.

    It lets Chinese packaging houses stay in the supply chain of American and allied chip designers. But a sale of the same stacks to a Chinese buyer still needs a license. HBM needs a license only for Macau and Country Group D:5, and the exception was written into the December 2024 rule that first controlled HBM (89 FR 96790).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    License Exception LPPLPP, Low Processing Performance

    An export rule that lets a buyer almost anywhere receive a capped amount of top-band AI chips each year without a license. The cap is 26,900,000 TPP, the export rules' measure of computing power, per ultimate consignee per calendar year. Macau, Country Group D:5 and firms headquartered in either are excluded, and it does not cover transfers within a country. The AI Diffusion rule created it in January 2025, at 15 CFR 740.29.

    It lets buyers outside the nineteen destinations in supplement no. 5 to part 740 take top AI chips in small amounts with no license application. BIS said in May 2025 that it would not enforce the AI Diffusion rule, but it withdrew none of the text. So LPP still stands in the regulations beside the rule's other exceptions, AIA and ACM, and the nineteen-destination list.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    License Exception NACNAC, Notified Advanced Computing

    An export rule that lets AI chips other than top-band data center chips ship to Macau and Country Group D:5, and to firms headquartered there, with no license. The exporter must notify BIS at least 25 calendar days ahead, and the shipment can go if BIS does not say a license is needed. The top-band data center chips in ECCN 3A090.a and the memory in 3A090.c are excluded. It sits at 15 CFR 740.8.

    It lets these chips reach the restricted destinations without a license application. Since April 2024 section 740.8 has held two exceptions, NAC for the restricted destinations and ACA for everywhere else.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    liquid coolingdirect-to-chip cooling, cold plate cooling, cold plate, cold plates, liquid-cooled, direct-to-chip liquid, direct liquid cooling

    Taking heat out of a processor by pumping liquid through a cold plate on the chip package, instead of blowing air across a finned heatsink. A building loop then carries the heat outdoors.

    Nvidia's GB300 NVL72 rack is liquid cooled, and its Rubin platform is entirely liquid cooled. Nvidia says every cloud provider and data center operator building for Rubin is moving to liquid cooling.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    lithographyphotolithography

    Printing a circuit pattern onto a wafer by shining light through a patterned plate and projecting a shrunken image of it onto a light-sensitive coating. It works like photography at the scale of nanometers, repeated once for every layer of the chip.

    Only one company, ASML, makes the machines for its finest layers, and those layers set how densely transistors and wires pack.

    Read it in Lithography →
    logic chiplogic chips, logic die, logic dies

    A logic chip is one that computes, such as a processor, a graphics processor or an AI accelerator. Memory chips, such as DRAM and NAND flash, store data instead.

    US export rules set separate lines for logic and memory. The October 2022 rule covered equipment for fabs in China making logic chips at 16/14 nm or below. It also covered fabs making DRAM at 18 nm half-pitch or below, or NAND with 128 or more layers. ASML's 2025 system sales were €16,054.1 million to logic chipmakers and €8,420.2 million to memory makers.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    lotlots, wafer lot, wafer lots, per lot

    A lot is the batch of wafers a fab moves through its machines together, usually 25 in one sealed carrier. Recipes, inspections and yield are tracked lot by lot.

    A fab decides how many wafers in each lot it can afford to inspect. That choice sets how much it spends on process control, the measuring that keeps each step on target.

    Read it in Metrology and Inspection →
    MacauMacao, China or Macau, China and Macau

    Macau is a Chinese city with its own customs territory, like Hong Kong, so goods can enter it under separate rules. US export controls name China and Macau together to close that route, and treat a firm headquartered in either the same way.

    Under the US rules on advanced AI chips, a chip that needs a license for China needs one for Macau too.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    mask blankmask blanks, EUV blank, EUV blanks, photomask blank, photomask blanks, blank plate, DUV blanks

    A mask blank is a photomask before any pattern is on it. It is a six-inch square of very flat glass carrying the film that the pattern will be cut into. For extreme ultraviolet that film sits on a mirror of about forty pairs of ultrathin layers, and a particle buried in the mirror cannot be repaired.

    The Japanese glassmaker AGC says only three firms supply EUV blanks, and AGC and Hoya, both Japanese, are two of them. AGC spent more than a decade meeting the blank's requirements before it began mass production in 2017.

    Read it in Photomasks and Pellicles →
    mask shopmask shops, mask making, mask maker, mask makers

    A mask shop is the factory that turns a finished chip design into its set of photomasks. It writes each plate with an electron beam, inspects it and repairs it.

    No chip can be printed until its masks are made. Chipmakers such as TSMC and SMIC run shops of their own, and independents such as Photronics sell to them and to others.

    Read it in Photomasks and Pellicles →
    mask writermask writers, multi-beam writer, multi-beam writers, electron-beam writer, e-beam writer, mask writing

    A mask writer is the machine that uses electrons to draw a chip's pattern into the resist on a photomask blank. A single-beam writer flashes one shape at a time, while NuFlare's multi-beam writer for the most advanced masks controls 260,000 beams at once.

    No new chip can be printed until its masks are written. In 2023 Intel said advanced EUV requires multi-beam mask writers and called Austria's IMS Nanofabrication the established leader in them. Counting all electron-beam mask writers, CSET put IMS at 46.6 percent of 2025 sales and Japan's NuFlare at 39.2 percent.

    Read it in Photomasks and Pellicles →
    mature nodemature nodes, mature-node, mature logic, older nodes, older lines, trailing edge

    A mature node is an older chipmaking process, 28 nm and above, that has run for years and competes on price. Most of the world's wafers come off these lines, making power chips, analog parts and microcontrollers.

    China held 33 percent of the world's logic capacity at 28 nm and above in 2022. In the five years before May 2024, Chinese companies invested $63 billion in 73 fabs, mostly for chips above 28 nm, SIA and BCG reported.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    memory bandwidth densitybandwidth density, bandwidth-density

    Memory bandwidth density is how much data a memory stack can move each second divided by the area of its package or stack, in gigabytes per second per square millimeter. The December 2024 rule controls any stack above 2, and BIS said every HBM stack then in production exceeded that.

    One threshold catches every HBM stack in production, including stacks made outside the United States, so the control reaches all three makers, SK hynix, Samsung and Micron. A license exception still lets stacks below 3.3 go straight to a chip designer's packaging site. HBM already packaged with a processor falls under the chip rules instead.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    memory wall

    The widening gap between how fast a processor can calculate and how fast memory can feed it numbers to work on. The cost of arithmetic has fallen faster than the cost of moving numbers.

    An AI chip reads its whole model from memory for each word it writes, so memory size and speed usually set how many people one chip can serve. Memory is also about half the cost of building an Nvidia B200, on Epoch AI's estimate.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    metal-oxide resistmetal-oxide resists, metal oxide resist, tin-oxide resist, metal-oxide EUV photoresist

    A metal-oxide resist is a photoresist built on clusters with a tin-oxide core. It absorbs more extreme ultraviolet light than a chemically amplified resist. That helps because an EUV dose arrives as relatively few photons.

    Resist makers aim it at High-NA tools and the tightest pitches. The Japanese resist maker JSR agreed in 2021 to buy Inpria, an Oregon maker of these resists. In 2024 a company owned by a Japanese state-backed fund took 84.36 percent of JSR.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    METIMinistry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

    METI is Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the ministry that writes Japan's export controls and funds its chip industry. It put advanced chipmaking equipment under export license from July 2023. It also supports the chipmaker Rapidus and new capacity for mask blanks, the glass plates that photomasks are made from.

    Japan's controls apply to every destination and name no country, and METI decides them.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    metrologyprocess control, when grouped with inspection, metrology and inspection, inspection tools

    Measuring what a factory actually built: how wide a printed line came out, how thick a film is, whether this layer sits exactly on top of the last one. Inspection is the related job of finding flaws.

    A fab that cannot buy sensitive inspection tools finds fewer of the defects that lower its yield, so its yield rises more slowly. KLA held 56.8 percent of the market for these tools in 2025, by CSET's count.

    Read it in Metrology and Inspection →
    microbumpmicrobumps, solder bump, solder bumps, bumps, bump, bump metrology

    A microbump is a dot of solder that joins a die to the interposer or substrate beneath it. In Intel's 2.5D packages microbumps sit 36 microns apart, less than half a hair's width. Each one is an electrical connection that has to survive as the package heats and cools.

    Their spacing limits how many connections fit between stacked or neighboring chips. Hybrid bonding, which joins copper straight to copper, would pack connections far closer, but it is not yet ready for HBM.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    mm2square millimeters, square millimeter, mm²

    mm2 means square millimeters, the unit chip areas are given in. A lithography scanner prints at most 858 mm2 in one shot, and each compute die in an Nvidia B200 is about 800 mm2. TSMC plans to start making CoWoS packages with interposers 14 times the size of one scanner shot in 2028.

    Yield, the share of dies that work, falls as die area grows, so the cost of each working chip rises faster than its area.

    Read it in The Economics of AI Chips →
    model weightsweights, frontier model weights, trained weights

    Model weights are the billions of numbers that make up a trained AI model. They are the file that runs on the chips, so copying the weights copies the model.

    A chip reads the model's weights from memory for each word it writes, so bigger models need more HBM. The AI Diffusion rule also made frontier model weights a controlled item, ECCN 4E091.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    MOFCOMMinistry of Commerce, China's Ministry of Commerce

    MOFCOM is China's Ministry of Commerce, the ministry that writes and administers China's own export controls. Its notices put gallium, germanium and seven rare earths under license. In December 2024 it banned exports of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the United States.

    China's retaliation targets inputs such as these minerals, and MOFCOM signs each notice.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    multipatterningdouble patterning, quadruple patterning, self-aligned double patterning, self-aligned quadruple patterning, SADP, SAQP, LELE, multiple patterning, multi-patterning, several passes, several exposures, multiply exposed, DUV multipatterning

    Building one chip layer in several patterning steps, because a single exposure cannot print lines that close together. It comes in two kinds. Litho-etch multipatterning splits the layer's pattern across two or three masks, then prints and etches each part separately. Self-aligned double or quadruple patterning prints one coarser pattern, then deposits and etches thin spacer films along its edges to halve or quarter the line spacing. Cut masks then remove the parts of lines the circuit does not need.

    SMIC makes its 7 nm-class chips without extreme ultraviolet machines by multipatterning on deep ultraviolet tools. TSMC's first 7 nm process and Intel 7 were also made without extreme ultraviolet light. Every extra mask or spacer step adds cost and machine time, and each extra litho-etch exposure adds a chance that parts of the layer misalign.

    Read it in Lithography →
    NAND3D NAND, NAND flash, flash memory, 128-layer NAND

    NAND is the memory that keeps data when the power is off. It is the storage inside a phone, a laptop drive or a data center disk. 3D NAND stacks its cells in many layers, made by etching holes far deeper than they are wide. It is slow next to DRAM and is not used inside an AI accelerator.

    Under the October 2022 US rules, items subject to US export rules bound for a fab in China that makes NAND with 128 or more layers need a license. The proposed MATCH Act would name YMTC, a Chinese NAND maker, in the law itself.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    nanometernm, nanometers, microns, micrometer, micrometers, angstrom, angstroms, picometer, picometers

    A nanometer is a billionth of a meter. A micron, or micrometer, is a thousand nanometers, an angstrom is a tenth of a nanometer, and a picometer is a thousandth. Lithography light is measured in nanometers, package bumps in microns, and mirror flatness in picometers.

    Node names such as 2 nm no longer describe any feature that size, but the physical limits of printing and stacking are still measured in these units.

    Read it in Lithography →
    neonneon gas, semiconductor-grade neon

    Neon, mixed with krypton or argon and fluorine, is the gas inside the lasers that give deep ultraviolet scanners their light. A fab uses it by the cylinder, and those scanners cannot print without it.

    Ukraine supplied about 70 percent of the world's neon before Russia invaded in 2022. Many chipmakers had added to their gas stockpiles after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and several reported adequate supplies from China.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    nitrogen trifluorideNF3

    Nitrogen trifluoride is a gas that cleans process chambers between wafers. Split apart in a plasma, it releases fluorine that scours the deposits off the inside of the chamber.

    A shortage of any one chemical can stop a fab. SK Specialty of South Korea has made nitrogen trifluoride since 2001, when it became the first company to produce the gas there.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    nm-class5 nm-class, 7 nm-class, 2 nm-class, nanometer-class, nm class

    Nm-class, as in 7 nm-class, means a process roughly as dense as the foundries' 7 nm generation. The label is used when a maker's own name for the node is different.

    China's SMIC builds its 7 nm-class processes without extreme ultraviolet machines, and its most advanced, N+3, reaches the density of TSMC's 6 nm-class process.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    nodeprocess node, technology node, for example N2 or 18A, nodes

    The name a foundry gives one generation of its manufacturing process. The number in the name no longer measures anything on the chip. SMIC's N+3, a 7 nm-class process, spaces its narrowest wires closer together than Intel's Panther Lake chips on 18A do.

    Comparing two foundries by node name says little. Each foundry also picks its own baseline for the density gains it claims.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    NVL72GB200 NVL72, GB300 NVL72, Vera Rubin NVL72

    Nvidia's rack-sized product, with 72 accelerators in 18 compute trays joined through nine switch trays so that software can treat the whole rack as one computer. The GB300 version draws up to 142 kilowatts.

    AI capacity is built and costed by the rack. In July 2026 SemiAnalysis put the cost of owning a Vera Rubin NVL72 at $3.57 per GPU-hour, against $1.84 for a GB200 and $2.36 for a GB300.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    NVLinkNVSwitch, NVLink 5, NVLink 6, NV-HBI

    Nvidia's own high-speed connection between its accelerators, which lets dozens of them act as one. NVLink 6 carries 3,600 gigabytes per second per GPU, according to Nvidia's January 2026 Rubin launch.

    Nvidia controls it, while more than 50 makers of systems and components build around its racks. Since May 2025 its NVLink Fusion program has let other firms' custom chips connect to Nvidia GPUs over NVLink, and Fujitsu and Qualcomm plan CPUs that do so. UALink is a published open rival.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    ODMoriginal design manufacturer, ODMs, contract manufacturer, contract manufacturers, contract manufacturing, EMS, server ODM

    An ODM, for original design manufacturer, is a firm such as Foxconn, Quanta or Wistron that designs and builds servers and racks to a customer's specification. The customer's name goes on the box. A contract manufacturer does the assembly only.

    More than 50 makers of systems and components were gearing up for Nvidia's Vera Rubin NVL72 rack in October 2025, Nvidia said. In its filing for the quarter to July 2026, Nvidia said the complexity of producing its data center systems had caused production delays.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    oligopolyoligopolies, duopoly, three-firm oligopoly

    An oligopoly is a market with only a few sellers, so each one's decisions move the price. A duopoly has two. DRAM, industrial gases, substrates and chip testers are all oligopolies.

    The fewer the sellers, the more one accident or one license decision moves the market. With a single seller, losing that seller stops the buyer's production line.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    operating marginoperating profit, operating loss, operating income

    Operating margin is the share of revenue left after paying both the cost of making the product and the cost of running the company, research and sales included. It is lower than gross margin, which counts only the cost of making.

    SK hynix's earnings release gives no gross margin, only an operating margin, which was 76 percent in the June 2026 quarter.

    Read it in The Economics of AI Chips →
    optical transceiveroptical module, pluggable optics, optical transceivers, transceiver, transceivers, optical modules, 800G optical transceivers

    A small device that turns electrical signals into laser light for sending down a glass fiber, and turns them back at the far end. Every network link longer than a few meters in a large AI cluster needs one at each end.

    A cluster needs several for each accelerator. One design for 100,000 H100s uses 98,304 just to link its GPUs to the first tier of switches. Chinese firms assemble the modules in volume, but the lasers inside them were scarce in 2026.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    OSAToutsourced semiconductor assembly and test, OSATs, outsourced assembly and test, assembly and test firms, assembly and test contractor, assembly and test houses

    A contract firm that takes finished wafers, cuts them into chips, seals the chips into packages and tests them. It is the back end of chipmaking, done for hire.

    Every chip passes through assembly and test. Yet in the June 2026 quarter Amkor earned a gross margin of 16.8 percent, and ASE's packaging and test segment 27.3 percent. In a TrendForce ranking cited by CSET, four of the ten largest of these firms by 2024 revenue are headquartered in China.

    Read it in Test and Assembly →
    overlayoverlay error, alignment

    How precisely one printed layer of a chip lands on top of the layer beneath it. Before each exposure the scanner finds marks printed in earlier layers and lines the new layer up on them to within a few nanometers, across a disc 300 millimeters wide.

    Misalignment can ruin whole regions of a wafer, so overlay is one of the specifications that separates an advanced printing machine from an ordinary one. Each extra pass on a layer is another chance to misalign.

    Read it in Metrology and Inspection →
    panel-level packagingpanel-level, panel level packaging, rectangular panel, rectangular panels

    Panel-level packaging builds packages on a large rectangular sheet instead of a round wafer, so far less area is wasted at the edges and many more packages fit on one carrier. It gets around the size limits of a 300 mm wafer.

    Powertech, a Taiwanese assembly and test firm, aims to run the first panel-level packaging line for AI chips in 2027.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    PCIePCI Express, PCIe 6, PCIe 7

    PCIe is the standard connector and link that joins a processor to the cards inside a computer, an accelerator included. In an AI server it carries data between the host processor and the GPUs, while faster private links join the GPUs to each other.

    The PCIe block is licensed IP that has to be proven on each new node before a chip can use it.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    PDKprocess design kit, process design kits

    A process design kit, or PDK, is the set of files a foundry gives designers to describe exactly what its factory can print on one process, or node. It gives the sizes, spacings and electrical behavior of every feature. Design software is checked against it before a chip is accepted.

    Foundries develop each kit with the design-software vendors about two years before production starts and specify which tools customers must use for tape-out.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    pelliclepellicles, EUV pellicle

    A thin transparent membrane on a frame above a photomask, the patterned plate a chip layer is printed from. Dust settles on it, far enough out of focus that it does not print, so the pattern stays clean. It works like a lens cap a photographer can shoot through.

    Pellicles already work in high-volume EUV manufacturing. But no material is completely transparent to EUV light, and the light crosses the membrane twice, so every pellicle costs some output. Carbon nanotube membranes, which passed up to 97 percent of the light in one crossing in imec's 2020 tests, are the next step.

    Read it in Photomasks and Pellicles →
    performance density

    An export control test of how densely a chip packs its computing power. It divides the chip's TPP, the export rules' measure of computing power, by its applicable die area in square millimeters. That area counts all logic dies made on a process with non-planar transistors, such as FinFETs. The test applies only to a chip that reaches 1,600 TPP. It replaced the 2022 test, which was based on interconnect bandwidth, the speed at which a chip exchanges data with its neighbors.

    It closed a gap that Nvidia's China-specific chips, such as the A800 and H800, had used. Nvidia had designed those chips to stay under the 2022 interconnect-speed threshold. The top band, ECCN 3A090.a, now starts at 4,800 TPP, or at 1,600 TPP with a performance density of 5.92 (88 FR 73458).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    photomaskmask, reticle, mask set, photomasks, masks, mask sets, mask blank set

    The master template for one layer of a chip: a quartz plate, or for the shortest wavelengths a mirror, that carries the pattern projected onto the wafer. A chip needs dozens of them, at least one per layer. In July 2022 SemiAnalysis put a full set above $1 million at 28 nm and above $10 million at 7 nm. In May 2026 it put a leading-edge set at $40 million.

    The cost of a mask set limits which chips are worth making on a leading-edge process at all. Only three firms supply the blank plates for EUV masks, and two of them are Japanese.

    Read it in Photomasks and Pellicles →
    photoresistresist, resists, EUV resist, EUV resists, resist makers

    The light-sensitive coating that records a chip's pattern during lithography. A machine spins a thin film of it across the wafer. Light shone through a stencil changes the film where it lands, and a wash removes those parts. What remains shows the next machine where to etch.

    Every printed layer of a chip uses it. Each resist is tuned to the layers it prints, and even one that passes the first time takes seven to 17 months to approve in a fab. Japanese companies held 78 percent of world sales in 2023. In 2024 an investment vehicle of a Japanese state-backed fund bought 84.36 percent of the resist maker JSR.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    pitchpitches, half-pitch, gate pitch, metal pitch, wire pitch, line pitch

    Pitch is the distance from one line on a chip to the next, center to center, so it counts the line and the gap together. Half-pitch is half that. A 16 nm pitch means lines 16 nanometers apart. The 2022 US rules set a DRAM threshold at 18 nm half-pitch.

    Unlike a node name, pitch measures something physical on the chip. But SemiAnalysis calls a single pitch an incomplete metric for comparing processes.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    plasmaplasmas, plasma etch, plasma-enhanced, plasma source

    A plasma is a gas energized until some of its atoms or molecules break into charged particles. Most etch steps and many deposition steps happen in a plasma that an electric field makes inside a vacuum chamber, though batch furnaces mostly work without one. In the chamber, neutral fragments called radicals do most of the chemistry, and charged ions give etch its direction. In an extreme ultraviolet machine, a laser vaporizes droplets of molten tin into a plasma that gives off the 13.5-nanometer light.

    Export controls describe each tool by the process it is designed to run. An extreme ultraviolet source has to make its tin plasma 50,000 times a second to give enough light for production.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    polysiliconpolycrystalline silicon, electronic-grade polysilicon, semiconductor-grade polysilicon, polysilicon feedstock

    Polysilicon is purified silicon that has not yet been grown into one crystal. It comes as gray rods made of many small crystals. It is the raw material that is melted down to pull the single crystal a wafer is cut from. The same material, at lower purity, goes into solar panels.

    China made about 93 percent of the world's polysilicon in 2023. But the German wafer maker Siltronic names five major suppliers of the electronic-grade kind for 2025, and none of them is Chinese.

    Read it in Silicon and Wafers →
    power shelfpower shelves, rack power shelf

    A power shelf is a slide-in unit in a rack that converts the incoming supply to the voltage the boards use and feeds it to the busbar. A GB300 NVL72 rack draws its 142 kilowatts through eight of them at 33 kilowatts each.

    Many firms supply the shelves and the boards behind them. The large transformers upstream commonly took three years to arrive in 2024.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    presumption of approvalapproval is presumed, presumed approval

    A presumption of approval means a license is still required but will normally be granted. It is the opposite of a presumption of denial, and one rule can contain both. HBM license applications for Macau and Country Group D:5 are presumed approved when neither the buyer nor its ultimate parent is headquartered in either place, and presumed denied otherwise (15 CFR 742.6(b)(10)(ii)).

    The split lets HBM reach plants in China owned by firms headquartered elsewhere while holding it back from Chinese-owned buyers.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    presumption of denial

    A license review policy in which the reviewing agencies start from the position that an application should be refused. An application can still be filed and will be considered, but the exporter has to overcome that starting position. It is the general policy for advanced computing chips going to China and Macau under 15 CFR 742.6(b)(10), and for most Entity List entries. Since January 2026 export applications for some less powerful chips, such as the H200, are reviewed case by case instead.

    The difference between a presumption of denial and a prohibition decides whether a company files at all. Under a presumption of denial an application can still be made, but under a prohibition it cannot.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    printed circuit boardPCB, PCBs, printed circuit boards, circuit board, circuit boards, high-multilayer PCB

    A printed circuit board is the flat green or black card that electronic parts are soldered onto, with its wiring etched from copper sheets and stacked in layers. Boards for AI servers can run past 30 layers.

    It carries the power and the links between GPUs. How much signal its laminate absorbs is now a main design limit.

    Read it in Substrates and PCBs →
    probe cardprobe cards

    A circuit board carrying thousands of fine needles that press onto the contact pads of a chip while it is still part of the wafer. A tester drives signals into the chip through the needles. Every card is custom-built for one chip design.

    Because each card is custom-built and slow to qualify, probe card supply and lead time can limit how fast a new accelerator or memory stack reaches full production.

    Read it in Test and Assembly →
    PVDphysical vapor deposition, sputtering, sputtering target, sputtering targets, sputter

    Physical vapor deposition, or PVD, coats a wafer with metal in a vacuum. It knocks atoms off a solid slab of metal, the sputtering target, and they fly across and land on the wafer as a thin film. It lays down the metal barriers and seed layers under a chip's copper wiring.

    Every copper wire needs that barrier, because copper seeps into the insulator around it. JX Advanced Metals puts its own share of the world market for semiconductor sputtering targets at about 65 percent as of fiscal 2026.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    qualificationqualify, qualifies, qualified, qualifying, requalify, requalification, qualification tests, qualification lock-in

    Qualification is the testing a fab or a customer runs before it will accept a new material, tool or supplier. A resist, a slurry, a wafer source or a memory stack is approved for a set use, such as one layer in one fab's process, and switching means running the tests again.

    Even a resist that passes the first time takes seven to 17 months to approve, the Semiconductor Industry Association wrote in 2023, so a second source is slow to add.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    rackcabinet, racks, cabinets, rack-scale

    The standard steel frame that computing equipment is bolted into in a data center, roughly the size of a wardrobe. For AI, a whole rack is wired and sold as one machine, so the rack itself is the product.

    A GB300 NVL72 rack draws up to 142 kilowatts. Nvidia's 800-volt power design is intended for racks of more than a megawatt from 2027. A megawatt rack needs a different busbar, the metal bar that carries power to its equipment. It also changes the weight the floor must bear, the coolant flow and the energy stored in the rack to keep its power draw steady.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    rampramps, ramp-up, ramping, yield at ramp

    A ramp is the months in which a new process or product climbs from a few wafers a week to full output while the share of working chips rises. Yield is lowest at the start of the ramp and improves as engineers find which steps lose dies.

    Whether a new process makes a profit or needs a subsidy depends on its yield in the first year.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    rare earthsrare earth, rare-earth, rare earth elements, medium and heavy rare earths

    The rare earths are a group of metals, including samarium and yttrium, that go into the strong magnets in motors, disk drives and wind turbines, and into some lasers and glass.

    Beijing put seven of them under export license in April 2025. In October 2025 it claimed jurisdiction over foreign goods containing Chinese rare earths worth 0.1 percent or more of their value. That rule is suspended until 10 November 2026.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    redistribution layerRDL, redistribution wiring, redistribution layers

    A redistribution layer is a thin sheet of fine copper wiring, laid down in resin, that spreads a die's tightly spaced connections out to a wider pattern the package can handle. CoWoS-R and CoWoS-L use it in place of a full silicon interposer.

    TSMC pushed packages past 3.3 times the reticle size by swapping silicon for redistribution wiring.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    reexport

    Shipping an item that falls under US export rules, the EAR, from one foreign country to another. The term is defined at 15 CFR 734.14. A memory stack subject to the EAR moving from Korea to China is a reexport, and it needs the same US license a shipment from Texas would.

    The reexport rule lets US controls follow an item after it leaves the United States, so they reach trade between two foreign countries.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    reticlephotomask

    The patterned plate whose image a lithography machine projects onto the wafer, one chip layer at a time. In practice it means the same as photomask, but the word reticle stresses that the machine steps the same image again and again across the wafer.

    One exposure from a reticle prints at most 26 by 33 millimeters of the wafer, and every large AI chip has to be designed around that limit.

    Read it in Photomasks and Pellicles →
    reticle limitreticle size limit, reticle field, field size, reticle-limited, reticle size, reticles, times reticle

    The largest chip a lithography machine can print in a single exposure, about 858 square millimeters, or 26 by 33 millimeters. It is set by the machine's optics and is the same for every design. The newer High-NA EUV machines print half that area.

    Many leading AI accelerators, Nvidia's Blackwell among them, need more circuitry than this, so they are split into several dies, separate pieces of silicon, and joined back together inside a package.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    RISC-VRISC-V cores, RISC-V processor

    RISC-V is an open instruction set, the list of basic commands a processor understands, that anyone may use without a license. Companies build their own processor cores on it, and Nvidia now uses such cores for small control tasks inside every GPU.

    It is the license-free alternative to Arm's processor designs.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    RTLregister-transfer level, register-transfer-level, register transfer level, RTL description, RTL code

    RTL, for register-transfer level, is the code in which a chip is first written. It is text, in a language such as SystemVerilog, that describes what every storage element holds on every tick of the clock. Software later turns it into transistors and wires.

    It defines what the chip does. A large team checks it in simulation and emulation before tape-out, because a mistake found later needs new masks.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    scale-out networkback-end network, cluster fabric, scale-out, scale out

    The network that joins thousands of accelerator groups into one cluster, running at hundreds of gigabits per second over Ethernet or InfiniBand. Its Ethernet versions use the same standard as ordinary data center networks.

    It lets thousands of accelerators train one model together. InfiniBand was the main scale-out network when AI clusters were small. But Ethernet capacity has since grown quickly, as Broadcom doubled the bandwidth of its switch chips every generation.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    scale-up networkscale-up fabric, coherent domain, scale-up, scale up, scale-up domain, scale-up switch

    The network that joins a group of accelerators, from a few dozen in one rack to thousands, so a model too large for a single chip can be spread across them. It runs at terabytes per second. In Nvidia's GB300 NVL72 each GPU has nine times as much bandwidth on it as on the scale-out network.

    The bandwidth of this network limits how efficiently a large model trains. Nvidia sells its own NVLink for it, and UALink is a published open standard that competes with NVLink.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    scannerscanners, stepper, steppers, lithography scanner, lithography scanners, lithography machine, lithography system, lithography systems

    A scanner is the lithography machine itself. It holds the photomask up to a light source and projects a shrunken image of one layer onto the wafer. Mask and wafer sweep past each other in a narrow slit of light. An older stepper exposes the whole mask image at once instead of scanning. A standard EUV scanner sells for around $200 million.

    ASML makes every EUV scanner in the world, so a rule aimed at its scanners reaches all advanced chipmaking.

    Read it in Lithography →
    second sourcesecond sources, second-source, multi-sourcing, dual source, single source, sole source, single-source

    A second source is a second supplier qualified for the same part or material, so that a fab can keep running if the first one stops shipping. A single-source part has none, and adding one means joint development and a fresh qualification.

    When Japan put three chemicals under export licenses for South Korea in 2019, South Korea bought more from other countries. Output of all three chemicals rose at South Korean firms and at Japanese companies' affiliates in South Korea.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    SerDesserializer-deserializer, high-speed serial links, serial links, serial link

    A SerDes, for serializer-deserializer, is the circuit at the edge of a chip that turns many slow parallel signals into one very fast stream over a single pair of wires. A SerDes at the other end turns the stream back into parallel signals. Every link out of an accelerator, to another chip, a switch or an optical module, runs through one.

    SerDes speed sets how much data a chip can move. Many chip designers license the blocks as IP, and each design has to be proven in silicon on every new process.

    Read it in Systems and Networking →
    signoffsign-off, static timing analysis, timing signoff, timing sign-off, physical verification, signed off

    Signoff is the final set of automated checks a chip design must pass before tape-out. Static timing analysis checks that every signal arrives in time at the clock speed promised. Physical verification checks that every shape in the layout can be printed.

    A foundry accepts only layouts that pass physical verification against its rules. At advanced nodes, Synopsys holds more than 90 percent of timing signoff, and Siemens more than 85 percent of physical verification.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    silicon bridgesilicon bridges, EMIB, silicon-bridge, local silicon bridges, embedded bridge

    A silicon bridge is a small sliver of silicon carrying dense wiring. It is set into the package only where two dies need thousands of connections between them, so the rest of the package can use cheaper wiring. Intel calls its version EMIB, and TSMC's CoWoS-L uses the same idea.

    Bridges let a package grow past a single interposer's size limit, and CoWoS-L uses them to package Nvidia's Blackwell and Rubin chips. The bridges in Blackwell needed very high placement accuracy, and packaging issues limited its supply.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    silicon shield

    The argument that Taiwan's lead in advanced chipmaking deters an attack on the island, because so many countries rely on its chips.

    The idea is central to debate about Taiwan's security, and it is contested. It holds only while Taiwan's chipmaking is hard to replace, so Taiwan keeps its newest chip processes at home first while the United States pushes for more chipmaking on its own soil.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    small yard, high fencesmall yard with a high fence, small yard

    The stated design of US technology controls: tightly restrict a narrow set of items that genuinely matter to national security, and leave the rest of trade alone.

    It gives critics and defenders a test for whether export controls remain targeted security policy or have become general industrial policy.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    SoCsystem on a chip, system-on-chip, system-on-a-chip, SoCs

    A system on a chip, or SoC, is a single chip that combines processor cores, a graphics processor and other circuit blocks that a device needs. The main processor in a smartphone is one.

    Makers of chip testers split their market in two. SoC testers check processors and other non-memory chips, and memory testers check memory. Advantest put SoC testers at about $6.9 billion of a $9.0 billion tester market in 2025.

    Read it in Test and Assembly →
    specialty gasesspecialty gas, electronic specialty gases, bulk gases, bulk gas, electronic gases, process gas, process gases

    Specialty gases are the gases a fab uses in small amounts, each for one job. Silane, for example, carries silicon into the chamber to build a film, and nitrogen trifluoride cleans the chamber. They arrive in cylinders. Bulk gases, such as nitrogen and oxygen, come by pipeline or from plants built at the fab.

    Specialty gases are shipped to the fab in cylinders, so a government or a war can cut them off. Ukraine supplied about 70 percent of the world's neon before Russia invaded in 2022.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    SRAMstatic random-access memory, cache, on-chip memory, on-die SRAM, on-die memory, L2 cache

    SRAM is the fast memory built from transistors on the logic chip itself, used as a cache that holds the numbers a processor is about to need. It is far faster than the memory stacks beside the chip and holds far less.

    The cell that holds one bit has barely shrunk since the 5 nm node, which limits how much cache a designer can afford to put on an accelerator.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    subject to the EAR

    The test for whether an item falls under US export rules at all. Under 15 CFR 734.3 it covers anything in the United States and anything of US origin wherever it is. It also covers foreign-made goods that contain more than a permitted share of controlled US content, and foreign-made goods caught by a foreign direct product rule. The test applies to the item, whatever the seller's nationality.

    The rules follow the item, so a Dutch or Korean firm shipping between two foreign countries can still need a US license.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    Substitutabilitysubstitutability rating

    A four-band rating of how hard it would be for a well-funded state or firm, starting today, to build an alternative to the leading suppliers at one stage of the supply chain. It is judged against four written tests. Easy: a second supplier is qualified, meaning approved by customers, and shipping today at the leading node, the most advanced process. Moderate: a second supplier exists but is not yet qualified at the leading node, and closing the gap takes about two to five years. Hard: no second supplier exists at the leading node, the path to one is known, and closing the gap takes five to ten years. Very hard: no second supplier exists, and the path depends on physics, decades of unwritten know-how or protected intellectual property. No one has yet repeated what the leaders did, and closing the gap takes ten years or more. The years are always counted for that same well-funded state or firm, and the count stops at qualification, which comes well after a prototype.

    It says how long a rival or a government would need to replace a stage. The debate over export controls turns on that question.

    substratepackage substrate, IC substrate, substrates, build-up substrate, build-up substrates, package substrates, IC substrates, resin substrate

    The small, dense circuit board at the base of a chip package. The chips sit on it, and it spreads their microscopic connections out to the millimeter-scale solder balls a motherboard can accept. It is built up layer by layer from epoxy film, laser-drilled holes and plated copper.

    A handful of firms, most of them in Asia, build these substrates for others. As packages grow, a substrate warps more and needs more layers, so fewer come out working.

    Read it in Substrates and PCBs →
    tape-outtape out, taped out, tapes out, tape-outs, tapeout

    The moment a chip design is declared finished and the pattern files are sent to the factory to be written into masks. The name survives from when the data physically left on a reel of magnetic tape.

    Each revision after tape-out, called a respin, needs at least some new masks. In May 2026 SemiAnalysis put a single respin at leading-edge nodes at $50 million to $100 million, so designers check everything they can before tape-out.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    TC-NCFMR-MUF, Advanced MR-MUF, TC-NCF bonding

    TC-NCF and MR-MUF are two ways of joining the thinned memory chips in an HBM stack. In TC-NCF, thermocompression with non-conductive film, each chip is pressed onto the one below under heat, with a thin insulating film between them. Samsung uses it for its twelve-high HBM3E. In MR-MUF, used by SK hynix, the chips are stacked first, and a liquid protective material is injected between them and hardened.

    Thinner chips and taller stacks warp more easily, and both methods aim to control that. SK hynix says its Advanced MR-MUF also dissipates heat well.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    thermocompression bondingthermocompression, thermo-compression bonding, thermocompression bonder, thermocompression bonders, TCB, die bonder, die bonders, bonder, bonders

    Thermocompression bonding presses one die onto another, or onto a substrate, under heat and force until the tiny solder bumps between them melt and join. It is how memory dies are stacked to make high bandwidth memory (HBM) and a growing way to place chiplets on a package.

    ASMPT says it remained the leader in these bonders in 2025, when its revenue from them rose about 146 percent. It aims for 35 to 40 percent of a market it puts at $1.6 billion in 2028.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    throughputwafers an hour, wafers per hour, wafers-per-hour

    Throughput is how many wafers a machine can process in an hour. ASML's NXE:3800E EUV scanner reaches 220.

    Throughput sets the cost of each layer and how many lots, or batches of wafers, a fab can afford to inspect. Brighter EUV light sources and multi-beam inspection tools both aim to raise it.

    Read it in Lithography →
    TPPtotal processing performance

    Total processing performance, the measure US export rules use for a chip's computing power. It starts from the number of multiply-accumulate operations, a multiply followed by an add, that the chip does each second. That number is doubled, multiplied by the number of bits in each operation, and added up across every processing unit on the chip. The definition is in ECCN 3A090, in supplement no. 1 to 15 CFR part 774.

    The export rules for chip sales to China draw their lines in TPP. The top band, 3A090.a, starts at 4,800 TPP, or at 1,600 TPP with a performance density of 5.92. Since 15 January 2026, export applications for chips below 21,000 TPP and 6,500 GB/s of total DRAM bandwidth, such as the H200, are reviewed case by case for end users in China and Macau (91 FR 1684).

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    TPUTensor Processing Unit, TPUs

    Google's own AI chip, designed in-house for its data centers and cloud service. Its eighth generation, announced in April 2026, is split into two chips, the TPU 8t for training and the TPU 8i for inference.

    It shows that a large buyer can design its own alternative to chips sold on the open market. Ironwood, the seventh generation, carries 192 GB of memory per chip, six times its predecessor's. Google says the TPU 8t and TPU 8i deliver up to twice Ironwood's performance per watt.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    transistortransistors

    The switch every chip is built from. Current runs through a channel between two terminals. A voltage on a third terminal, the gate, opens or closes that path, much as a tap opens or closes a pipe. One Nvidia Blackwell part contains 208 billion of them.

    The whole chip supply chain exists to make transistors smaller, faster and less leaky. Only three companies, TSMC, Intel and Samsung, make the newest kind in volume.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    transistor densitylogic density, chip density, transistors per square millimeter, density gain

    Transistor density is how many transistors fit in a square millimeter of chip. SemiAnalysis measured SMIC's N+3 at 113.4 million, against 107.7 million for TSMC's N6. TSMC says N2P gives 1.2 times the logic density and 1.15 times the chip density of N3E. A16, which adds backside power, gives up to 1.10 times the chip density of N2P. TSMC says A14, planned for 2028, will give more than 20 percent more logic density than N2.

    Density sets how much logic fits on a die of a given size. No foundry publishes wafer prices, so cost per transistor cannot be worked out from public figures.

    Read it in Transistors and the Front End →
    TSVthrough-silicon via, TSVs, through-silicon vias, through silicon via, through silicon vias

    A copper column that runs all the way through a chip so that power and signals can pass from its top face to its bottom face. It makes stacking chips vertically possible, in the way an elevator shaft makes a tall building usable.

    High bandwidth memory depends on these columns. US rules control the tools that cut the holes for them, and define those tools by hole shape and etching speed.

    Read it in Memory and HBM →
    TWhterawatt-hour, terawatt-hours, terawatt hours

    A terawatt-hour is a billion kilowatt-hours, the unit national electricity use is counted in. US data centers used 192 TWh in 2024, 4.7 percent of the country's electricity.

    Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory's reference case projects 649 TWh in 2030, 11.8 percent of forecast US electricity use, within a range of 521 to 843 TWh.

    Read it in Data Centers and Power →
    UCIeUniversal Chiplet Interconnect Express, UCIe 3.0

    UCIe is an open standard for the short, very fast link between two chiplets sitting side by side in one package. It lets chiplets from different vendors be wired together, the way PCIe lets cards from different vendors share a computer.

    Accelerators too large to print as one chip are built from chiplets, and a shared standard lets more firms supply the pieces.

    Read it in Chip Design, EDA and IP →
    US personUS persons, U.S. person, U.S. persons

    In export law a US person is any American citizen, permanent resident or company, wherever in the world they are, and anyone in the United States. Since October 2022 a US person may not service or support an advanced chip fab in China without a license.

    The rule reaches people as well as goods, so American citizens, residents and companies need a license to support advanced chipmaking in China.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    utilizationutilization rate, fab utilization

    Utilization is how full a fab's lines are running, as a share of what they could run. Most of a fab's costs, such as paying off its tools, stay the same whether it runs full or half empty, so utilization largely decides whether it makes money.

    SMIC ran its lines 93.5 percent full in 2025, and its gross margin that year was 21 percent.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    VEUValidated End-User, Validated End User, Validated End-User status, VEU status, VEU cover, validated end users

    An authorization that BIS, the US Commerce Department office that licenses exports, grants to a named foreign facility, so approved items can ship to it without an individual license each time. The approved facilities are listed in supplement no. 7 to 15 CFR part 748, and the procedure is set out in 15 CFR 748.15.

    It let the China subsidiaries of Samsung and SK hynix, and the Dalian NAND flash memory fab that SK hynix bought from Intel, receive US equipment without individual licenses. BIS revoked that status effective 31 December 2025 (90 FR 42321). It said it would license those fabs to keep running, but not to expand capacity or upgrade technology (90 FR 42321). In December 2025 BIS granted SK hynix an annual license to ship approved US equipment to its China fabs during 2026.

    Read it in Who Controls the Chain →
    viascopper vias, vertical vias, vertical copper vias

    Vias are the small vertical holes, filled with metal, that connect one layer of wiring to the layer above or below it. A chip's wiring is full of them. An interposer has them through its whole thickness, and a package substrate has them drilled by laser through each sheet of film.

    Every added layer brings another set of vias that can fail, so yield falls as packages and substrates grow.

    Read it in Advanced Packaging →
    wafersilicon wafer, 300 mm wafer, wafers, silicon wafers, 300 mm wafers

    The polished disc of ultrapure silicon that chips are built on, 300 millimeters across for advanced chips. Hundreds of chips are printed on one wafer and cut apart at the end.

    A flaw wastes more silicon on a large AI chip than on a small one, so AI chips need wafers that are nearly flawless and flat to the edge. The top five wafer makers hold around 75 percent of a market worth $11.4 billion in 2025.

    Read it in Silicon and Wafers →
    wafer fab equipmentWFE, front-end equipment, equipment billings, wafer processing equipment, semiconductor equipment, chipmaking tools, chipmaking equipment

    The collective name for the machines that process wafers inside a fab: printing systems, deposition and etch chambers, cleaning tools and measurement systems. It excludes the packaging and test machines used afterward.

    Spending on it shows how much new chipmaking capacity is being built. World sales of all chipmaking equipment reached $135.1 billion in 2025, and sales of wafer processing tools rose 12 percent.

    Read it in Deposition and Etch →
    wafer sortwafer test, probe test, wafer probe

    Wafer sort is the first test a chip gets, while it is still on the wafer. Thousands of needles on a probe card press onto the pads of one die, or of several dies at once, and a tester drives signals in and reads the answers. Any die that answers wrong is marked and never packaged.

    Proving a die good before it is packaged keeps one bad die from scrapping the memory stacks and substrate it would be joined to.

    Read it in Test and Assembly →
    wafers per monthwafers a month, wafer starts, wafer starts per month, WSPM, wafer starts a month, million wafers per month

    Wafers per month is how fab capacity is counted: the number of wafers a plant can start through its line each month. A TSMC gigafab runs more than 100,000. In September 2025 SemiAnalysis conservatively put SMIC's capacity at 7 nm and below at 45,000 a month by the end of 2025. Figures are often converted to 8-inch or 12-inch equivalents so plants with different wafer sizes can be compared.

    In June 2024 the industry association SEMI forecast China at 10.1 million wafers a month in 2025, the most of any region. In 2026 it projected China would stay largest through 2027, but little of that capacity is advanced.

    Read it in Foundries and Fabs →
    wet chemicalswet chemical, wet processing, wet clean, cleaning chemicals, process chemicals

    Wet chemicals are the liquids a wafer is dipped in or sprayed with between steps: acids that strip a layer, solvents that remove resist, and ultrapure water rinses. Wet processing is any step done in liquid.

    CSET's January 2021 brief, drawing on 2019 market reports, put five firms at more than 60 percent of the wet chemicals market. BIS controls wet processing tools by how selectively they etch one material over another.

    Read it in Chemicals, Gases and Photoresist →
    yielddie yield, yields, packaging yield, package yield, stack yield

    The percentage of chips on a wafer that work. Flaws land at random, so the larger the chip the more likely it is to catch one, and yield falls steeply as chips get bigger.

    Yield sets the cost of a working AI chip. Epoch AI models the Blackwell compute die at 40 to 70 percent good, with 60 percent as its central estimate. In the same model, the cost of packages that fail testing, spread across the ones that pass, adds about $1,000 to each B200.

    Read it in The Economics of AI Chips →